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The thesis is first and foremost the examination of the notion and consequences of 
‘state failure’ in international law.  The disputes surrounding criteria for creation 
and recognition of states pertain to efforts to analyse legal and factual issues 
unravelling throughout the continuing existence of states, as best evidenced by the 
‘state failure’ phenomenon. It is argued that although the ‘statehood’ of failed 
states remains uncontested, their sovereignty is increasingly considered to be 
dependent on the existence of effective governments.  
The second part of this thesis focuses on the examinations of the legal 
consequences of the continuing existence of failed states in the context of jus ad 
bellum. Since the creation of the United Nations the ability of states to resort to 
armed force without violating what might be considered as the single most 
important norm of international law, has been considerably limited. State failure 
and increasing importance of non-state actors has become a greatly topical issue 
within recent years in both scholarship and the popular imagination. There have 
been important legal developments within international law, which have provoked 
much academic, and in particular, legal commentary. On one level, the thesis 
contributes to this commentary.  
Despite the fact that the international community continues to perpetuate a notion 
of ‘statehood’ which allows the state-centric system of international law to exist, 
when dealing with practical and political realities of state failure, international law 
may no longer consider external sovereignty of states as an undeniable entitlement 
to statehood. Accordingly, the main research question of this thesis is whether the 
implicit and explicit invocation of the state failure provides sufficient legal basis for 
the intervention in self-defence against non-state actors in located in failed states. 
It has been argued that state failure has a profound impact, the extent of which is 
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1.1. Scope and context of the thesis 
This thesis addresses two increasingly important areas of international legal 
concern – state failure and the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors 
located on the territory of so-called ‘failed states’. Since the creation of the United 
Nations in 1945, the ability of states to resort to armed force without violating what 
might be considered as the single most important norm of international law, has 
been considerably limited. Unless the use of force comes within the ambit of the 
two exceptions contained in the UN Charter, namely the inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defence, as prescribed by Article 51, or force which has been 
authorised by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter renders it unlawful. The system established 
at the San Francisco Conference aimed at preventing inter-states conflicts and, 
consequently favoured rigorous principles of non-intervention, as well as equality 
and sovereignty of states. The sine qua non condition for the functioning of that 
arrangement was the existence of empirically viable political communities capable 
of discharging obligations under the Charter including those owed to other states. 
The international community which embarked upon the creation of the United 
Nations, right after the end of the Second World War, has undergone a 
considerable transformation throughout the years. The international power 
structure became increasingly complex and accordingly, security threats changed 
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noticeably. What seems to remain constant is that since the creation of 
international law states have always been its central element. Through their 
governmental structures, states play a primary role in the creation as well as 
implementation of international law both within their internal jurisdiction and 
external arenas.1       
In the latter part of the twentieth century, however, the international legal system 
began to confront a phenomenon of failing and collapsed states – territorial units 
formally not deprived of statehood but empirically incapable of providing basic 
political goods to their populations and fulfilling their obligations to other states.2 
Overwhelmed by mass violence steaming from internal conflicts as well as by the 
humanitarian emergencies which followed, such states as Somalia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Yemen, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire and in fact many other 
countries, were pushed towards the brink of failure. These circumstances had and 
in many cases continue to have serious repercussions not only for the state in 
question and its people, but also for its neighbours and the international 
community of states.3 Internal difficulties, however, were not the only challenges to 
                                                          
1
 It has been, however, recognised that various non-state entities, such as non-governmental 
organisations, transnational corporations, organised armed opposition groups, rebel groups, 
insurgents and belligerent groups, indigenous peoples and others, play an increasingly important 
role in the processes of international law-making as well as monitoring compliance with 
international law. See: A Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007) and International Law Association, The Hague Conference (2010) Non-State 
Actors, available at: http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1023     
2
 See: G Helman and S Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States’, 89 Foreign Policy,(1992-93) pp 3-20. 
3
 For one of the first thorough research projects on state failure see early reports of Political 
Instability Task Force (formerly known as State Failure Task Force) The research conducted by both 
State Failure Task Force and subsequently by Political Instability Task Force was funded by the 
United States Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence through a contract with 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The initial task of this group of researchers 
from various American institutions was to assess and explain the vulnerability of states all over the 
world to political instability and state failure. During the course of the research, the researchers 
focused not only on the extreme cases of state failure but also shifted their attention towards more 
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be tackled. Throughout the decades, following creation of the UN, states became 
increasingly inter-dependent and presently have multitude of obligations towards 
each other as well as international community as a whole. Highly globalised 
economy, information systems and interlaced security all confront fragile states 
with demands they are practically incapable to cope with. Additionally, states have 
been confronted with the emergence of new standards of governance and the high 
levels of expectations regarding their fulfilment.4 Failed states are incapable of 
operating within this new globalised system of extended responsibilities and 
consequently become ineffective actors in the international stage. 
Dealing with the, now widely acknowledged, problem of state failure has proven to 
be difficult both at the theoretical level and in practice. States which are incapable 
of operating in an increasingly interdependent international community in fact 
weaken the whole system. Nevertheless, autonomy and the principle of equal 
sovereignty are still highly prized by all states. Accordingly, although fragile, failing 
and failed states do not fulfil their internal and external obligations, the major 
institutions of international law are very cautious to authorise intervention in the 
internal affairs of these states as it is feared that such action would lead to abuses.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
general political instability caused by outbreaks of revolutionary or ethnic war, adverse regime 
changes and genocide. After the September 11, 2001, PITS initiated a programme focusing on the 
relationship between states and international terrorist groups. Nevertheless, the main objective for 
the group remained the same and that is the development of a statistical model that would be 
capable of accurately assessing the countries’ prospects for major political change and identifying 
key risk factors of interest to US policymakers. Further details regarding Political Instability Task 
Force can be found on Centre for Global Policy website:  http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-
instability-task-force-home/    
4
 See, e.g., T M Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86(1) American Journal of 
International Law, 46 (1992): “Both textually and in practice, the international system is moving 
toward a clearly designated democratic entitlement, with national governance validated by 
international standards and systematic monitoring of compliance”.   
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State failure undeniably causes great human suffering and consequently the state 
itself becomes questionable in the hearts and minds of its inhabitants.5  It is not 
unprecedented that the void caused by the state collapse is being filled by 
powerful, armed, non-state actors.6 These groups may not necessarily aim at 
replacing a legitimate government and they often vary considerably in terms of the 
degree and the level of their organization as well as the political, religious and 
military objectives they pursue. As explained in more detail below, recent times 
provided numerous cases of such situations.  
The proliferation of non-state actors in the international political and legal arenas 
has been noted and widely discussed in international legal scholarship.7 There are 
various types of actors described as non-state actors, including, non-governmental 
organizations, transnational corporations, so called sui generis entities, such as, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the Holy See, The Sovereign Military 
Order of Malta, and finally organized indigenous peoples’ groups in themselves. The 
                                                          
5
 According to Rotberg: ‘A nation-state fails when it loses legitimacy –when it forfeits the ‘mandate 
of heaven’. Its nominal borders become irrelevant…The state increasingly comes to be perceived as 
being owned by an exclusive class or group, with all others pushed aside. The social contract that 
binds inhabitants to an overreaching polity becomes breached’. R I Rotber ed., When States Fail. 
Causes and Consequences, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 9.         
6
 ‘Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions. In 
most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, 
the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, 
different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and the 
groups within the state’. R I Rotberg, ed. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 
(Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 5.      
7
 Supra note 1. See also e.g. W C Jenks , ‘Multinational Entities in the Law of Nations,’ in W 
Friedmann, L Henkin & O J Lissitzyn, (eds), Transnational Law in a Changing Society. Essays in Honor 
of Philip C. Jessup (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972); R Hoffmann and N Geissler (eds.), 
Non-State Actors as New Subjects of International Law: International Law – from the Traditional 
State Order Towards the Law of the Global Community (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1999); P Alston, 
ed. Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005); J Alvarez, 
International Organizations as Lawmakers (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005); A Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006); M 
Noortmann and C Ryngaert eds. Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to 
Law-Makers (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2010). 
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legal status of non-state actors can be developed based upon their activities and 
functions within various international institutional arrangements and substantive 
areas of international law. The status of armed non-state actors, including 
organized armed opposition groups, rebel groups, insurgents and belligerent groups 
has been assessed in some areas of international law such as, for example, 
international humanitarian law and human rights law.8 The same cannot be said 
regarding the examination of their influence on and status under the ius ad bellum. 
More specifically, the matter of self-defence against such groups located within a 
failed state setting increasingly requires attention. Array of irregular, non-state 
armed forces, often transcends beyond the borders of territorial units which failed 
in many respects both internally and on the international plane. By conducting 
armed activities on the territory of neighbouring states, armed non-state actors 
pose a serious challenge for the international regime regarding use of force in 
international relations.  
The primary area of international law on which this thesis will focus is the UN 
Charter and framework of international law regulating the resort to force in the 
territory of other states in self-defence. Ius ad bellum regulates the exercise of 
powers which are commonly regarded as falling within the monopoly of the state. 
Accordingly, the UN Charter regime regarding use of force in states’ relations refers 
to inter-state conflict. Much of the applicable body of law is subject to widespread 
agreement. Some issues nevertheless, such as use of force in anticipatory self-
                                                          
8
 See, e.g., Alston, supra note 7; Clapham, supra note 7; L Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed 
Opposition groups in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002); International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts, M Mack, Geneva, February 2008; available at  
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0923.pdf   
13 
 
defence or the definition of ‘armed attack’, remain contentious. Recent 
developments, including state failure and rise of powerful, armed non-state actors, 
have challenged the traditional rules restricting resort to armed force even further. 
Most importantly for the subject matter of this thesis, one cannot fail to notice the 
increasing importance of armed non-state actors and their corresponding capacity 
to carry out military operations which may amount to an armed attack against 
other states. Accordingly, although subject to, at times widespread, contestation, 
states invoked the right to exercise self-defence against attacks by armed non-state 
actors, even in cases where the state on whose territory force is used cannot be  
held responsible for the attack. For instance, in July 2006, Israel invaded parts of 
Lebanon in order to put an end to the firing of rockets by Hezbollah; in December 
2006, Ethiopia sent a considerable number of troops into Somalia pursuing what 
has been portrayed as self-defence against the threat posed by the Union of Islamic 
Courts; similarly, Russia repeatedly claimed broad right of self-defence against non-
state actors emanating from Georgia; in February 2008, Turkey started a major 
operation into Iraq to put an end to attacks carried out by Kurdistan Worker’s Party; 
and finally, from December 2008 until January 2009, Israeli army entered territory 
of Gaza with an objective to destroy the Palestinians’ capacity to fire missiles into 
southern Israeli territory. The recent developments in Iraq and Syria in a fight 
against so-called Islamic State provide yet another example.9   
One of the recent illustrative representations of a conflict with substantial 
involvement of powerful non-state actors operating within a setting of a state 
                                                          
9
 See Chapter 5 for further examination of the above cited cases of state practice in relation to the 
use of force in self-defence against non-state actors located on the territory of failed states.  
14 
 
which in many respects fulfils the criteria of a failed one, is certainly the Great Lakes 
dispute between the Democratic Republic of Congo and its neighbours – Uganda 
and Rwanda amongst others. A vast array of actors participated in a conflict which 
had aspects of non-international armed conflict, internal disturbances and 
interstate conflict, all at the same time. The cross border implications of this conflict 
had been the subject of the Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Uganda) decision of the International Court of Justice issued 
on December 19, 2005.10 The conflict in question had been factually unusually 
complex and involved both state and non-state actors. Additionally, the rebel 
groups implicated were varying when it comes to the degree and level of their 
organization, as well as the character of their association with the state actors – 
some of them acted independently, whereas the others in fact as a surrogates of 
the participating states.11 The latest chapter in the history of this deeply conflicted 
region is the rise of yet another powerful, rebel military group, the March 23 
Movement.12 The group operates in the Eastern regions of the DRC, mainly North 
Kivu province, and accuses the government of President Kabila of not respecting a 
peace deal signed on 2009 with the rebel group National Congress for the Defence 
of the People (CNDP), as well as cheating in the November 2011 elections.13 It 
appears that there is every possibility that the history may repeat itself, as the First 
                                                          
10
 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v Uganda), Judgement of 19
th
 December 2005( Merits) http://www.icj-cij.org    
11
 For a comprehensive list of the armed groups operating in the DRC, see: Letter of 1st April 2002 
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, ‘First Assessment of 
the armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, S/2002/341; as well as ‘Third 
Special Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’, S/2004/650.      
12
 See: The Guardian, 20 November 2012, ‘M23 may be DRC’s new militia, but it offers same old 
horrors’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/20/m23-drc-militia-horrors 
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Congo War started with the fighting in the very same region.14 Undisputedly, legal 
ramifications of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region will be of concern for some 
time to come.15 One of the reasons why this is the case, is due to the fact that the 
conflict emphasises a very significant challenge to the contemporary international 
law regime regarding the use of force – the failure of the state to effectively govern 
its territory and control armed non-state actors. 
The country which has become known as an epitome of a ‘failed state’ is certainly 
Somalia.16 The state of Somalia had been without effectively functioning 
government for over two decades since president Siad Barre was overthrown in 
1991.17 Years of fighting between the rival warlords left the country ridden by 
famine and disease. It is estimated that up to one million people lost their lives.18 
The vacuum of central authority led to the division of the country between clans 
and group leaders who eventually became warlords. Several attempts to unite 
Somalia proved futile. In 2006 Islamist insurgency, including the Al-Shabaab group, 
gained control of much of the south of the country. Al-Shabaab is a radical youth 
                                                          
14
 The New York Times, 20 November 2012, ‘Congo Rebels Seize Provincial Capital’ 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/world/africa/congolese-rebels-reach-goma-reports-say.html 
15
 Most recently, the M23 rebels proclaimed that they will fight against that newly created first 
United Nations offensive force – 3,000 strong Intervention Brigade. See: The Guardian, 5 May 2013, 
‘M23 rebels in DRC prepare for battle with new UN force’ 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/05/m23-rebels-drc-un-force).  
16





 Following the interim mandate of the Transitional Federal Government, the Federal Government 
of Somalia has been established on 20th August 2012.   
18
 See:  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm  
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group of the Union of Islamic Courts established in 200619 in order to fight the 
Ethiopian forces that have entered Somalia around that time.   
As a result of the inability of the central government to control the entirety of the 
state’s territory, in 2011 and 2012 Al-Shabaab gained control of a large portion of 
the South Somalia. Their military incursions into the Kenyan territory led to an 
announcement by the Kenyan minister of defence, Yusuf Haji, and minister of 
internal security, George Saitoti on 15th October 2011, at a press conference held in 
Nairobi, that in order to protect territorial integrity from foreign aggression, Kenyan 
security forces will engage in a military operation against the Al-Shabaab militants 
in Somali territory.20 Article 51 of the UN Charter has been invoked as a legal basis 
for the action and the declaration made that all measures taken in the exercise of 
the right of self-defence will be reported to the Security Council. The 
announcement came after several incidents which involved the Al-Shabaab 
incursions as deep as 120 kilometres into the Kenyan territory and abduction of 
several foreign nationals.21         
The situation on the border of Somalia and Kenya clearly puts into context 
troublesome questions concerning legal and political aspects of state failure and 
the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors. First of all, although it may 
                                                          
19
 See Council on Foreign Relations, Al-Shabaab Profile: http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-
shabaab/p18650 
20
 See: Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, Saturday, 15 October 2011: 
http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=72938 
21
   See: The Standard, 16 October 2011: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000044912&cid=4&ttl=Kenyan%20military%
20crosses%20into%20Somali      
As also an article published in The Standard on 17 October 2011: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000044985&cid=4&story=Assault:%20Kenya
n%20troops%20attack  
And the BBC News, ‘Kenya sends troops into Somalia to hit al-Shabab’, 17 October 2011,  
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15331448    
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be justifiable, is the Kenyan operation legal? In more general terms, can military 
measures against non-state actors be considered legitimate self-defence under 
international law and, if so, in what circumstances? Are the measures which do not 
comply with the parameters of self-defence necessary unlawful, or could there be 
other legal justification for them? Al-Shabaab is obviously not a state and its acts 
cannot be attributed to the weak Somali Transitional Federal Government since the 
latter is engaged in an armed conflict with this armed group. Al-Shabaab is an 
armed non-state group operating within a territorial entity which has been 
recognised as an independent state by the international community but in fact does 
not possess many of the attributes of an effectively governed state capable of 
entering into relations with other international law subjects. Is the fact that Al-
Shabaab at some point in time controlled and, to a certain extent, administered 
large parts of south Somalia at all relevant? How does the ‘failed state’ setting 
affect the rules regarding use of force in self-defence in international relations? The 
above questions constitute the core of the subject matter to be extensively 
examined through this thesis. In late September 2012 Kenyan forces claimed to 
have taken over Kismayu, the last stronghold of Al-Shabaab in Somalia.22 Despite 
some success of Kenyan armed forces, the militants’ attacks continued and, 
although recognised by an increasing number of countries,23 Somali Federal 
Government faces a long struggle before regaining effective control over the entire 
states’ territory. A number of other African countries similarly suffer from the lack 
                                                          
22








of central governments’ capacity to effectively govern the entirety of their 
territories. Recently, strong presence of powerful non-state armed groups in both 
Mali and Central African Republic led to the overthrow of the existing governments, 
serious humanitarian crises and the necessity for the international community’s 
interventions.24  
The above described cases indicate that failed states and powerful armed non-state 
actors raise a multitude of complex legal problems, the examination of which 
remains relevant and important. This thesis is therefore, first and foremost, the 
legal analysis of state failure and the extraterritorial use of force in self-defence 
against non-state actors. In particular, the international legal consequences of 
continuing existence of failed state and non-state actors control over extensive 
parts of a state territory will be considered in the context of jus ad bellum with a 
specific emphasis on the rules governing self-defence. Firstly, the thesis re-
examines core principles of international law to which both traditional and more 
avant-garde approaches to failed states and non-state actors refer to. 
Subsequently, the focus will shift towards the area of international law regulating 
the use of force in the states’ relations. The central problem posed in this relation 
concerns the right to use force in self-defence against non-state armed groups 
whose actions cannot be attributed to the failed state. Accordingly, this thesis seeks 
to identify and analyse international law norms regarding the use of force in self-
defence which would be applicable in the specific context of state failure. The 
military operations investigated here will be those taking place outside the borders 
                                                          
24
 See, inter alia: 28 November 2012 – Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, 
S/2012/894; 14 June 2013 – The situation in the Sahel region, S/2013/354; 3 May 2013 - The 
situation in the Central African Republic, S/2013/261. 
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of the state being a victim of an armed attack by non-state actors, and on the 
territory of failed states. Throughout the thesis, a state taking extraterritorial 
defensive measures against non-state actors will be referred to as the “victim state” 
and a state on whose territory such measures are taking place will be the 
“territorial state” and/or a “failed state”. The thesis will concentrate on defensive 
measures taken without the consent of a failed state and analyse unilateral state 
actions in self-defence, rather than the UN sanctioned or multinational peace 
support operations, as the investigation of the latter ones would be beyond its 
scope. Finally, the armed non-state actors which will be taken into consideration, 
are the groups not acting under control and/or on behalf of a state, and do not 
form part, neither de jure or de facto, of any state organisation, and accordingly 
maintain existence independent of the state.    
 
1.2 Literature Review 
The notion of ‘failed state’ became an increasingly recognisable feature in 
international legal literature since the 1990s.25 While the existence of states 
suffering from governance problems is nothing new in statehood’s history26, the 
                                                          
25
 See, inter alia: J Milliken ed, State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction (Blackwell Publishings Ltd., 
2003) (situating state failure and state collapse in historical context and analysing contemporary 
interventions and reconstruction efforts); S E Eizenstat, J E Porter, and J M Weinstein, ‘Rebuilding 
Weak States’, Foreign Affairs 134 (Jan-Feb 2005) (discussing how to limit threats to America by 
rebuilding failed nation-states); J L Holzgrefe and R O Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Standards for 
Political Trusteeship’, 8 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Affairs  385 (2003) (proposing a political framework 
based on trusteeship as a model for international intervention in failed states);  
26
 See: A Yannis, State Collapse and the International System, Implosion of Government and the 
International Legal Order from the French Revolution to the Disintegration of Somalia (2000), 
unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Geneva, on the file with the Library of the Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; R H Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, 
International Relations and the Third World, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
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most recent wave of failed states coincided with the end of Cold War and a 
considerable shift in states’ relations where super powers progressively lost interest 
in providing their economic and military support to former allies in Africa and 
Asia.27 Simultaneously, the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, consistently broadened the understanding of the notion of a 
threat to the international peace and security for it to encompass humanitarian 
crises, massive violation of human rights and humanitarian law, and breakdowns in 
national governance28 - all of which, as will be noted below, are features of a 
situation of state failure. Ever since, the absence of effective government is 
undoubtedly one of the most important challenges for the international peace and 
security in a state-orientated international law system. Up until the events of 
September 11, 2001, however, the international community continued to view 
failing and collapsed states as relatively containable humanitarian disasters with 
limited global impact beyond immediate threat to their neighbours. The rhetoric 
changed dramatically after 2001 and failed states, as well as non-state actors 
operating within their territories, became one of the primary threats to 
international peace and security and arguably, the legitimate target of self-defence 
operations.29  
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The manifestations of failure may differ in each country and it is difficult to 
precisely denominate the characteristics of state failure. As a consequence, 
although the labels of ‘failed state’ or ‘fragile state’ are repeatedly used in 
international legal and political discourse, it is with a general ‘we will know one 
when we see one’ attitude.30 Academics struggled to approach in a systematic way 
the conundrum raised by the collapse of state institutions at the international level. 
The actual term ‘failed state’ had been introduced by Gerald Helman and Steven 
Ratner in their 1992 article published in the Foreign Policy magazine.31 The 
phenomenon of ‘failed nation-state utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a 
member of international community’32 led the authors to question whether the 
nation-state framework remains appropriate for all peoples and territories. 
Accordingly, they proposed a new form of the United Nations conservatorship as a 
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solution for failed states.33 As such, it would be only a temporary reduction in 
sovereignty ultimately leading to the failed state regaining its full independence.34 A 
similar theme reverberates in the earlier work on ’quasi-states’ by Robert Jackson 
who argued that a considerable number of third world states ‘appear to be juridical 
no more than empirical entities’ which without support from international law and 
material aid would not be a self-standing territorial jurisdictions.35 
The relevant literature addresses state failure in many different contexts, primarily 
in terms of humanitarian intervention36, state-building37 and neo-colonialism.38 It 
has also been discussed how the phenomenon affects statehood, as well as 
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sovereignty.39 Likewise, the issue of state failure emerged in debates about the 
future of a state as a basic unit in international relations and primary subject of 
international law.40 Finally, more recently, ‘disappearing states’ have been 
discussed by Jane McAdam with reference to the potential impact of climate 
change on the two necessary requirements for statehood, namely, a defined 
territory and a permanent population.41 Due to an overwhelming complexity of the 
concept of ‘failed state’, however, it has been extremely difficult to achieve 
agreement on an articulated, objective definition and a number of propositions 
have been put forward. Zartman for example focuses on the failed state’s inability 
to fulfil its social contract and defines state collapse as ‘a situation where structure, 
authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be 
reconstituted in some form, old or new’.42 Similarly, Rotberg observes that ‘nation-
states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering 
positive political goods to their inhabitants’.43 Thürer, whose definition appears to 
be the most broadly cited, argues that state failure is ‘the product of collapse of the 
power structures providing political support for law and order’.44      
Although it is widely acknowledged that state collapse raises a number of 
fundamental legal and political questions as it puts the very core of international 
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legal system – the state itself – in doubt, it remains insufficiently explored how the 
concept can be encapsulated within a legal paradigm. In particular, it remains to be 
clarified under which criteria a state in question may be described as being in the 
process of failing or already failed and collapsed.45 Some academics adopt a 
utilitarian approach and focus on specific purpose for which the definition of state 
failure is sought. Crawford for example refers to state failure as primarily crises of 
government.46 As he concludes, none of the situations described as state failure, i.e. 
Somalia, the Congo, Liberia, etc. ‘has involved the extinction of a State in question 
and it is difficult to see what possible basis there could be for supporting otherwise 
(…) although there are many poor, often desperately poor, States, one must ask 
what they might otherwise be or have been – satellites of a neighbour, for example, 
or equally poor or even poorer colonies?’.47 Nevertheless, it remains somewhat 
unexplained how the criterion of the lack of effective government should be 
applied.    
Additionally, the concept requires further analysis both with reference to the 
international law rules regarding the creation as well as extinction of states. It 
remains to be clarified how the requirement for effective government in control of 
a state’s territory affects the continuing existence of states and what are the legal 
consequences should this essential precondition for statehood not be fulfilled for a 
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prolonged period of time.48 Chiara Giorgetti attempts to provide a basis for a 
principal approach towards state failure. The author makes an argument that state 
failure is a phenomenon characterised by a progressive inability of a state to 
perform its obligations both towards its own population and the international 
community, from which particular consequences should derive under international 
law at different points of this continuum.49  Nevertheless, one of the most 
important premises which Giorgetti puts forward is that, despite alleged state 
failure, whether understood as a governmental collapse or a more complex process 
of societal disintegration, its sovereignty remains intact.50 As shown by the example 
of Somalia, to which the author devotes a significant part of her book, the 
interventions by the international community in response to state failure should at 
all times observe the principle of sovereign equality. Notwithstanding the fact that 
it is probably more factually accurate, the description of state failure as a 
‘continuum’ raises some concerns from the jus ad bellum perspective and in 
particular with reference to matter of self-defence and its requirements. That is 
primarily due to the uncertainty of the legal consequences at each given moment 
during the process of failure, as well as the difficulties in factually ascertaining 
whether a state in question has reached a certain ‘level of failure’ when the rules 
regarding the use of force in self-defence come into play. Following the utilitarian 
approach, it may therefore still be necessary to examine the possibility of 
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constructing the definition of state failure for the specific purposes of the 
international rules concerning the use of armed force in self-defence. The above 
will be one of the matters addressed later in this thesis.    
As noted above, state failure has been discussed from a variety of perspectives. 
Nonetheless, the issue which remains largely unexplored is the impact of the 
continuing existence of failed states on the rules regarding the use of force in self-
defence in states’ relations. Neither of the above mentioned publications directly 
discusses this. The complex process referred to as state failure is commonly 
accompanied by and associated with armed conflict and non-state actors control 
over vast proportions of the state’s territory. This situation not only creates 
innumerable humanitarian problems, but also, as it often expands beyond the 
state’s borders, raises multitude of difficult legal questions relating to the self-
defence aspect of the jus ad bellum. In the circumstances where the state, and its 
government, as a central addressee of international legal obligations is largely 
inexistent and non-state armed groups take over the majority of the governmental 
functions, it is of a great importance to determine the applicable framework of 
international law regarding the use of force in self-defence and that is where the 
present thesis will attempt to fill the vacuum in the literature. Analysing the issue of 
state failure from the jus ad bellum perspective, it is evident that many descriptions 
of the phenomenon do not seem adequate for its purposes. The discussion on the 
notion relates predominantly, if not exclusively, to reasons for failure, prevention of 
failure, the reactions of the international community and state’s rebuilding 
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process.51 In contrast, this thesis focuses primarily on the legal implications relating 
to the use of force in self-defence in the situations where the paradigm of 
traditional statehood is inapplicable. 
It is hardly groundbreaking to argue that the prohibition of the use of force in 
states’ relations has undergone some corrosion in recent decades. Undoubtedly, 
state failure and powerful non-state actors sit in the middle of the debate about 
international peace and security due to their potentially great impact on shaping 
the contemporary state practice regarding the use of force. Although for a long 
time, due to the fact that the United Nations Charter focuses on the inter-state use 
of force as the primary source of threats to international peace and security, most 
writing in the field related mainly to the use of armed force by states against other 
states;52 increasingly, the attention has been given in the relevant literature to the 
activities of non-state actors operating across frontiers and, in particular, those 
branded as transnational terrorists.53 Notwithstanding the fact that state failure 
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and the extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors within the framework 
of inter-state rules concerning the use of force in self-defence remains one of the 
most difficult and controversial areas of international law, it has received 
proportionally little scholarly attention. In particular, it remains insufficiently 
examined how state failure affects the international legal order by undermining the 
prohibition of the use of force which stands as one of the instrumental elements of 
state-centric, Westphalian system. Accordingly, this thesis will focus on ascertaining 
the impact of the continuing existence of state without effectively functioning 
governments and increasing dominance of non-state actor element on one of the 
exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force in states’ relations, namely self-
defence.  
The discussion in the relevant literature regarding the idea of the use of force 
against non-state actors’ attacks relates predominantly to either the relevant 
degree of state’s involvement in such attacks54 or, the actual capacity of the non-
state actors to perpetrate the attack so that it can be considered an ‘armed attack’ 
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under the Article 51 of the UN Charter.55  Additionally, a number of commentators 
engage in the examination of the conditions attached to the right of self-defence 
against non-state actors.56 Nevertheless, the question of when it is lawful to use 
force across borders against non-state actors remains insufficiently explored, 
particularly if such a military action takes place in a failed state setting. As will be 
analysed below, the existing literature does not satisfactorily answer all the 
questions pertaining to the implications of state failure and in particular the 
prolonged loss of effective government for the international rules regarding the use 
of force in self-defence in states’ relations.  
                                                          
55
 For example, Yoram Dinstein questions restrictive approach towards self-defence against non-
state actors’ attacks arguing that it does not provide sufficient margin of action to the states whose 
interest is threatened. Referring to the fact that the perpetrator of the attack is not identified in 
Article 51, Dinstein confidently asserts that an armed attack can be carried out by the non-state 
actors acting alone. The determination of what constitutes the armed attack is therefore strictly 
speaking dependent primarily on the intensity of the attack. See: Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and 
Self-Defence, 5
th
 edn. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). Invoking the prevalent role 
played in the development of the customary law by the practice of major states, Olivier Corten 
submitted that the US military operation in Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, ‘immediately rendered obsolete the conception according to which a military action 
against another state could be launched only if it could be demonstrated that it had participated in a 
substantial manner in an armed attack’. See: O Corten, ‘The Controversies over the Customary 
Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate’ 16 European Journal of International Law 
(2006), at p. 810. Theresa Reinold arrives at a similar conclusion stating that ‘It is probably fair to 
conclude that as a result of international acquiescence of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, the 
existing rules governing the use of force have been called into question, with Nicaragua standard 
losing its validity as the yardstick for what constitutes and armed attack’. T Reinold, ‘State 
Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defence Post 9/11’ in 105 American Journal of 
International Law (2011), at p. 252. Other authors questioning the restrictive approach towards self-
defence against non-state actors include, inter alia: T M Franck,  'Terrorism and the Right of Self-
Defence', (2001) 98 American Journal of International L 840; or J Paust, 'Use of Armed Force Against 
Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond', (2002) 35 Cornell Journal of International Law 534 
56
 T Franck, ‘Editorial Comments: Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defence’ 95 American Journal of 
International Law (2001), at p. 840; M Schmitt, ‘Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in 
International Law’ The Marshall Centre Papers no. 5, The George C. Marshall European Centre for 
Security Studies, at pp. 26-27; J Paust, ‘Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Beyond’ 35 Cornell International Law Journal (2002), at pp. 533-534; C Greenwood, 
‘International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq’ 4 San Diego 
International Law Journal (2003), at p. 17. More recently, Noam Lubell also submitted that ‘There is 
in fact plentiful evidence to provide solid support for the contention that non-state actors can be 
responsible for armed attacks which give rise to self-defence…This evidence rests on both a reading 
of the texts, and on the state practice in the interpretation of the rule’. See: N Lubell, Extraterritorial 
Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011).   
30 
 
Some authors do acknowledge the difficulties of adopting the inter-state rules on 
the use of force in self-defence to the extraterritorial forcible measures undertaken 
against non-state actors which operate within failed state settings. In his recent 
contribution to the debate on the subject, Noam Lubell analyses the relevant rules 
of international law applicable to the extraterritorial use of force against non-state 
actors’ attacks which cannot necessarily be attributed to a particular state.57 The 
author analyses the use of force against non-state actors from the perspective of 
three international legal frameworks: jus ad bellum, jus in bello and the law 
enforcement framework found in the international human rights law. In the first 
part of his book, Lubell makes an argument that self-defence, as the only lawful 
option of unilateral extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors, can only 
be a reaction to an ‘armed attack’ as understood by Article 51 of the UN Charter. He 
underlines the position of States as the primary actors at the international level and 
interprets the existing rules so as to cover extraterritorial forcible measures against 
non-state actors. Consequently, Lubell argues that an attack by non-state actors 
may require a higher threshold than an attack by a state, however, he does not 
provide a direct answer as to what this threshold might be.58 Similarly, although it is 
recognised that a lack of willingness or ability of a host state to prevent attacks 
from non-state actors is a part of a necessity requirement of self-defence, the 
author does not engage in a discussion regarding the assessment of the state’s 
condition. It is not elaborated upon what constitutes state failure nor is it examined 
in detail how to establish state’s unwillingness or inability for the jus ad bellum and 
in particular, self-defence purposes.  
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The most important defining criterion of failed states in legal terms is undoubtedly 
the loss of effectively functioning government. Consequently, one of the aspects to 
consider regarding the possible international responsibility of a failed state for the 
actions of non-state actors, is the question of attribution of conduct to a state. 
Thürer makes the general argument that a state with no organs or agents capable 
of acting on its behalf is not internationally responsible for the violations of 
international law committed by individuals in its territory.59 On the other hand, 
Trapp explores the potential of existing legal rules to hold states responsible for 
their implication in the commission of terrorist attacks.60 Despite the fact that the 
author’s main prism of analysis is international terrorism, which definition she 
draws from the existing ‘terrorism suppression conventions’ as well as elements of 
practice of both the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly61, some 
insights regarding the invocation of state responsibility for acts of non-state actors 
in general, remain relevant. Her analysis of the post September 11 states practice, 
leads to a conclusion that ‘despite the ICJ’s failure to engage the issue, there is a 
right under international law to use force directly against non-state terrorist actors 
operating from foreign territory. An attribution-based reading of ‘armed attack’ 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter should therefore be laid to rest’.62 Trapp focuses 
largely on the international legal tools aiming to address state-sponsored terror, 
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rather than focusing on the lawfulness of extraterritorial forcible measures and the 
analysis of state’s inability to prevent non-state actors’ attacks. The author’s 
examination of state practice in relation to the latter issues is not entirely 
convincing and an alternative interpretation has been offered by other 
commentators.63 In particular, it has been suggested that, despite the fact that the 
concept of self-defence against non-state actors as traditionally interpreted by the 
ICJ is no longer satisfactory, some form of state attribution is still indispensable. 
Accordingly, the rules of attribution contained in Articles 4-11 of the International 
Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility ought to be differently or more 
loosely interpreted in cases of attacks by non-state actors.64As Ruys points out that 
this is primarily due to the recent shift in customary practice in relation to cross 
border attacks.65 Nevertheless, it remains somewhat unclear as to how to deal with 
a difficulty in claiming the international responsibility of a failed state associated 
primarily with that state’s inability to interact in the international level.66   
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It is undoubtedly a challenging conundrum to solve trying to ascertain on what legal 
basis states could defend themselves against non-state actors’ attacks emanating 
from failed states territories. The lawfulness of extraterritorial forcible measures 
has been consistently put into question. The extensive analysis of both state 
practice and opinio juris concerning the use of force against non-state actors 
conducted by Ruys led him to a conclusion that ‘De lege lata, the only thing that can 
be said about proportionate trans-border measures of self-defence against attacks 
by non-state actors in cases falling below the Nicaragua threshold is that they are 
‘not unambiguously illegal’.67 In his study, the author focuses primarily on the 
‘armed attack’ requirement of self-defence and discusses each of the major areas 
of debate surrounding the concept, namely: what actions will constitute an armed 
attack (rationae materiae), when an armed attack begins and ends thus allowing a 
state to respond in self-defence (rationae temporis), and ﬁnally who may be 
responsible for an armed attack (rationae personae). He does not, intentionally, 
concentrate on the necessity and proportionality aspects of self-defence. As noted 
above, it has been proposed, that the necessity requirement for self-defence 
encompasses the inability or incapacity of the territorial state to prevent armed 
attacks from non-state actors. In that respect, Ruys analysis is somewhat 
incomplete and accordingly, there is a room for further analysis of state practice 
and opinio juris in terms of the necessity requirement for self-defence against non-
state actors. The present thesis will aim to contribute to the debate.  
The above analysis leads to a conclusion that a lot of the literature relating to the 
subject of extraterritorial use of force in self-defence against non-state actors 
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concentrates predominantly, if not exclusively, on the controversies surrounding 
the definition of an ‘armed attack’ in this context and further, to the proportionality 
of the use of force.68 Very little scholarly attention has been given to the 
examination of the problem of inability of the territorial state to prevent non-state 
actors from using its territory to launch attacks. Ashley Deeks recognizes the 
necessity for the evaluation of the issue however, her analysis of the ‘unwilling or 
unable’ test fails to successfully argue the proposition that international law 
traditionally requires the state which is a victim of the attack by non-state actors, to 
assess the ability or willingness of a territorial state to suppress the threat itself 
first.69 It is quite clear that with reference to the international legal consequences 
of the continuing existence of failed states, the analysis of the ‘unwilling or unable’ 
test undoubtedly proves relevant. It should therefore be further explored how the 
‘unable or unwilling’ test could be applied and what it requires. This thesis’s 
intention is to analyse whether state failure and its inability to prevent attacks by 
non-state actors provides sufficient legal basis for the exercise of the right of self-
defence under the rules of jus ad bellum as it presently stands. Additionally, the 
issue needs to be considered from the allegedly unable territorial states perspective 
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– namely whether they are entitled to act upon the use of armed force by a victim 
state launched in response to the initial attack by non-state actors. Although it will 
not be its main focus, it is the intention of this thesis to provide some insights 
regarding this aspect of the problem which remains largely unexplored in the 
relevant literature.  
It is the prevailing view that the statehood of failed states continues in international 
law despite the absence of effective government even for a prolonged period of 
time70 and that international legal system is not willing to abandon the 
fundamental principle of sovereign equality of states. Nevertheless, the states in 
question suffer from serious difficulties in the exercise of their international legal 
personality. Article 51 of the UN Charter may well have been drafted in the context 
of dealing with armed attacks carried out by one state against another; 
nevertheless, it is undeniable that non-state actors increasingly present a serious 
threat to international peace and security.71 Although at times strongly contested, 
some recent state practice tends to accept the possibility of self-defence absent the 
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attribution of the conduct of non-state actors to the state itself.72 As Lindsay Moir 
concludes: ‘Both common sense and realpolitik dictate that the military action 
against non-state actors in situations where the host state is either unable or 
unwilling to take preventive action may well be necessary, in that there is no 
reasonable or effective alternative to the use of force. Indeed, it may even be the 
case that the inability or unwillingness of a host state to take effective measures 
against non-state actors operating from within its territory is now seen as 
tantamount to the level of involvement required to render military action against 
non-state actors lawful’.73  Nevertheless, the exact conceptual foundations of the 
extension of self-defence to the situations of armed attacks by non-state actors in 
the context of failed state is still very much a matter of debate. Further analysis of 
the ongoing state practice and relevant opinio juris is therefore necessary. 
Following the methodology proposed in the subsequent chapter, this thesis’s goal 




Doctrinal legal research methodology74 is considered to be the most appropriate for 
the scope and context of this thesis. Accordingly, the study will focus primarily on 
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the collection of the relevant body of law and analysis of how it applies. The 
contentiousness of the application of appropriate legal provisions is certainly one of 
the reasons why this research was undertaken, since its general objective is to 
explore what are the implications of the state of the law. Although the thesis does 
not intend to employ interdisciplinary outlook or methodology, it is considered that 
certain sections will benefit from the insight and conceptual knowledge produced 
by the international relations scholars. This in primarily relevant in consideration of 
the legal issues pertaining to state failure, as well as, although to a lesser extent, to 
the question of self-defence against non-state actors located in failed states’ 
territories. The determination of the existing law will be followed by a consideration 
of the policy underpinning the international regulations and issues currently 
affecting the law and its application. Accordingly, alongside the doctrinal 
methodology, the thesis will analyse selected, recent state practice in order to 
ascertain how the actors in the legal system behave and in turn, how this behaviour 
affects the system itself.  The examination of state practice will involve collection 
and analysis of data regarding various incidents of the use of extraterritorial forcible 
measures in self-defence by states against non-state actors. Subsequently, the most 
relevant case studies, examined in Chapter 5 below, will be identified based on the 
investigation such factual data with specific focus on the use of force by states in 
self-defence against non-state actors operating within failed state setting as 
described in detail in Chapter 3.   
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The most striking features of the international legal system are that it is consensual, 
decentralised and that there is no clear hierarchy among the sources of 
international law. In contrast to the domestic legal systems, it is not possible to 
single out institutions endowed with readily identifiable legislative and executive 
functions on the international plane. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of existing 
international judicial organs is not compulsory and there is no international legal 
instrument which possesses unambiguously constitutional character such as 
domestic constitutions or statutes. This has profound consequences for the conduct 
of research in international law which, for a long time, used to be primarily a 
system of customary law increasingly supplemented by treaty law.75 As the 
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doctrinal research is based on authority and hierarchy, the objective is to construct 
any statements of what the law is on primary authority and that is either a 
legislation or case law. Accordingly, the kaleidoscope of sources of international law 
deeply affects the structure of legal research conducted in this field.  As a result, for 
the analysis undertaken in this thesis to be effective, it is required to pay close 
attention to a particular system of primary sources of international law and their 
interpretation. It is therefore necessary to begin with the identification of the 
relevant treaties and customary international law76 as well as, where applicable, 
general principles of international law. Consequently, the body of relevant judicial 
decisions will be identified as they are ‘subsidiary means for the determination of 
the rules of law’77 as well as the applicable state practice. Likewise, the secondary 
sources in the form of the works of leading scholars on the subject, contained in the 
monographs and law journals, will be examined in their supporting role. Similarly to 
judicial decisions, these are not in themselves sources of international law, 
however, they are significant for the purpose of ascertaining the state of customary 
international law in relation to questions raised as well as helpful in interpreting 
and applying the treaties. The international law materials can be collected from a 
multitude of resources and accordingly, in order to discover all the possible relevant 
documents, the author will inspect, amongst others, the United Nations Treaty 
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Collection; United Nations, African Union, European Union and other international 
organisations online document databases; International Law Commission texts, 
instruments and final reports; International Court of Justice and other international 
tribunals databases; International Law Association Reports; current awareness 
series; as well as online databases (HeinOnline, Westlaw, LexisNexis).    
The ability to identify and interpret treaties as well as knowledge of the law relating 
to the operation of the treaties is a fundamental requirement for an effective 
research in any area of international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties codifies the methods of treaty interpretation and in particular Articles 31-
33 contain the rules of treaty interpretation.78 The primary rules for interpreting 
any treaty are contained in Article 31 and indicate the necessity to take into 
consideration three main elements, namely the text, context as well as the object 
and purpose of a treaty.79 The supplementary means of interpretation, such as the 
analysis of the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the teaty conclusion, 
can be found in Article 32.80 Nevertheless, as pointed out by Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
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‘the issue of treaty interpretation has always been one of the most difficult 
questions in treaty law, which the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
did not settle in a satisfactory manner’.81 The traditional methods of interpretation 
of treaties will obviously be followed throughout this thesis. Additionally, the 
author intends to incorporate the dynamic interpretation of treaties as it is 
conceivable that adoption of such a method of interpretation will benefit the 
research undertaken here. The dynamic/evolutive interpretation of treaties is a part 
of the teleological principle which focuses on the analysis of the object and purpose 
of the treaty.82 Although the dynamic interpretation of treaties appears to be 
particularly relevant in relation to human rights conventions, the dynamism of 
treaty interpretation could be productive and in fact at times necessary in order to 
account for the practice of state parties to the treaty and organs of the 
international organisation in relation to other multilateral treaties as well. 
According to Bernhard, the Charter of the United Nations provides the best 
example for the necessity of the evolutive interpretation.83 Undoubtedly, the 
international law regulations regarding the use of force contained in the UN Charter 
are relatively brief and, as Professor Gray points out, ‘cannot constitute a 
comprehensive code’. 84 Accordingly the employment of the dynamic treaty 
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interpretation, in this instance, the UN Charter rules on the use of force in states’ 
relations, will be necessary in order to account for the practice of state parties in 
relation to the extraterritorial use of force in self-defence against non-state actors 
operating within failed states.     
It has been submitted that although stability is an essential component of every 
legal order, placing too much emphasis on this aspect would neglect the temporal 
dimension of law.85  In that sense, stability requires adaptability and change in 
accordance with the evolution of the situation for which it was designed to apply.  It 
is of a great importance to note that the survival of unrevised treaty obligations 
largely depends on the ability to follow the political, social and economic changes 
which transform the scope and indeed sometimes the very nature of the 
obligations agreed upon. According to Pierre-Marie Dupuy, there are two variations 
of evolutionary interpretation: one supported by memory and therefore based on 
the will of the parties as manifested in the past; and the other one heading more 
towards prophecy and preoccupied with ensuring the continuing existence of 
objectives articulated by a community.86 Following the first version one would 
interpret treaty provision in such a way so that it reflects a common desire of the 
parties as if they had renegotiated the same agreement taking into consideration 
changing circumstances. On the other hand, and in accordance with the second 
variation, evolutionary interpretation of a treaty would manifest itself in a concern 
about the furtherance of a collective plan and achievement of a shared purpose. 
However, as pointed out by Dupuy, ‘according to the current state of the positive 
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international law, the ICJ only allows for a dynamic interpretation of a treaty where 
justified by notions and concepts in the terms of the treaty from which it may be 
inferred that the text is open to considerations of factual or legal evolution after the 
conclusion of the treaty’.87 The terms in which a treaty provisions are drafted are 
therefore the most important indication of whether the text is open to an 
evolutionary interpretation. Accordingly, the examination of selected state practice 
will focus on ascertaining whether and if so, how, the unrevised provisions of the 
UN Charter regarding the use of force in self-defence have been interpretated by 
states using dynamic interpretation to the specific circumstances of failed states 
and armed attacks perpetrated solely by non-state actors.   
As the UN Charter provisions regarding the use of force in states’ relations are 
rather brief, the UN Security Council’s resolutions play an important role in 
establishing the current state of the law in this relation. The interpretation of the 
UN Security Council’s resolutions however, similarly to the interpretation of treaties 
presents some difficulties. The International Court of Justice did state the following 
in the 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion: ‘The language of a resolution of the Security 
Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its 
binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question 
whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having 
regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, 
the Charter provisions invoked, and in general all circumstances that might assist in 
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determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council’.88 
Consequently, as Wood points out, ‘interpretation of the SCRs requires an 
understanding of the nature of the Security Council and its place under the United 
Nations Charter and an appreciation of the nature and indeed variety of SCRs. And 
it also requires some knowledge of how they are drafted’.89  The rules regarding the 
interpretation of the UN Security Council’s resolutions have not been codified 
unlike the rules regarding the interpretation of treaties. Nevertheless, there are 
certain similarities to the rules of interpretation contained in Article 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT and accordingly, the first step would be to decide which terms of the 
resolution are to be interpreted. It is obviously important to note that, unlike most 
treaties, the Security Council’s resolutions are not self-contained in that they refer 
to other documents, or incorporate by reference other documents, and often 
constitute part of a series. Article 2 paragraph 2 of the UN Charter, according to 
which all Members shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the Chapter, supports the requirement of good faith in 
interpretation of the Security Council’s resolutions. Furthermore, the aim of the 
interpretation should be to give effect to the intention of the Council as expressed 
by the words of the Council and taking into consideration the surrounding 
circumstances. Accordingly, as Wood notes ‘In case of the SCRs, given their 
essentially political nature and the way they are drafted, the circumstances of the 
adoption of the resolution and such preparatory work as exists, may often be of a 
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greater significance than in the case of treaty. The Vienna Convention distinction 
between the general rule and supplementary means has even less significance than 
in the case of treaties’.90  Consequently, when interpreting the Security Council’s 
resolutions attention will be given, more so than in the case of treaties, to the 
overall political background as well as the background of related Security Council 
action. 
It is often submitted that purely doctrinal research is too narrow in its scope and 
application to understand law.91 While rules certainly guide and structure legal 
environment, their application involves a multitude of factors. The practice of 
international law, being no exception to this statement, occurs in a wider political 
context. The legal rules cannot in themselves provide a complete statement of the 
law in any given situation. This can only be discovered by application of the relevant 
legal provisions to the particular facts of the situation under consideration. 
Consequently, the research undertaken in this thesis intends to collect and analyse 
data regarding recent state practice in relation to the use of force in self-defence 
against non-state actors acting from a territory of a failed state. According to Yin, a 
case study is a ‘study that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident’.92  The analysis of selected case studies undertaken in this 
thesis will have the characteristics of both descriptive and evaluative research. The 
starting point will be to collect data regarding a set of factual circumstances as 
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encompassed in the notion of extraterritorial use of force in self-defence against 
non-state actors. The most relevant cases of state practice will be selected 
according to specified criteria described in detail in the following chapters. The 
collection of data regarding the factual evidence will be followed by its evaluation 
based on the analysis conducted in the preceding chapters. It will be examined how 
the law regarding use of force in international relations works in practice and in 
particular its influence on the actions, attitudes and expectations of states. As 
pointed out by Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, ‘the content of any legal system will 
in practice inevitably tend to reflect the interests and assumptions of those most 
able to make their voices heard in the law-making process. These, in turn, will tend 
to be the more powerful members of the community to which the legal system 
applies’.93 The case analysis will therefore also aim to draw conclusions about 
whether and, if so, how, recent state practice interprets and influences the content 
of the regulations regarding the use of force in self-defence in international 
relations.   
The factual materials regarding selected incidents of the extraterritorial use of force 
in self-defence against non-state actors will be gathered using a variety of sources 
including official documents as well as, where appropriate, press reports and 
academic works. A state is a legal person and accordingly its will is necessarily 
expressed through the choices and conduct of natural persons whose activities are 
legally attributable to it, and in particular its government and any other person, 
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organ or institutions exercising official public authority or public functions.94 State 
practice will therefore be evidenced by reference to a wide array of materials. 
These will include speeches by state official and diplomats, policy statements, press 
releases and communiques, reports of military activities, diplomatic 
correspondence and comments by governments on the work of international 
bodies, voting records in international forums and others. State practice can also 
include omissions and these will be considered where necessary. Equally, any 
protests will be deliberated upon as they are significant in the case of alleged new 
rules of customary international law 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
It is intended that the structure of this thesis will shape as outlined below. Chapter 
One comprises an introduction which presents the research question, its 
justification and the methodology applied in seeking the answer to it.  Chapter Two 
investigates and critically assesses the concept of statehood and sovereignty in 
international law. The main research question posed in this section concerns the 
international law regulations applicable to statehood – primarily its creation but 
also, extinction. Initially however, the concepts will be outlined from a historical 
perspective for the purpose of presenting how they developed through legal 
reasoning. The research method adopted in this Chapter will be generally doctrinal, 
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as the author analyses the basic concepts in the law of statehood which will be 
relevant for the subsequent chapters. The principal aim will be collection of the 
relevant body of primary as well as secondary sources in order to identify the law 
and how it applies. In terms of the definition of statehood in international law, the 
1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States95 is the starting 
point of the analysis. The other applicable documents would be, amongst others, 
the 1991 European Communities ‘Declaration on the “Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”, the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the applicable provisions of the UN 
Charter. Additional materials such as the relevant United Nations General 
Assembly’s resolutions, including the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples or the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, will be 
examined. Equally, a number of relevant international cases will be investigated. 
Additionally, there is a significant body of legal literature on the subject.96 
Nevertheless, the above is obviously only a short selection of the materials to be 
investigated.  It will be argued that, notwithstanding the fact that the notion of 
sovereign statehood has profound implications for the nature of international law, 
its definition remains unsatisfactory. The examination of the criteria for statehood 
                                                          
95
 Convention on Rights and Duties of States (signed 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 
December 1934) 165 LNTS 19 
96
 See: inter alia: H Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1947), H Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1949), R Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United 
Nations (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), J Crawford, The Creation of States in International 
Law, 2
nd
 edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), I Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, 7
th
 edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).      
49 
 
in this Chapter will identify the legal context in which factual issues arise. Several 
case studies will be selected in order to attempt to answer the question whether 
due to the contentious character of the criteria for statehood, the process of 
creation and recognition of new states remains overwhelmingly politicised.  
The disputes surrounding criteria for creation and recognition of states pertain to 
efforts to analyse legal and factual issues unravelling throughout the continuing 
existence of states, as best evidenced by the ‘state failure’ phenomenon. 
Accordingly, in Chapter Three, the more traditional doctrinal methodology focused 
on finding the applicable legal rules, will be complemented by problem orientated 
research centred around the examination of the issue of state failure in 
international law as well as the policy underpinning the existing law’s approach 
towards this dilemma. In terms of the primary and secondary sources analysed in 
this Chapter, a lot of the documents referred to in the preceding section on 
statehood in international law will have relevance for the investigation of the ‘state 
failure’ phenomenon. There are obviously some additional sources which will be 
studied, such as for example, the United Nations International Law Commission 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, United 
Nations Secretary-General ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of 
the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations’, as well as a number of the United Nations Security Council and General 
Assembly Resolutions. Even more importantly, however, the recent state practice in 
connection to the state failure phenomenon will be closely examined.  
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Chapter 3 will consider to what extent the criteria for the recognition of statehood 
in international law are relevant for the examination of the viability of existing 
states. It will be scrutinised whether and, if so, how, statehood is altered by 
changes to the constitutive elements of a state from the international law’s 
perspective. The Chapter also aims to assess if the sovereignty of a state can be 
questioned due to prolonged periods of time without effectively functioning 
governmental authorities and the state’s inability to participate in international 
affairs. Expansive descriptions of the concept of ‘failed state’ embrace a large 
number of states which temporarily do not fulfil some of the requirements for 
effective and legitimate government. They are accordingly more in line with the 
broad definitions of the minimum requirements of government preferred by the 
political perspective to state collapse. On the contrary, in legal discourse, it would 
only seem relevant for the purposes of the legal analysis, to reserve the notion of 
‘failed state’ to territorial entities where the governmental authority ceased to 
function or disappeared for a prolonged period of time. In order to position the 
notion of state failure in a wider political context, the perspective of international 
relations will be integrated into the investigation of the matter. There are some 
considerable differences between the methodology proposed by international law 
and international relations. The disciplines share the same research area; however, 
they employ different presumptions, questions, data collection methods and nature 
of the conclusions.97 Whereas the international relations scholars are primarily 
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interested in understanding how and why states and other actors on the 
international plane behave in the ways that they do, the nature of the international 
system, and the role of international actors, processes and discourses; the 
international law preoccupies itself primarily with the regulation of international 
affairs. The Chapter will therefore analyse, without actually employing the 
interdisciplinary methodology, whether and if so how, the international relations 
perspective can contribute towards understanding of the state failure phenomenon 
in legal context. It will be discussed whether in fact that the international relations 
scholars have embraced the concept of state failure and produced a considerable 
amount of conceptual knowledge about the subject matter can be useful for the 
international law discourse. The Chapter aims to conclude with the workable 
definition of a ‘failed state’ in international legal context.   
Drawing on the doctrinal analysis conducted in Chapters Two and Three Chapter 
Four examines the applicable ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ rules of international law 
regarding the use of force in self-defence in response to attacks by non-state actors 
located in failed states. The extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors 
includes a wide variety of incidents and the framework for addressing these actions 
is not always clear and consequently, it is necessary to identify applicable legal 
rules. Chapter Four will therefore explain the fundamental concepts involved in the 
discussion. Undoubtedly, the most significant multilateral treaty in terms of the 
regulation of the use of force in states relations is the United Nations Charter. The 
Charter departed from the Covenant of the League of Nations and provided a new 
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terminology and first expression of the rules regarding use of force in their modern 
form. Accordingly, the position of the UN Charter relating to the issues in question 
will be examined. The Chapter will deliberate upon the question of whether the 
state-centric security regime envisaged by the UN Charter is in fact adequate to 
face the problem of failed states and powerful non-state actors, or whether there is 
a gap in a treaty based regime governing the use of force in self-defence in 
international relations. If the latter is the case, how, if at all, are the UN Charter 
regulations supplemented by the customary law? Consequently, the question of the 
legality of extraterritorial self-defence measures against non-state actors under 
international law rules will be discussed. In particular, if there is a customary right 
of self-defence of victim state which is not contingent upon consent of the host 
state and what are the conditions under which the victim state may act in self-
defence against non-state actors. How do the conditions of necessity and 
proportionality relate to self-defence against non-state actors’ attacks? Is the 
organisational structure of non-state actors at all relevant for the jus ad bellum 
purposes? Most importantly however, the Chapter investigates if state failure has 
in fact contributed to shaping various incipient doctrines relating to the use of force 
in self-defence. Is the implicit or explicit invocation of the state weakness and 
incapacity to act sufficient basis for intervention? The conceptual routes, by which 
the notion of self-defence can accommodate the contemporary state practice of 
armed force used against non-state actors operating within ‘failed states’, are 
examined. ‘Attribution’ of responsibility to a state for the actions of non-state 
actors presents a great juridical challenge in the context of balancing between the 
sovereignty of failed state and legitimate grounds for self-defence. More generally, 
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the underlying question of this section of the thesis will be whether it is necessary 
to contextualise the building blocks of international law – sovereign equality and 
non-intervention – in order to address the issues raised by state failure and non-
state actors.   
Apart from the UN Charter, there are a number of additional primary as well as 
secondary sources which have to be analysed in order to reflect the evolution of 
the law regarding use of force in states relations. These are, amongst others, 
regional arrangements such as for example Constitutive Act of the African Union 
and the later African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, The 
Charter of the Organisation of American States or The North Atlantic Treaty. 
Although generally the subsidiary sources for identifying evidence of customary 
law, the judicial decisions played an incredibly important role in the evolution of the 
regulations regarding the use of force in self-defence. Accordingly, it will be 
necessary to revert to such landmark decisions by International Court of Justice as 
the 1948 Corfu Channel Case, the 1986 Nicaragua Case, 2003 Oil Platforms Case, 
the 2004 Advisory Opinion regarding the Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory or the 2006 Armed Activities on the 
Territory of Congo case. Similarly, the United Nations Security Council and the 
General Assembly numerous resolutions on the matter play an integral part in the 
analysis of the current state of the use of force regime in states’ relations.  
The primary goal of the penultimate Chapter Five will be the identification and 
analysis of recent state practice in relation to the use of force in self-defence 
against non-state actors operating from a territory of a ‘failed state’. The main 
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research questions which this section will endeavour to answer are, firstly, whether 
it can be submitted that states increasingly invoke self-defence to justify responses 
to attacks committed solely by non-state actors acting on the territory of a failed 
state; secondly, how does the alleged failure of a territorial state affect actions 
undertaken by victim states; and finally, is the recent state practice consistent 
enough and acceptable by the international community so that it may possibly have 
an impact on customary international law rules regarding the use of force in self-
defence. There are frequent instances of extraterritorial use of force by states 
against non-state actors located in other jurisdictions. It is, however, not 
anticipated that this thesis will consider all of them. Many of the incidents of the 
extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors are nowadays referred to as 
constituting a part of the ‘war on terror’. Using the context of terrorism as a frame 
of reference for this thesis however, is not considered to be the most useful 
approach. Firstly, because of the fact that the definition of terrorism has not been 
unanimously agreed upon and secondly due to the controversies surrounding the 
notion of the ‘war on terror’ – the actions taking place under this heading as well as 
whether such ‘war’ exists at all and if so, what its legal and practical meaning is. 
Consequently, the second criterion for selection of the relevant case studies will be 
that of a factual and visible phenomenon of extraterritorial use of force in self-
defence against non-state actors located in failed state, as defined in Chapter 
Three. The choice therefore, will not be guided by unclearly defined notion of 
extraterritorial forcible counter-terrorist measures. The final important criterion 
will be that of the alleged failure of a territorial state where non-state actors 
operate. As stated above, the proposed definition of state failure will be provided in 
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Chapter Three and only the cases where the territorial states conform to that 
definition will be examined.  
The foundation of the analysis undertaken in this thesis is international law as it 
currently stands. Whereas in some instances past cases may be relevant, the author 
does not intend to conduct a historical analysis of the development of the rules 
regarding the use of force in international relations. A number of issues examined 
may certainly raise questions about the adequacy of the international law in certain 
areas and at times, claims of a need for development. These will be addressed and 
perhaps in some cases supported by the results of the research. Overall however, 
the examination will be centred on the question of how the existing international 
law can assist in regulating the matters under discussion here. 
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  CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATEHOOD 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter identifies and analyses international law rules regarding statehood – 
primarily its creation and continuity as well as, to some extent its extinction. The 
introductory section provides the examination of the principle of sovereign equality 
of states from a historical perspective. Subsequently, this part of the thesis will be 
dedicated to the inquiry regarding the principal criteria for statehood and their 
application. It will furthermore outline the development of any additional criteria 
for statehood. The main goal of this chapter, however, will be to establish whether 
the statehood is altered by changes to its constitutive elements from the formal 
legal perspective. To that end, the relevant international norms and principles, as 
well as, state practice and opinio juris will be analysed. The Chapter will cover the 
issue of the relationship between the constitutive elements of statehood and the 
process of creation, transformation and extinction of states. Additionally, the 
dynamics of the state in time will be considered, in order to identify the different 
characteristics and effects that the processes of creation, transformation and 
extinction of a state have on the existence of statehood under international law in 
general. This chapter is this first part of two main sections of the thesis. The analysis 
carried out therein provides the essential starting point and background for the 
subsequent investigation of the failed state phenomenon. The second main part of 
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the thesis builds upon chapters two and three by way of examining the impact of 
state failure on the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors.      
 
2.2 States as the primary subjects of international law. The principle of sovereign 
equality of states in historical perspective 
‘A subject of the law is an entity capable of possessing international rights 
and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims’.1   
Sovereign states constitute building blocks of the modern world order and the 
primary subjects of international law. It is generally recognized that the concept of 
sovereign equality of states started to dominate, at least in Europe, since the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia. Historically, ever since then, international law has been 
perceived as an essentially state-centric discipline.2 Consequently, the emergence 
of many new states throughout the twentieth century has to be considered a major 
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twentieth century of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, and the displacement of the 
Concert of Europe as the most important international arena by an open global community of 
states’; C Schreuer, ‘The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International 
Law’, 4 European Journal of International Law 447 (1993), p. 447.    
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political development having a substantial impact on both international law and 
international relations. In parallel, throughout the latter part of the twentieth 
century the position and functions of states, both on domestic and international 
level, have changed rapidly. Due to transforming social, economic and political 
dynamics new standards of governance have emerged, whereupon national 
governments have to bear increasing responsibilities towards the inhabitants of the 
territorial entity they control. Additionally, states become ever more inter-
dependent and consequently, their obligations towards each other and 
international community as a whole increase. 
Despite fast changing international settings, states undoubtedly remain the primary 
subjects of international law. As Professor Wolfgang Friedmann observes,  
‘The basic reason for this position is, of course, that ‘the world is today 
organized on the basis of the co-existence of States, and that fundamental 
changes will take place only through State action, whether affirmative or 
negative’. The States are the repositories of legitimate authority over 
peoples and territories. It is only in terms of State powers, prerogatives 
jurisdictional limits and law making capabilities that territorial limits and 
jurisdiction, responsibility for official actions, and a host of other questions 
of co-existence between nations can be determined (…) This basic primacy 
of the State as a subject of international relations and law would be 
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substantially affected, and eventually superseded, only if national entities, 
as political and legal systems were absorbed in a world state’.3  
Although written in 1964, the above statement is very much relevant to present 
times and as Professor Higgins stated ‘States are…still at the heart of international 
legal system’.4    
Notwithstanding the unquestionable importance of statehood in international law, 
it has to be noted that it remains to some extent an unsatisfactorily defined 
concept. Indisputably, the notion of state is a particularly complex one. It is not only 
the domestic elements such as constitutions, legislatures, courts, elections, parties, 
bureaucracies, local governments and many more that form statehood. The 
expression of sovereignty internationally – mutual recognition, diplomacy - is 
equally important. It has been argued that ‘*t+he existence of a state is a question of 
fact and not of law. The criterion of statehood is not legitimacy but 
effectiveness…’.5 The statement reflects postulates of the declaratory theory, which 
describes statehood as a legal status independent of recognition. Accordingly, if a 
state already exists, the legality of its creation and existence is somewhat an 
abstract issue, as it is necessary for the law to recognize a new situation despite its 
alleged illegality. Consequently, where the state does not effectively exist, rules 
considering it as legitimately functioning are pointless. As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht 
formulates it: 
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‘The guiding juridical principle applicable to all categories of recognition is 
that international law, like any other legal system, cannot disregard facts 
and that it must be based on them provided they are not in themselves 
contrary to international law’.6   
The constitutive theory of statehood on the other hand, asserts that the rights and 
duties pertaining to statehood derive from discretionary recognition by other 
states. Accordingly, any rules granting a status of a state to a territory that is not 
being recognized as such by the international community seem futile. 
According to James Crawford neither of the above mentioned theories 
appropriately explains modern practice. In general, declaratory theory confuses 
‘fact’ with ‘law’ – ‘*f+or, even if effectiveness is the dominant principle, it must 
nonetheless be a legal principle’.7  On the other hand, the constitutive theory 
incorrectly equates identification of subjects in international law with diplomatic 
recognition and ‘fails to consider the possibility that identification of new subjects 
may be achieved in accordance with general rules or principles rather than on an ad 
hoc, discretionary basis’.8 The most important question behind these 
considerations is, according to Crawford, to what extent creation and later 
existence of a state is simply a matter of fact and to what extent it is regulated by 
international law. As it will be discuss subsequently, international law is primarily 
concerned with the creation of states. Once a territorial entity becomes a state, it 
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seems that even considerable changes to the constitutive elements of statehood do 
not dissolve it. 
The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States in the Article 1 provides 
that: ‘The State as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory, (c) government; 
and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states’.9 Accordingly, the most 
commonly referred to legal characteristics of a state include capacity to perform 
acts, make treaties in the international sphere as well as an exclusive competence 
with regard to its internal matters, although, obviously, international law can 
impose certain constrains. States are not subject to compulsory international 
process, jurisdiction, or settlement without their consent and, as recognized by the 
Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter, in principle states have equal status and 
standing.  Finally, derogation from the abovementioned principles shall not be 
presumed:  
‘In case of doubt an international court or tribunal will tend to decide in 
favour of the freedom of states’ action, whether with respect to external or 
internal affairs, or as not having consented to a specific exercise of 
international jurisdiction, or to a particular derogation from equality’.10     
Generally speaking, the five above mentioned principles constitute the core of the 
concept of statehood – the essence of the special position of states in international 
law. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the exclusive attributes of states do not 
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prescribe specific rights, powers and capacities that all states must, in order to be 
states, posses. These attributes should rather be considered as presumptions that 
such rights, powers and capacities exist unless otherwise stipulated. 
While all the above mentioned legal characteristics of the state are important, 
sovereignty is probably the one which remained the most controversial and broadly 
discussed over the centuries.11  The theory of sovereignty had been elaborated 
upon by Aristotle as well as Roman and Medieval laws. Jean Bodin wrote about it in 
his 1576 treaties Six Livres de République, creating what became known as theory 
of ‘absolute’ sovereignty. Grotius, the so-called ‘father of international law’, for the 
first time referred to sovereignty in the context of relations between states.12 At 
approximately the same time, Thomas Hobbes created the theory of 
‘uncommanded commander’ – sovereignty understood as subject to no exception 
in natural or divine law.13   The subject had been approach basically by all the most 
important political philosophers between seventeenth and twentieth century: 
Samuel Pufendorf 14, John Locke15 , Jean- Jacques Rousseau16 , Immanuel Kant17 , 
Georg Hegel18 , Jeremy Bentham19 , John Austin20  and many others.   
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In the eighteenth century Emmer de Vattel took a major step forward in developing 
the external aspect of sovereignty. In The Law of Nations the author laid theoretical 
foundations of international law and particularly the doctrine of equal sovereignty. 
According to Vattel: 
‘Nations or States are political bodies, societies of men who have united 
together and combined their forces, in order to protect their mutual welfare 
and security. Such a society has its own affairs and interests; it deliberates 
and takes resolutions in common, and it thus becomes a moral person 
having an understanding and a will peculiar to itself, and susceptible at once 
of obligations and of rights’.21    
Consequently, he defined the law of nations as ‘the science of the rights which 
exists between Nations or States, and of obligations corresponding to these 
rights’.22 States in Vattel’s theory were free and independent, although, he also 
noticed that the existence of international community requires certain degree of 
mutual respect among nations. 
Accordingly, with regard to sovereign equality of states Vattel concludes that:  
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‘Since man are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations 
the same, as coming equally from nature, Nations, which are composed of 
men and may be regarded as so many free persons living together in a state 
of nature, are by nature equal and hold from nature the same obligations 
and the same rights. Strength or weakness, in this case, counts for nothing. 
A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign 
State than the most powerful Kingdom’.23     
A sovereign state is defined as an entity: 
‘…which governs itself, under whatever form, and which does not depend 
on any other Nation…Its rights are, in the natural order, the same as every 
other state. Such is the character of the moral persons who live together in 
a society established by nature and subject to the Law of Nations. To give a 
Nation the right to a definite position in this great society, it need only be 
truly sovereign and independent; it must govern itself by its own authority 
and its own laws’.24     
Sovereign states are independent and, therefore, the intervention with one 
another’s matters is not allowed. The Law of Nations had an immense impact on 
later considerations of the content of both sovereignty and the principle of legally 
equal relations between states.   
The impact of colonization on the meaning and scope of territorial sovereignty had 
been mainly exercised through the debate over which ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ 
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peoples were thought capable of exercising it. Sovereignty was primarily authored 
in the nineteenth century by the first international institutions such as the Concert 
of Europe established by the 1815 Congress of Vienna.25 A century later the League 
of Nations was created and the primary principles of the Wilsonian system,26 which 
were subsequently introduced, incorporated both aspects of sovereign equality 
among nations and legalized hegemony. The judicial organ of the League, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ), attempted to define 
sovereignty in several of its cases.27 In one of the most famous proceedings, The 
Lotus Case,28 the PCIJ implemented, what Koskenniemi calls the ‘pure fact 
approach’, in defining the scope of sovereignty. The Court considered state 
sovereignty unlimited unless constrained by some specific rules.29 The PCIJ also 
stated that independence constitutes the cornerstone of sovereignty. 
Together with the creation of the United Nations the concept of sovereign equality 
as imposed and maintained by the legal hegemony of the Great Powers has been 
reinforced. At the San Francisco Conference smaller states were understandably 
anxious to accept legalized hegemony of the Great Powers, nevertheless they 
agreed that certain amount of it would benefit the new world system. As Simpson 
observes:  
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‘Ultimately, there was agreement on three points. First, sovereign equality 
was to be a cornerstone of the new international system. Second, 
departures from the principle or, at least, deviations from the strict 
implementation of the principle, would be necessary to give the new 
international security regime some teeth. Third, these departures would 
have to be justified on the basis either of competing legal principles or by 
reference to overwhelming political necessity’.30      
One of the major concerns for the small states, as well as for the Great Powers, for 
different reasons however, was the maintenance of protection of states’ domestic 
jurisdiction. Finally, it was agreed that the Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter 
will read as follows: 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’.31    
As a consequence, domestic jurisdictions had been limited by potentially extensive 
Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Security Council. The membership 
provisions of Chapter II of the Charter also impose certain institutional limits upon 
state sovereignty. State in order to become a member of the United Nations must 
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be a ‘peace-loving’ nation that accepts all Charter obligations as well as the 
obligations of international law as developed under the Charter.32   
Sovereign equality undoubtedly constitutes the basic principle of the United 
Nations Charter and has been principally preserved by the Article 2(4)’s prohibition 
of the use of force in international relations. The only, very limited and in fact 
ambiguous in many respects, exception to the prohibition of the use of force is 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.33  Notwithstanding the above, legalized hegemony still 
emerges in some of the UN Charter provisions which preserve the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security for the 
Security Council – a single, membership-restricted organ.34  It is to be noted that 
the text of the UN Charter did not by itself generate the concept of sovereignty 
under the UN system. The balance between sovereign equality and legalized 
hegemony has been further remodelled by the ongoing practice of the 
organization, which is not always coherent and depending on the circumstances 
puts emphasis either on sovereign equality or human rights. Hilla argues that:  
‘*t+here is no ‘current juridical reality’ of sovereign equality that can be 
asserted as the version of sovereignty upheld by the U.N. Charter System… 
It is clear that the U.N. has not generated a definitive guideline to the actual, 
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workable scope of sovereignty under international law. For the member –
states of the U.N., the Charter represents a set of voluntary restrictions on 
freedom of action, which may or may not be limiting action that can be 
classified as a sovereign prerogative in the historical or contemporary 
customary sense’.35 
In conclusion, it is quite clear that there is a tension in the international system 
established by the UN Charter which is based on principles of international concern 
and obligations on the one side and sovereign, territorial and political 
independence of the Member States on the other. 
 
2.3 Constitutive elements of statehood 
The existence of the concept of statehood is a prerequisite for determining criteria 
that should be applied in order to establish which entities are to be considered a 
state. It is understood that, a moment in which a state’s existence under 
international law can be identified and from which it enjoys a full international legal 
personality, occurs when the constitutive elements of statehood are verified in 
practice. In that sense, the existence of a state is in principle a matter of a fact. 
Nevertheless, as noted below, international law plays a central role in determining 
if an entity is a state. The criteria for statehood are of a special character, in that 
their application conditions the application of most other international law rules. As 
a consequence, existing states have been inclined to retain for themselves as much 
freedom of action with regard to new states as possible. During its existence, a 
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state may go through transformations in those constitutive elements which in turn 
raise questions under international law as to the state’s position, international 
obligations and relations with other subjects of international law. Lastly, a state 
may cease to exist or some of its constitutive elements disappear – both situations 
raising plenitude of complex legal questions.  
As pointed out above, the best known formulation of the classic criteria for 
statehood is the one included in the Article I of the Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States.36 These provisions have acquired the status of 
customary international law.37 However, ‘the question remains whether these 
criteria are sufficient for Statehood, as well as being necessary’.38 Despite the fact 
that the formal definition of statehood remained unchanged, the separate 
components of statehood have been interpreted and applied in a flexible manner, 
generally depending on the circumstances and context in which the claim for 
                                                          
36
 Supra note 9. More recently, the validity of the Montevideo Convention definition of statehood 
has been confirmed by the Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Committee, which stated in its 
First Opinion that ‘the State is commonly defined as a community which consist of a territory and a 
population subject to an organized political authority’ and that ‘such a State is characterized by 
sovereignty’; in Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising 
From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, (1992) 31 I.L.M. 1488. The Commission chaired by Robert 
Badinter delivered its four opinions concerned with the question of whether the Republics of 
Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, who had formally requested recognition by the Community and its 
Member States, had satisfied the conditions laid down by the Council of Ministers of the European 
Community on the 16th of December 1991. The Committee ruled that two Republics, Macedonia 
and Slovenia, fulfilled all the conditions. In the case of Croatia a reservation was made in relation to 
the rights of minorities. The request for recognition made by Bosnia-Herzegovina was, in the 
absence of a referendum, refused. The above cited statement has to be considered against the 
background of the particular international circumstances. It was argued that the international 
involvement had constitutive effect on the creation of new states in case of the dissolution of the 
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. While the declarations of independence of Slovenia and 
of Croatia were initially considered to be attempts at unilateral secession, it was the opinion of the 
Badinter Commission which provided the authority that the dissolution was underway and thus 
Yugoslavia’s claim to territorial integrity was removed. Although the Badinter Commission expressly 
held that recognition was declaratory, its opinions had notable constitutive effects. 
37
 D J Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 7
th
 ed. (London Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), p. 
99.   
38
 M Dixon & R McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law 4
th
 ed. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 137.  
70 
 
statehood had been made. More importantly however, as Professor Higgins 
concludes: ‘*O+nce in the club, the rules by which admission was tested – and that 
always with a degree of flexibility – become less relevant’.39 The following sections 
of this chapter will be dedicated to the analysis of international legal criteria for 
statehood as well as, to a certain extent, the process of creation, continuity and 
extinction of states.  
 
2.3.1 Permanent Population  
States constitute territorial units but also aggregate of individuals; consequently, a 
territory alone cannot be considered a state without a group of people intending to 
inhabit it permanently. It is required for an entity claiming statehood to possess a 
permanent population, although international law does not prescribe any minimum 
levels for the number of people needed to inhabit certain territory. As a 
consequence, even entities such as Tuvalu, Nauru or Palau all having very small 
populations, are considered to constitute viable states. Similarly, the criterion of 
permanency has not been described in detail and it does not seem to be affected by 
even the major shifts in population’s dynamics, as evidenced in cases of Somalia or 
Sudan.  
The population should not be confused with the international legal concept of a 
“people”.40 It should also be noted that the requirement of permanent population 
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does not refer to the nationality of that population – it is the latter that is 
dependent upon statehood and not the other way round.41 As Brownlie concludes, 
the criterion of permanent population should be exercised in relation to that of 
territory and ‘connotes a stable community’.42    
The requirement of permanent population had been assessed during the debate 
over the membership of microstates to the United Nations in the 1970s. Although 
Article 4 of the UN Charter43 states that membership is open to all states, it took 
some time before all so-called microstates became equal members of the United 
Nations.44 Consequently, there are no specific requirements for a minimum 
population inhabiting a territorial entity for it to be considered a state for the 
purposes of the United Nations membership.  
In conclusion, the size of the population of a state may vary greatly and the element 
of permanency is equally undetermined. Nevertheless, the changes in the number 
of people living in a state and their connection with central authority do not, in 
principle, affect the criterion of permanent population as an element which defines 
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statehood.  More recently however, McAdam raised a question of whether a state 
ceases to meet the criterion once a large proportion or in fact all of its population 
lives outside the state’s territory as a result that territory being severely affected by 
the climate change.45 The author refers to the situation of a number of Pacific 
countries where ‘the exodus of population is accompanied by, or premised on, the 
imminent or eventual loss of territory’.46 As noted above, as the international law 
currently stands, even major shifts in the population do not seem to affect the 
element of permanent population as a criterion that defines statehood. 
Nonetheless, if no population remained on the territory, it would become 
necessary to ask whether and how a state may continue to exist.  
 
2.3.2  A Defined Territory  
States are undoubtedly territorial entities and at least at the first instance, the right 
to be a state depends upon exercising full governmental powers with respect to 
some area of territory.47 As is the case with the permanent population element, 
international law does not prescribe minimum limits with regard to area of territory 
required for an entity to claim statehood. 
Much of what has been said above regarding the element of permanent population 
applies to the criterion of defined territory. The territory needs not to be 
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continuous as even split territories are accepted as constitutive of statehood.48 
Similarly, international law does not require settled borders but rather ‘sufficient 
consistency’ of the territory.49  As confirmed by the International Court of Justice in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases: 
‘The appurtenance of a given area, considered as an entity, in no way 
governs the precise delimitation of its boundaries, any more than 
uncertainty as to boundaries can affect territorial rights. There is for 
instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and 
defined, and often in various places and for long periods they are not, as is 
shown by the case of the entry of Albania into the League of Nations’.50    
Consequently, although the link between statehood and territory is crucial, even a 
substantial boundary or territorial dispute is not enough to bring statehood into 
question. As stated by Crawford:  
‘The only requirement is that the State must consist of a certain coherent 
territory effectively governed – a formula that suggest that the requirement 
of territory is rather a constituent of government and independence than a 
distinction criterion of its own’.51      
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With regards to the membership in the United Nations, again, the size of a state’s 
territory does not seem to be relevant. However, as argued by Conforti, Article 4 of 
the UN Charter adopts the traditional notion of a state and consequently, 
admission has to be restricted to these governments which actually exercise 
authority over a territorial community. Consequently, ‘…the possible admission of 
governments in exile or of Organisations or Committees of national liberation 
operating abroad should be considered illegal’.52 
The criterion of a defined territory received a lot of attention in terms of it being a 
requirement for the creation of a state. As pointed out by the above mentioned 
Jane McAdam however, the criterion raises some interesting legal questions 
regarding its continuous fulfilment by states throughout their existence. Referring 
to the phenomenon of ‘disappearing states’ or ‘sinking islands’, the author 
examines the possibility of potential extinction of a state because of the climate 
change.53 She concludes that ‘in legal terms, the absence of population, rather than 
of territory, may provide the first signal that an entity no longer displays the full 
indicia of statehood’ and accordingly ‘the focus on loss of territory as the indicator 
of a State’s disappearance may be misplaced’.54 Undoubtedly, the general 
requirement for a state to have a defined territory ‘assumes that there remains a 
population on that territory to be governed’.55 
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To sum up, although as Lowe points out, the concept of a state ‘is rooted in the 
concept of control of territory’56, it seems that the criterion of defined territory as a 
necessary element of statehood is in fact minimal. It is not required that a state 
possesses defined borders and that its territory is uncontested. Most importantly, 
however, it is not required that sovereignty is exercised at every moment in every 
point of a territory – the only minimal requirement is that a certain territorial base 
exists for a state to operate. It is therefore necessary to agree with Craven that:  
‘*T+he criterion of territory assumes a highly indeterminate form in the legal 
conception of statehood – it being a simultaneously indispensable quality, 
but yet one incapable of being articulated in anything other than an 
abstract, and once again metaphorical way’.57     
 
2.3.3 A Government  
The requirement that an entity claiming its right for statehood has an effective 
government might be regarded as a central one since all other criteria to a large 
extent depend upon it. International law defines territory by reference to the reach 
of governmental power exercised or capable of being exercised with respect to 
some territory and population. It is the governmental authority that creates the 
basis for normal inter-states relations. The government needs not only exercise 
effective control over certain territory but it is also required that it does so 
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independent from the authority of other states.58 The effectiveness means that the 
government is in a position to exercise all governmental functions effectively over 
the population and territory.59 As Raič further explains: 
‘Effectiveness operates to some extent as evidence of the ability to possess 
legal rights and to fulfil legal obligations. Thus (…) an entity wishing to 
acquire (full) international personality must have effective existence of 
certain facts (that is, it must satisfy the traditional criteria for statehood) 
before the attribution of this status will take place by the international legal 
system’.60  
The requirement of government should not be identified exclusively with the 
executive power of a state as it comprises other organs such as the parliament, 
judiciary as well as the regional and local levels of government.  
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It is important to note that traditionally, international law does not prescribe a 
particular type of government.61 As concluded by the International Court of Justice 
in Western Sahara Advisory Opinion ‘no rule of international law, in the view of the 
Court, requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern, as is 
evident from the diversity of the forms of State found in the world today’. 62 
Positively, the existence of governmental system in and of specific territory signifies 
certain legal status and should be considered in general as a precondition for 
statehood. On the other hand, the lack of government in a given territory greatly 
impacts the claim against that territory being a state. Nevertheless, as noted by 
Rosalyn Higgins:  
‘*W+hile the concept of what constitutes a state has a certain undeniable 
core, the application of the component elements will also depend upon the 
purpose for which the entity concerned is claiming to be a state, and the 
circumstances in which that claim is made’.63   
The above statement is definitely correct with regard to the effective government 
criterion. The strict application of the necessary effectiveness element of the 
government in particular, seems to have been altogether abandoned in some 
recent situations of the state creation.  Probably the best modern example to 
support this claim is that of the former Belgian Congo which had been granted the 
independence in 1960 as the Republic of the Congo, later renamed Zaire and since 
1997 known as the Democratic Republic of Congo. The country experienced various 
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secessionist movements64 and the division of central government, shortly after the 
independence, into two fractions, both posing a claim to be a lawful government.65 
The Congolese authorities required continuing international assistance due to its 
effective bankruptcy and the UN had to introduce its forces in the country shortly 
after the independence in order to restore law and order and prevent civil war.66 It 
is doubtful whether the country in question had any form of effective government; 
nevertheless, the existence of the Congolese state was never put into question. On 
the contrary, the state had been widely recognized and its application for the UN 
membership accepted without dissent.67 One might therefore conclude that the 
requirement of effective government is less rigorous than has been thought, 
particularly in some circumstances. The reaction of the international community to 
the situation in Somalia in the 1990s appears to provide further supporting 
argument to that claim. Yet again, anything less like effective government it would 
be hard to imagine, nevertheless, the existence of Somali state has never been 
doubted.68  
The relaxation of the criterion of effective government in the second half of the 
twentieth century would have to be associated with the introduction of the 
principle of self-determination of peoples. In 1960 the UN General Assembly 
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proclaimed that when a people exercises its right of self-determination ‘inadequacy 
of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a 
pretext for delaying independence’. 69 Consequently, the entities which traditionally 
would not have qualified for statehood due to the lack of effective government 
have been granted one under international law.70    
Referring to the continuing existence of states, it would appear that the 
requirement of effective government is even more leniently applied in cases of 
recognised states notwithstanding the fact that they might be going through a 
considerable internal turmoil.  Even the loss of stable and effective governing body 
does not remove the attribute of their statehood once acknowledged by the 
international community. Consequently, it is necessary to agree with Brownlie’s 
conclusion that: ‘Once a state has been established, extensive civil strife or the 
breakdown of order through foreign invasion or natural disasters are not 
considered to affect personality’.71 Similarly, transformations to the constitutive 
element of the government do not mean that a state in question seizes to exist as 
such. Governments change almost constantly in terms of their internal composition 
after elections or due to a political crisis (e.g. revolutions or coups d’État). In neither 
of the above cases the statehood is being questioned. The most recent example 
confirming this claim is The Arab Spring. The revolutionary wave which so far led to 
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a complete regime change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya certainly did not put in doubt 
the statehood of these entities.72 
Consequently, once again, it has to be concluded that the criterion of effective 
government proves to be quite loosely defined. International law lays no specific 
requirements as to the nature and extent of the governmental control, as long as it 
includes some degree of maintenance of law and order and the establishment of 
basic institutions. Even more so, certain territorial entities continue to enjoy 
statehood despite lacking any sort of central authority at all.73   
 
2.3.4 Capacity to enter into relations with other states  
Finally, the last requirement for statehood, as recognized by the Montevideo 
Convention, is the capacity to enter into relations with other states. In principle, it is 
the government of a state that can bind a state, for example, by a treaty. The 
capacity to enter into relations with other states is therefore more a consequence 
of statehood than a precondition for it. Consequently, Crawford argues that:  
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‘*C+apacity to enter into relations with other States, in the sense in which it 
might be useful criterion, is a conflation of the requirements of government 
and independence’.74       
Additionally, the competency to enter into relations with other states at 
international level is not an exclusive prerogative of a state.75 It has been argued 
that various non-state entities more commonly participate in law-making 
processes, monitoring compliance with international law and enforcement of 
international rules.76  Nonetheless, it has to be noted that it is still only state that 
can enter into a full range of international relations. Actors other than states may 
have certain capacity to enter into international relations but, most commonly, only 
for limited purposes. Both selected international organisations and sub-units of 
states do have a significant, however limited at the same time, capacity to enter 
into relations with states. This limited capacity nevertheless, cannot imply their 
statehood.     
It is also important to remember that the law of statehood does not impose the 
obligation on states to enter into relations with other states at all if they do not 
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wish to do so.77 The latter would be a matter of state policy rather than the 
precondition for statehood. Consequently, the criterion of capacity to enter into 
relations with other states has been criticised as being problematic for its lack of 
substantial contribution to the definition of state.78      
The above described ‘Montevideo criteria’ are considered to be essentially based 
on the principle of effectiveness.79 However, in contemporary international law 
there exist significant and important evidence that effectiveness is no longer the 
only principle on which the law of statehood stands and there are some other, 
additional criteria which should be considered.   
 
2.4 Additional Criteria for statehood  
Certain additional criteria are sometimes suggested as required for statehood. In 
particular, even though it has not been specifically mentioned in the Montevideo 
Convention, independence should be regarded as yet another central criterion for 
statehood and various legal consequences can be attached to the lack of it in 
specific cases. As Judge Huber noted in the Islands of Palmas arbitration: 
‘Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise 
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State. The 
                                                          
77
  See Raič: ‘It does not seem to be correct to state that a territorial and political entity must have 
relations with existing States in order to qualify as a State, because the existence or lack of such 
relations is largely dependent on the will of the existing States to enter into relations with the entity 
in question. The emphasis must, therefore, be put on the term ‘capacity’’. Supra note 40, at p.73.     
78
 T Grant, ‘Defining Statehood: the Montevideo Convention and its Discontents’ 37 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 403(1999) pp. 434-435.   
79
 Supra note 7, p.97.   
83 
 
development of the national organization of States during the last few 
centuries, and, as a corollary, the development of international law, have 
established this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard 
to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in 
settling most questions that concern international relations’.80       
The independence of an existing state is protected by the rule against unlawful use 
of force in international relations contained in Article 2.4 of the United Nations 
Charter. Accordingly, the state may exist as a legal entity, even for a considerable 
time, despite its lack of effectiveness.81 On the contrary, an entity claiming 
statehood may need to demonstrate a substantial independence from the state it 
attempts to secede in order to be recognized as definitely established, separate 
state. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between independence as an 
initial criterion for statehood and as a condition for a continued existence of a 
state.82    
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It should be noted that ‘independence’ as requirement for statehood should not be 
understood literally. As Conforti observes, the formal element of the 
‘independence’ criterion requires that a state’s ‘legal system is original, it draws its 
power from its own Constitution and is not derived from the legal system or the 
Constitution of another State’.83 Consequently, for the purposes of the admission to 
the United Nations, all the states which have become members have been 
independent territorial entities.84   
Both capacity to enter into relations with other subjects of international law and 
independence are crucial for the existence of a state, however they both directly 
refer to the criterion of government and in that respect do not constitute separate 
elements which exist in parallel to the latter.  
It has been submitted that the ability and willingness to observe international law 
also constitutes an important element of statehood. The recently published Report 
of the EU’s Independent Fact-Finding mission on the conflict(s) in Georgia finds that 
‘In current international law, the observation of legal principles which are 
themselves enshrined in international law (notably the principles of self-
determination and the prohibition of the use of force), are accepted as an 
additional standard for the qualification of an entity as a state’. 85 Similarly, the 
1991 EU’s foreign ministers’ Declaration on the `Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union' proclaims that the process of 
recognition of new states requires respect for the basic international law 
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obligations and in particular these referring to the human and minority rights.86 As 
Crawford points out however, it is necessary to distinguish recognition from the 
concept statehood itself.87 Consequently, ‘unwillingness or refusal to observe 
international law may constitute grounds for refusal of recognition, or for such 
actions as international law allows, just as unwillingness to observe Charter 
obligations is a ground for non-admission to the United Nations. Both are distinct 
from statehood’.88 Additionally, the inability or unwillingness to observe 
international law does not seem to affect the continuing existence of states. As 
noted above, the statehood of Somalia has not been questioned despite the lack of 
governmental authority and clearly a complete inability to fulfil international law 
obligations.  
Likewise, a state’s legal order or legal system, namely the existence of at least some 
basic rules, does not seem to possess a status of a distinct criterion for statehood. 
As noted above, particularly during the decolonisation process, states may only 
have had basic or incomplete legal systems nevertheless had been recognised as 
states. Furthermore, even ‘revolutionary change of constitution does not as such 
affect the identity or continuity of the state’.89  Some scholars claim that recent 
developments in state practice lead to the creation of the requirement of 
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democratic governance in recognition of states.90 The view is primarily supported 
by the practice of states in relation to the recognition of new states formally part of 
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as Murphy states, although ‘notions of democratic 
legitimacy are certainly present in contemporary practice concerning recognition of 
states (…) the evidence of these notions is not uniform, and it derives exclusively 
from practice of States that are themselves democratic’.91   
It is doubtful whether the above mentioned additional elements constitute legal 
conditions for statehood.  They may nevertheless guide the political practice of 
recognition of states. The assessment of statehood in international law and 
international politics does overlap to a certain extent but also differs. Accordingly, it 
is feasible that an entity short of statehood from the formal legal perspective is 
recognised as a state by another state or states for particular political motives. It 
would therefore perhaps be more appropriate to consider the elements of 
willingness and ability to observe international law as well as the existence of a 
minimal legal order as relevant in the process of recognition of states, not 
necessarily as defining components of statehood. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
establish the accurate guidelines as to how to assess whether the above mentioned 
criteria are sufficiently met in practice. As a consequence, these requirements 
prove to be even more problematic from the international law perspective.  
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2.5 Conclusion   
The concept of statehood has been in flux throughout the twentieth century and it 
can be argued that the Montevideo Convention definition does not accurately 
reflect these changes. It appears that the application of constitutive elements of 
statehood differs in relation to creation of states, their continuing existence and 
extinction. Furthermore, as has been argued in this chapter and will be further 
analysed in the following section of the thesis, Montevideo definition is primarily 
limited to an indication of the elements necessary for a state to be created. Even in 
the circumstances of state creation however, the application of constitutive 
requirements for statehood varies as is most evidently shown by the 
implementation of the effective government requirement.  Consequently, although 
it is theoretically required that a state must fulfill all four Montevideo requirements 
when it is created, as will be evidenced by the state failure phenomenon, it is 
difficult to employ the analysis of the constitutive elements to assess any 
transformations in an already recognised state. In fact the international legal 
consequences of the change to any of the elements are not clear and as it would 
appear that they do not affect the condition of an entity as a state as such. A strong 
presumption applies to the continuity of a state once it has been created and even 
protracted loss of effective government does not appear to affect its international 
legal personality. It is therefore essential to establish the international legal 
consequences of the continuing existence of states in a situation where one of the 
principal features of statehood – effective government – is not in place. The 
following chapter will accordingly explore the concept of state failure from formal, 
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legal perspective. The analysis conducted in chapter three provides a starting point 
for the investigation of a more specific matter, namely the impact of state failure on 





CONCEPTUALISING STATE FAILURE 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the concept of ‘failed state’ from the international law 
perspective. The point of departure will be the consideration of applicability of the 
Montevideo Convention requirements for statehood in the evaluation of failed 
state. Two different possible approaches towards failed states will be analysed, 
namely their extinction and their continuity under international law. Subsequently, 
it will be analysed how the concept has been embraced by the international 
relations scholars and whether this perspective can contribute towards resolving 
the conceptual and terminological difficulties that such construct entails. 
Throughout the chapter some examples of ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ states will be 
presented in order to provide an understanding of how the phenomenon occurs in 
practice. It is anticipated that chapter three will conclude with a proposition of a 
legal approach to the definition of state failure – such that is suitable for an 
international law analysis and application. Finally, the international legal 
consequences of the lack of effective government will be analysed focusing on 
three main areas: states’ incapacity to interact with other subjects of international 
law, its inability to exercise rights and fulfil international legal obligations and the 
international responsibility of such entities.  The investigation of state failure 
phenomenon carried out in this chapter provides the essential background for 
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chapters four and five where the thesis engages in consideration of the issue of 
whether a state may use force in self-defence in response to forcible action by non-
state actors operating from within a failed state.  
 
3.2 Conceptualising state failure  
The disintegration of governmental structures and accompanying intense internal 
conflicts are not an infrequent occurrence. Subsequent failure or at times total 
collapse of the social organisation of society entails numerous conceptual and 
terminological difficulties. The following section of this chapter will be dedicated to 
the examination of the phenomenon of state failure and the statehood of 
‘collapsed’ or ‘disintegrated’ states in public international law. Accordingly, legal 
definition, suitable for an analysis based in international law, of a failed state will be 
provided. 
   
3.2.1 State failure and the Montevideo Convention requirements for statehood. 
Is statehood altered by changes to the constitutive elements of a state? 
States experience constant transformations in their constitutive elements which 
nevertheless, as observed in the preceding chapter, do not have effect upon 
recognition of their statehood in international law. As noted above, the population 
of states continuously changes. At any given moment it is not exactly the same as 
nationals die and new are born, some people obtain nationality and others 
renounce it. Equally, territorial changes, although less frequent, also occur. Internal 
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political organisation of a society, and in particular governments, similarly does not 
permanently remain the same. Changes in the governments may take place after 
each elections, as an effect of political crises or even through revolutions and coups 
d’État. In neither of these cases statehood is being put into question. The 
transformations to the constitutive elements of the government certainly do not 
equate to the extinction of a state and an emergence of a new one to occupy the 
position of the former. Accordingly, the concept of a state continuity is one of the 
most important presumptions in international law.1 The notion indicates that 
despite suffering some internal changes in its constitutive elements, the state 
continues to exist without these transformations affecting its condition of state or 
legal personality.  
Generally, therefore, there is a strong presumption favouring the continuity of 
states and negation of state extinction. A state does not cease to exist even if it is 
occupied, either lawfully or unlawfully, by another state.2 As Brownlie pointed out: 
‘illegal usurpation of power as a result of foreign invasion will not cause the demise 
of a State (…) it will compromise its enjoyment of the incidents of statehood within 
a part or the whole of its own territory’.3 That is why when Iraq illegally invaded 
Kuwait in 1990 the latter did not cease to exist and the United Nations Security 
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Council called upon ‘all states, international organisations and specialised agencies 
not to recognise that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that 
might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation’.4 Equally, when 
Iraq was invaded and consequently occupied in 2003, the UN Security Council 
again, clearly indicating that the state continued to exist, reaffirmed ‘the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq’.5  
Failed states witness major changes in all of their constitutive elements. Large 
portions of their populations migrate outside the state border, as shown by the 
examples of Sudan or Somalia. Major shifts in population however, do not prevent 
the recognition of states in question as fully-fledged sovereign entities with all the 
obligations that follow. Additionally, it is not infrequent occurrence that parts of the 
failed states’ territory remain contested or suffer continuous incursions. As 
discussed earlier, due to the rapid climate change some of the island states may 
lose large parts of their territory. Nevertheless, the requisite of a determined 
territory is not strict and remains fulfilled despite competing claims over a 
territory.6 As Giorgetti concludes, ‘the requisite for a definite territory is minimal 
and it only requires that a certain territorial base exists for a State to operate (…) 
failed State continue to be considered fully fledged and fully responsible States 
even if their territories are altered’.7 In conclusion, even substantial changes to the 
first two elements of statehood, do not in any event indicate that state becomes 
extinct. It would be an extreme and unprecedented, although in view of the rapid 
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climate change perhaps not unforeseeable, case for a state to lose its entire 
territory and population.    
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, failed states experience not just 
simple changes in government but prolonged periods of time without any 
government capable of exercising its functions. Undoubtedly, from a legal point of 
view, this is a considerably more complex scenario than the shifts in population and 
territory. As noted in Chapter two, statehood has been at times achieved without 
an effective government. Furthermore, international law allows for an existence of 
a state which lost its effective government as a result of the violation of the 
prohibition of the use of force. The lack of effective government characterising 
failed state situation is somewhat different and appears to be its most relevant 
feature from the international legal perspective. Again, however, the contradictory 
nature of the definition of statehood contained in the Montevideo Convention is 
particularly evident here. Despite being considered as the core of statehood, it is 
accepted that momentary lack of effective government does not affect it.8 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that in terms of continuing existence of states, 
temporary disappearance of effective government does not bear any fundamental 
consequences. As Higgins points out, ‘what is absolutely clear is that a loss of 
‘stable and effective government’ does not remove the attribute of statehood once 
statehood has been acknowledged’.9 Consequently, failed states remain states 
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notwithstanding a complete lack or radical alterations to their governmental 
structures.  
Finally, it would appear that the fourth element identified in the Montevideo 
Convention as a requirement for statehood, namely the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states, also does not provide much assistance in assessing the 
status of failed states. It is quite evident that a state continues to exist despite its 
incapacity not only to enter into international relations but even when it is unable 
to fully perform its international obligations.10 Failed states possess a very limited 
capacity to engage into international relations and discharge their international 
obligations. Nevertheless, they remain recognised as states by the international 
community and their status in the international community does not change.    
The above shows that the loss of any or in fact all elements that define statehood 
does not result in its automatic disappearance or even alteration of its status in 
international law. Alleged state failure does not seem to alter the identity of a state 
once it has been recognised by the international community.  The definition of a 
state contained in the Montevideo Convention does not assist in the assessment of 
the changes in the position and responsibilities of a state once it has been created. 
It is difficult to transpose the analysis of the constitutive elements to inspect any 
modification in an already existing and recognised state. The Montevideo 
Convention focuses primarily on the elements needed to create a state and not 
necessarily on the elements required to maintain statehood. At present, the 
phenomenon of failed states is not acknowledged by the framework of 
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international law. As a result of the definition of constitutive elements of statehood 
remaining very general, states which failed continue to be considered fully-fledged 
sovereign entities required to behave like states and fulfil many obligations 
imposed on them despite the fact that there may be no authority which can 
perform them. Nevertheless, while it is clearly necessary to recognise that a state 
does not disappear due to certain characteristics that were required at its creation 
being no longer present, it is also important to acknowledge that the 
transformations in the constitutive elements of statehood, and in particular lack of 
effectively functioning government, severely affect the ability of the state to 
exercise its rights and perform its obligations. Chapter four will focus on examining 
how such inability of a state to perform its duties under international law impacts 
the rules regarding self-defence against non-state actors.  
 
3.2.2 The notion of ‘Failed State’ - analysis of the concept 
The phenomenon of state failure and collapse entails a multitude of conceptual and 
terminological problems. The concept of ‘failed state’ originated in international 
relations and has been first brought into prominence with the 1992 article by 
Helman and Ratner.11 Ever since then, the idea has been widely used to describe 
states which are unable to maintain themselves as members of the international 
community. Nevertheless, there is no standard definition of what a failed or 
collapsed state actually is. Additionally, different terms are used by different 
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authors to refer to the same or similar situation: ‘failing’ states12, ‘collapsed’ 
states13, ‘disintegrated’ states14, ‘dysfunctional’ states15 and ‘weak’ states16 – all 
these can be found in the relevant literature. Academics struggled to approach in a 
systematic way the phenomenon and conundrum raised by the collapse of state 
institutions at the international level. One of the most important reasons for such a 
situation may be that, as explained by James Crawford at the beginning of his 
seminal book The Creation of States in International Law, statehood is a creature of 
law and fact, it is ‘not a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact … *but in the sense of+ 
a legal status attaching to a certain state of affairs by virtue of certain rules or 
practices’.17 Consequently, if one of the essential factual elements of statehood, 
that is an effective government, is non-existent for a number of years, it may 
become questionable to insist that a state still is. The reality of dysfunctional 
territorial entities which lack organised central governments emphasises the 
inadequacies of the Westphalian system of international law which is organised 
around fully operational states. Failed states do not fit this paradigm and therefore 
present a great challenge for the largely static international legal order.   
Observers and various institutions attempted to create indexes of failed states in 
order to classify nations with the least effective governments. Probably the best 
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known ranking is the annual Failed State Index (later renamed as Fragile State 
Index) produced by Fund for Peace in cooperation with Foreign Policy Magazine.18 
Fund for Peace constructed its own, unique methodology based on the Conflict 
Assessment Software Tool analytical platform. The study focuses on the indicators 
of risks and state vulnerability to failure. Scores are apportioned to every country 
based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators. According to the 2015 
Fragile State Index, the ten worst functioning states are:  
1. South Sudan  
2. Somalia 
3. Central African Republic 
4. Sudan  
5. Democratic Republic of Congo  
6. Chad 
7. Yemen  
8. Afghanistan 
9. Syria 
10. Guinea 19 
                                                          
18
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Similarly, The World Bank has created a "Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment" (hereinafter CPIA) index that ranks states for purposes of allocating 
aid. The CPIA employs sixteen criteria, divided into four groups, that is:  economic 
management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public 
sector management and institutions.20 The CPIA is referred to as International 
Development Association Resource Allocation Index for the purposes of resource 
allocation. In the 2010 - 2014 Index, the World Bank experts assessed 81 states 
being eligible recipients for concessional funds and the countries with the lowest 
average IDA Resource Allocation Index score were as follows:-     
1. Zimbabwe  
2. Sudan  
3. Chad   
4. Democratic Republic of Congo  
5. Angola   
6. Comoros  
7. Haiti  
8. Timor Leste  
9. Afghanistan 21   
It has to be noted that Somalia has not been rated in the 2010 - 2014 Index. 
Nevertheless, it would be included in the World Bank ‘core’ fragile states group 
along with all other states with the average IDA Resource Allocation Index score 
                                                          
20
 The World Bank Group, CPIA 2015 Criteria, available at  http://data.worldbank.org/data-
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below 3.0. According to the World Bank reports, these states experience high levels 
of extreme poverty, low levels of economic growth, savings and investment, and 
education, repeated circles of violent conflicts as well as high infant mortality and 
deaths from disease.22     
There are certain differences in the way observers and various institutions rank 
failed states, however, there is also the strong degree of overlap. For example, the 
Brooking Institution’s 2008 Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 
assesses more or less the same states as the World Bank using similar twenty 
economic, political, security and social welfare indicators.23 It is therefore 
commonly agreed that Somalia is the failed state par excellence, or to put it 
differently, the only truly ‘collapsed state’.   
The origin of ‘failed states’ is often considered to be the decolonisation process of 
the 1960s, when the execution of the principle of self-determination of peoples as 
defined by the UN General Assembly, led to the creation of a number of new state 
which lacked the capacity to govern themselves effectively. Referring to the 
phenomenon of ‘quasi-State’, Robert Jackson argued that a considerable number of 
‘third world’ states ‘appear to be juridical more than empirical entities’ which 
without support from international law and material aid would not be self-standing 
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territorial jurisdictions.24 The author distinguishes between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
sovereignty, the latter being employed to describe international normative 
framework which upholds sovereign statehood in the Third World.25 According to 
Jackson, ‘a great variety of international statuses including more intrusive forms of 
international trusteeship might have rendered the post-colonial situation less 
unsatisfactory than it proved time and again under the one-dimensional negative 
sovereignty regime’.26 The theme of a necessity for some form of international 
trusteeship recurs in the literature on state failure which followed. Helman and 
Ratner also questioned whether the nation-state framework remains appropriate 
for all peoples and territories. They accordingly proposed a new form of United 
Nations conservatorship as a solution for failed states.27 As such, it would be only a 
temporary reduction in sovereignty ultimately leading to the failed state regaining 
its full independence.28    
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Due to an overwhelming complexity of the concept however, it has been extremely 
difficult to achieve agreement on an articulated objective definition and a number 
of propositions have been put forward. Zartman, for example, focuses on the failed 
state’s inability to fulfil its social contract and defines state collapse as ‘a situation 
where structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen 
apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new’.29 The author argues 
that state failure manifests itself not only through the ineffectiveness of the central 
government but also in general breakdown of societal infrastructures and in fact 
the very foundations of society.30 Similarly, Rotberg, clearly referring to the theory 
of unfulfilled social contract, observes that ‘nation-states failed when they are 
consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their 
inhabitants’.31 The author proposes a hierarchy of political goods amongst which 
security and in particular human security is considered to be of utmost 
importance.32 Contrary to Zartman, he does distinguish between different kinds of 
state failure, identifying weak, failed and collapsed states.33 Accordingly, depending 
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on the degree of inability to provide various political goods, states can be classified 
as being more or less failed, since the phenomenon is considered to be more 
correctly depicted as a continuum rather than a once and for all established set of 
circumstances.  
Encapsulating the concept within a legal paradigm is undoubtedly a difficult task as 
the existence of a state without effective government has not been foreseen by 
international law and therefore, failed states are fundamentally unique creatures 
requiring specifically tailored responses to the challenges they pose. Consequently, 
it is difficult to resolve some terminological and conceptual issues involved in the 
studies on state failure. One of the principal sources of ambiguity is under which 
criteria a state may be described as being in the process of failing or already failed 
or collapsed. Thürer in his 1999 article ‘The “failed state” and International Law’ 
argued that the term ‘failed’ is far too broad since the aggressive, arbitrary 
tyrannical or totalitarian states could equally be considered as ‘failed’ states 
according to international law standards.34 Then again the approach focusing 
primarily on the lack of governmental authority is too narrow due to the complexity 
of the phenomenon and multi layered failure of a state as a whole.35 Consequently, 
Thürer acknowledges that ‘the term “failed” State does not denote a precisely 
defined and classifiable situation but serves rather as a broad label for a 
phenomenon which can be interpreted in various ways’.36 
                                                                                                                                                                    
plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state’; at p. 9: ‘A collapsed state is 
a rare and extreme version of failed state (…) A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority’.     
34
 D Thürer, supra note 14, p. 733.   
35
 Ibid.  
36
 Ibid. The author identifies three elements which characterise ‘failed states’ from the political point 
of view: ‘Firstly, there is a geographical and territorial aspect, namely the fact that ‘failed States’ are 
103 
 
The discussion about the applicable criteria under which a state can be described as 
being in a process of failing or already collapsed is far from being satisfactorily 
concluded. It is perhaps primarily due to the fact that, as Chiara Giorgetti observes: 
‘State failure is better described as a phenomenon in evolution, which, in a 
graphical representation, is better visualized as a line, not a point. Thus, while 
complete State collapse is the final stage of the phenomenon, there are several 
stages that link complete failure to a fully functioning State, depending on the 
residual capacity of a State to fulfil its obligations’.37As will be evident in the 
analysis conducted in chapter four, this “evolutive” character of state failure has 
profound consequences on the legality of the use of force in self-defence against 
non-state actors.    
The common feature of state failure is the loss of governmental control over states’ 
territory, which may of course vary in its form and extent, and which follows 
logically the implosion of central authority. Failed states suffer from implosion of 
the structures of power and authority which inevitably leads to disintegration and 
destruction of the state. However, as  Geiβ points out ‘…while loss of control over 
certain delimited parts of a state’s territory is not uncommon, total and protracted 
loss of central control over the entire territory is rare and arguably warrants the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
essentially associated with internal and endogenous problems (…) Secondly, there is the political 
aspect, namely the internal collapse of law and order (…) Thirdly, there is the functional aspect, 
namely the absence of bodies capable, on the one hand, of representing the State at the 
international level and, on the other hand, of being influenced by the outside world’. From a legal 
point of view ‘failed state’ could be characterised as one which ‘though retaining legal capacity, has 
for all practical purposes lost the ability to exercise it’. In terms of historical and developmental 
context, Thürer points towards ‘Third World States which have been affected by three geopolitical 
factors: the end of Cold War (…) the heritage of colonial regimes (…) general processes of 
modernisation’. Finally, from the sociological perspective, the phenomenon is characterised by ‘the 
collapse of the core of government’ and ‘the brutality and intensity of violence used’. pp.733.        
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specific categorization and suggestive designation as a failed state, in view of the 
various implications it entails at the international level’.38 In such situations various 
non-state entities claim and indeed eventually possess a monopoly on the use of 
force and perform a number of state functions such as taxation or even supply of 
education and health services to the local population. As it was noted above, the 
lack of effective governmental authority results in the state’s representation on the 
international arena being reduced to a bare minimum. The entity in question 
cannot enter into international agreements and may also be incapable of 
requesting or consenting to often urgently required interventions by third parties.   
One of the terminological difficulties presented by the notion of ‘failed state’ is the 
fact that it involves a value judgement which would imply that there is an agreed 
standard of social, political and economic performance to which all states should 
aspire. Such an approach would not be useful in the legal analysis of the problem. 
Instead, as Yannis argues, ‘such situation should be evaluated in terms of the 
minimum standards of governance that reflect a universal consensus about the 
minimum requirements of effective and responsible government’.39 It is necessary 
to employ legal terms when conducting the legal examination of the problem. From 
the international legal perspective, the most important element of state failure is 
undoubtedly the loss of effective government. The effective government is a 
constitutive element of statehood and a legal concept. Accordingly, as analysed 
below, from the legal perspective, it is more appropriate to refer to the situations 
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considered as state failure in terms of the loss of effective government. As pointed 
out by Koskenmäki, ‘contrary to the not uncommon practice, the terms ‘failed’ or 
‘collapsed state’ should not be employed carelessly, at least in legal discourse, but 
with awareness of their meaning and legal consequences’.40   
 
3.2.3 A legal approach to a definition of state failure – the loss of effective 
government  
Despite the fact that there are various characteristics of ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ 
states, it is important to distinguish between the symptoms or features which 
characterise them and actual legal concepts which can constitute their defining 
criteria. Consequently, although such elements as widespread human rights 
violations, humanitarian law violations, famine and poverty, or internal 
displacements and refugee flows are all present in case of state failure, they are 
equally relevant for other situations such as, for example, international and internal 
armed conflicts or natural disasters. They may be considered as the indicators of 
the phenomenon but hardly defining criteria in a legal sense.  
The way to achieve a workable definition of state failure would be through adopting 
a utilitarian approach and focus on specific purpose for which the definition is 
sought. Consequently, for the purposes of international law, the total or near total 
implosion of effective central government and governmental services guaranteeing 
law and order is the most relevant common denominator of failed states. The 
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effectiveness of government is, as a matter of fact, an extension of the principle of 
effectiveness which has been widely accepted as one of the general principles of 
international law in accordance with Article 38(I)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.41 As noted by Akpinarli, the principle of effectiveness 
is being implemented in the existing statehood through the internal and external 
aspects of the effectiveness of the government.42 The internal aspect of 
effectiveness is therefore expressed through the ability of the existing government 
to maintain law and order and govern the existing population within a defined 
territory. This is precisely where failed states prove to be unsuccessful. According to 
Kreijen, ‘the virtual absence of government (…) generates a general inability on the 
part of the failed state to maintain law and order’.43 Similarly, Thürer argues that 
state failure is ‘the product of collapse of the power structures providing political 
support for law and order’.44 It means ‘the absence of bodies capable…of 
representing the State at the international level and…being influenced by the 
outside world. Either no institution exists which has the authority to negotiate, 
represent and enforce or, if one does, it is wholly unreliable, typically acting as 
‘statesman by day and bandit by night’’.45 It is in fact as well a point taken upon by 
James Crawford who refers to state failure as primarily crises of government.46 As 
he concludes, none of the situations described as state failure, i.e. Somalia, the 
Congo, Liberia, etc. ‘has involved the extinction of a State in question and it is 
                                                          
41
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38 (I)(c) 
42
 N Akpinarli The Fragility of the ‘Failed State’ Paradigm: A Different International Law Perception of 
the Absence of Effective Government (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), p.10. 
43
 G Kreijen State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness. Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-
Saharan Africa, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), p. 84.  
44
 Supra note 14, p. 735.  
45
 Ibid.  
46
 Supra note 1, p. 721-722.  
107 
 
difficult to see what possible basis there could be for supporting otherwise (…) 
although there are many poor, often desperately poor, States, one must ask what 
they might otherwise be or have been – satellites of a neighbour, for example, or 
equally poor or even poorer colonies?’.47 On the other hand, the external 
effectiveness would be express via state’s ability to represent its people, active 
participation in states’ relations and the capacity to exercise its rights and fulfil its 
duties under international law. Yet again, failed states prove deficient in this 
respect.       
The absence of effective government, as evidenced by the collapsed of state 
institutions understood in a broad sense, leads to a long-term default of decision-
making power which in turn causes the gradual decline of administrative structure 
of a failed state. As noted above, prolonged lack of a functioning legislature, 
executive and judicial organs lead to the end of law and order and severe 
fragmentation of authority. Consequently, the power vacuum which emerges is 
often filled by a variety of non-state actors governing sections of the state’s 
territory. As a result of the above, failed states are most commonly incapable to 
reorganise and rebuild themselves and their effective governments by their own 
means. Furthermore, the appearance of powerful non-state actors and their armed 
activities beyond the boundaries of a failed state, necessitate the reconsideration of 
the rules regarding the use of force in self-defence.   
Prolonged inability to effectively govern a state and maintain law and order may be 
seriously compromised during an armed conflict. Such conflicts had been described 
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by the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as being characterised 
by ‘the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with 
resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of the law and order, and general 
banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, but its 
assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the 
country. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars’.48  Undoubtedly, state collapse is 
linked to a particular type of conflicts which, through the various causes of state 
failure, manifest themselves in a society to the point where the governmental 
failure occurs. These conflicts have been identified and referred to by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross as ‘anarchic conflicts’.49 The essential 
characteristics of such conflicts are as follows: (a) the disintegration of the organs of 
the central government, which is no longer able to exercise its rights or perform its 
duties in relation to the territory and the population (b) the presence of many 
armed factions (c) divided control of the national territory, and finally (d) the 
breakdown of the chain of command within the various factions and their militias.50  
According to the ICRC, these conflicts are non-international armed conflicts 
regulated by the applicable rules of international humanitarian law.51  The 
difference between such type of armed conflicts and the classic civil war is that in 
the former, it is often difficult to identify the number of parties involved as well as 
their aims and alliances. The fragmentation of the parties to an anarchic conflict is 
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most commonly determined along ethnic, religious and cultural lines or through the 
struggle for control over the country’s natural resources. It is not infrequent that 
the groups involved in such a conflict often lack military organisation and political 
identification. Furthermore, it has been identified that anarchic conflict usually last 
considerably longer than the civil wars.52 As a result, failed states remain without 
effectively functioning governments for a prolonged period of time. Although, as 
noted by the ICRC, anarchic conflicts would be govern by the applicable rules of 
international humanitarian law, the armed attacks perpetrated outside the state 
borders by non-state armed groups engage in this type of conflict, necessitate the 
implementation of the international law rules regarding the use of force in self-
defence in states’ relations.   
It has to be noted that no state in the world exercises a complete degree of control 
via its government over its population and territory. There is no support for the 
view that such loss of effective government entails the extinction of the state, as 
the acceptance of this argument would be in direct contradiction to some of the 
most fundamental norms of international law, including, most importantly, the 
principle of sovereign equality of states. Accordingly, the continuation of failed 
states is the preferred and widely accepted position despite the absence of a 
constitutive element of statehood. According to Classen, ‘in principle, the legal 
personality of the State survives and so do all rights which are derived from it. In 
particular, the State retains its territorial sovereignty and enjoys the protection 
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from the prohibition of interference in internal affairs, and of military 
intervention’.53  
The continuing existence of failed states presents a set of difficulties and challenges 
to international law, one of them being provision of the actual definition of such 
territorial entities. Taking into consideration the defining criteria for statehood 
analysed in the preceding chapter, from an international legal perspective, the 
prolonged lack of effective governance appears to be the main characteristic of 
failed states. Accordingly, a suitable legal definition would be applicable to the 
situations of the states which as a consequence of anarchic conflicts, as described 
by the ICRC above, lack, either totally or partially, an effective government capable 
to maintain law and order in its territory or substantial part of its territory, and 
which also lack the capacity to rebuild their governments by their own means. 
Consequently, the degree of state collapse or disintegration would be determined 
by the degree of lack of effective government – with extreme cases of a complete 
lack of governmental authority and other examples where the existing power 
structures exercise only marginal control over population and territory of the State.              
 
3.3 International legal consequences of the continuing existence of states with no 
effective government 
As a subject of international law, each state has two capacities – the legal capacity, 
namely the rights and duties under international law, and the capacity to exercise 
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rights and fulfil duties under international law order.54 The ability to act with 
unrestricted capacity by states is of paramount importance in international law. 
Failed states face numerous international legal consequences arising as a result of 
prolonged periods without effectively functioning governments and consequent 
inability to exert their sovereignty over national territory and in international 
relations. The three sections below, however, will only be concerned with a 
selection of issues which appear to be the most relevant for this thesis. 
Additionally, the question of possible international legal responsibility of failed 
states will be further examined in Chapter five with a specific reference to the 
regime governing the use of force in self-defence in states relation.    
 
3.3.1 The inability to enter into relations with other subjects of international law           
As pointed out by the Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘States can only act 
by and through their agents and representatives’.55 Consequently, the lack of 
effective government means that a failed state may not be in a position to provide 
such agents and representatives resulting in exclusion of the state and its people 
from international relations.56 The situation is well described by Kreijen: 
‘From a material point of view (…) the capacity of the failed State to enter into 
international relations is affected. It stands to reason that this capacity must be 
severely reduced by the virtual absence of government within the failed State. As 
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revealed by the extreme case of Somalia, the general lack of a clearly identifiable 
responsible agent severely complicates, and may even render impossible, the 
conduct and maintenance of any bilateral or multilateral international relations. 
Both individual States and international organisations will as a rule find it very 
difficult, if not impossible, to identify a counterpart to deal with the failed State’.57  
From a functional perspective, the fact that failed states lack bodies capable of 
representing them on the international level means that they are unable to 
conclude international treaties.58 Similarly, it proves difficult for the states with no 
effective government and representatives to participate in international 
proceedings.59 The ability of the state to participate in diplomatic relations suffers 
as a consequence of incapacity to issue credentials to diplomatic missions’ 
personnel.60 This can certainly have serious consequences for the nationals of a 
failed state as, for example, their passports cannot be renewed and their interests 
abroad protected.   
The absence of an effective government makes it impossible for a failed state’s 
representation to have its credentials renewed for every session of the UN General 
Assembly. For example, when Somalia lacked any government, although remaining 
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a member state of the UN and theoretically having a place in the UN General 
Assembly, in practice, nobody was authorised to represent it in the functioning of 
the organ between 1992 and 2000.61 Nevertheless, the practice of the UN Security 
Council and the UN human right bodies has been somewhat different as they 
allowed the participation and even invited Somalia to their meetings despite 
presumably defective or non-existent credentials of its representatives.62 This 
inconsistent approach evidences the unpreparedness of the organisation as a whole 
to deal with the issues relating to the representation of the failed state.  
There are some partial solutions to the problem of the failed state’s inability to 
engage in international relations. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court for example, in Article 57(3) (d) ‘authorize the Prosecutor to take specific 
investigative steps within the territory of a State Party without having secured the 
cooperation of that State under Part 9 if, whenever possible having regard to the 
views of the State concerned, the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined in that case 
that the State is clearly unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the 
unavailability of any authority or any component of its judicial system competent to 
execute the request for cooperation under Part 9’.63 Nevertheless, although 
suitable for the purposes of this particular international treaty, this type of 
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provision does not solve the above described wider problem of the incapacity of 
territorial entities without functioning government to participate in states’ 
relations. To sum up, the lack of effectively functioning government undoubtedly 
complicates the state’s capacity to interact with other subjects of international law 
by making it incredibly difficult to sign and implement treaties, as well as 
representing a state in regional and international organisations.   
 
3.3.2 The inability to exercise rights and fulfil international legal obligations    
States which experience lack of effective government or in fact lack of any 
government at all, are in great difficulties to fulfil their international legal 
obligations deriving from both conventional and customary international law. 
Despite suffering from disintegration of their governmental institutions, as noted 
above, failed states retain their legal personality. Without their agents and organs 
however, they are either unable to exercise their rights and fulfil their duties as 
subjects of international law or their capacity to do so is in fact severely limited. 
Koskenmäki pointed out that ‘the prolonged absence of any state organs, entails an 
absolute impossibility to comply with the international obligations of the state’.64     
First of all, the absence of an effective government presents an obstacle to exercise 
rights under treaties which have already been concluded. Additionally, as evidenced 
by the situation in Somalia, the capacity to conclude international treaties under 
Article 6 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is missing in case of 
failed states. The latter is particularly important in terms of international 
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development policy as international efforts to rebuild failed states suffer from the 
lack of central and other organs within such states.65 As stated in the UN Security 
Council Resolution 387 of 31st March 1976, it is ‘the inherent and lawful right of 
every state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance from any other 
state or group of states’.66 It would be physically impossible however, for a state 
without effective government to request such assistance. Again, the case of Somalia 
is an illustrative example. The UN Security Council Resolution 794 of 3rd December 
1992 clearly stated that ‘in Somalia there is no government that can be the 
interlocutor of the United Nations for the purposes of agreeing upon a 
humanitarian-assistance operation’.67 Furthermore, failed states would not be able 
to participate in judicial proceedings in either foreign or international courts since 
there exists no person or institution capable of such representation. 
The nonexistence of an effective government has a great impact on the capacity to 
fulfil international legal obligations by the failed state. As described by Akpinarli, 
‘The lack or restricted effectiveness of the central organs hinders the fulfilment of 
international duties in good faith. A state with no effective government cannot 
observe treaties according to the general principle of pacta sunt servanda in Article 
26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The state could appear in 
default on its payment or fail to fulfil multinational treaties on human rights or 
international humanitarian law.’68 Similarly, absence of effective government 
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equates to state’s complete incapacity to fulfil its duties as a member of 
international organisations.  
As noted above, a failed state would not be in a position to fulfil its conventional 
duties. There are a couple of provisions in the Vienna Conventions on the Law of 
Treaties (hereinafter VCLT) which could perhaps apply in these circumstances. 
Article 61 of the Convention concerns the impossibility of performance when that 
impossibility is either temporary or permanent and relates to the disappearance or 
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of a treaty.69 Nevertheless, 
as noted in the International Law Commission’s commentary to what would 
eventually become Article 61(1) of the VCLT, ‘the type of cases envisaged by the 
article is the submergence of an island, the drying up of a river or the destruction of 
a dam or hydro-electric installation indispensable for the execution of a treaty’.70 
The Article therefore, has not been drafted having in mind cases of states lacking 
effective governments and consequently, unable to discharge treaty obligations. 
Similarly, the applicability of the clausula rebus sic stantibus contained in the Article 
62 of the VCLT to the situations of failed states proves problematic.71 Although it 
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would appear that the partial or total collapse of a state could possibly satisfy the 
first condition contained in the Article, that is unforeseeable external change that 
influences the circumstances which formed the basis for concluding the treaty, the 
fulfilment of the second condition may be difficult to argue. It is questionable 
whether the disintegration of state structures has a radical effect on the extent of 
the obligations to be performed under a treaty. Additionally, in order to invoke the 
circumstances described in the Article 62, the procedure contained in the Articles 
65 – 68 of the Convention has to be followed.72 A state would therefore need to 
have the necessary organs in place in order to engage in international relations. It is 
therefore, correct to agree with Koskenmäki when she states that ‘the application 
of the VCLT to situations of state failure seems unsatisfactory, first, since its 
provisions on the non-application of treaties are difficult to apply to that particular 
situation, and second, as it completely ignores the possibility of the absence of a 
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3.3.3 The question of international responsibility  
Considering the fact that failed states continue to enjoy their international legal 
personality, in principle, they also continue to have international rights and 
obligations and could be subject to be held internationally responsible. The 
question, however, is whether a state with no organs or agents capable to act on its 
behalf can be held responsible for the violations of international law. According to 
Thürer, ‘current international law holds that a State cannot be held liable for any 
breaches if it no longer has institutions or officials authorised to act on its behalf. In 
particular, the State cannot be held responsible for not having prevented offences 
against international law committed by private individuals or for not having called 
them to account for their conduct. The reason for this is that the State does not 
have the necessary power to act’.74  Nevertheless, in order to analyse the problem 
of possible international responsibility of the failed state, it is necessary to take into 
consideration the work of the International Law Commission and, in particular, the 
Articles on State Responsibility.75    
In principle, states are responsible for the conduct of its agents or organs and the 
conduct of private persons or entities is not in general attributable to the state, 
unless in particular exceptions. Article 9 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility 
provides for one such exception stating that ‘a person or a group of persons is in 
fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of 
the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those 
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elements of authority’.76 These circumstances, according to the ILC’s commentary 
to the Article, occur only rarely and the cases referred to ‘presuppose the existence 
of a Government in office and a State machinery whose place is taken by irregulars 
or whose action is supplemented in certain cases. This may happen on part of the 
territory of a State which is for the time being out of control, or in other specific 
circumstances ’.77 This commentary appears to suggest that the provisions of Article 
9 intend to cover primarily transitional situation where, nevertheless, the 
governmental authority is present at least to a certain degree.78 Despite the above, 
the ILC’s commentary clearly points out to the possibility for the application of 
Article 9 to the situations of state collapse. The ILC’s states that: ‘The phrase “in 
absence or default of” is intended to cover both situations of a total collapse of the 
State apparatus as well as cases where the official authorities are not exercising 
their functions in some specific respect, for instance, in the case of a partial collapse 
of the State or its loss of control over certain locality. The phrase “absence or 
default” seeks to capture both situations’.79  This is in contradiction with above 
cited commentary referring to the necessity for existence of at least some presence 
of the governmental authority.  
Once certain conduct has nevertheless been attributed to the failed state in the 
light of the provisions contained in Article 9, the state in question could only be 
held internationally responsible if its conduct does not fall under one of the 
                                                          
76
 Ibid. Article 9.   
77
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of fifty-third session (23 April-1 June and 
2 July-10 August 2001), p.49 at para. 4.  
78
 According to the ILC Commentary, such circumstances ‘*O+ccur only rarely, such as during 
revolution, armed conflict, or foreign occupation, where the regular authorities dissolve. Are 
disintegrating, have been suppressed or are for the time being inoperative. They may also cover 
cases where lawful authority is being gradually restored, e.g. after foreign occupation’, p. 49, para. 1.  
79
 Ibid.  at para. 5.   
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circumstances precluding wrongfulness as referred to in Chapter V of the Articles 
on State Responsibility. One of such circumstances, namely force majeure, is of a 
particular relevance to the situation of the state without effectively functioning 
government. Article 23(1) of the Articles on State Responsibility provides the 
definition of force majeure as ‘the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an 
unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible 
in the circumstances to perform the obligation’.80 One would, therefore, have to 
consider whether the collapse of an effective government satisfies the conditions 
set out in Article 23(1). Undoubtedly, the disintegration of state structures may 
occur in such a way that the state in question is unable to avoid or oppose it by its 
own means and in that sense it may also be beyond its control. With regards to the 
material impossibility of performance, the ILC’s commentary states that this may be 
due to either natural or physical events or to human intervention.81 It could 
therefore, be concluded that the conditions for force majeure may be validly 
invoked in particular circumstances of state collapse and accordingly preclude the 
wrongfulness of illegal acts which took place during the period of state’s 
disintegration.  
The problem of possible state responsibility of a failed state for internationally 
wrongful acts and in particular the responsibility for the acts of non-state actors will 
be the primary subject of Chapter five of this thesis. Furthermore, the issue will be 
                                                          
80
 International Law Commission. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 23(1).   
81
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of fifty-third session (23 April-1 June and 
2 July-10 August 2001), p.76 at para. 3. 
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analysed with specific reference to the international law rules governing the use of 
force in self-defence.      
 
3.4 Conclusion  
International law requires certain constitutive elements discussed in Chapter two 
above for an entity to qualify as a state. Additionally, international law plays an 
important role in determining when an entity constitutes a state – in certain cases 
even if it lacks an effective government.  Despite the fact that states experience 
constant changes in their constitutive elements, there is a strong presumption in 
international law of continuity of states once they have been created. 
Consequently, failed states continue to be considered fully-fledged, sovereign 
states under international law despite experiencing extreme difficulties in 
exercising their international legal personality.  Despite not infrequent appearance 
of the phenomenon in international arena, there is no standard definition of what 
constitutes a ‘failed’ state and different terms are used to describe the same 
situation or seaming different ones but closely related. 
From an international law perspective, the employment of the expression ‘lack of 
effective government’ as a consequence of states’ disintegration and collapse, 
better describes the phenomenon of failed states as it uses the notions commonly 
employed in international legal discourse. Accordingly, the proposed definition of 
failed states would be reserved for the territorial entities which as a consequence 
of anarchic conflicts, lack, either totally or partially, an effective government 
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capable to maintain law and order in their territory or part of their territory, and 
which also lack the capacity to rebuild their governments by their own means. 
Following the analysis based in the current international law, there is no foundation 
to support the view that the above described states become extinct due to the loss 
of effective government they suffered. Both state practice and practice of the 
international organisations, in particular the United Nations via General Assembly 
and Security Council, as well as the majority of legal commentators agrees that 
failed states continue their international legal personality. 
The lack of effective government, however, entails grave difficulties. Failed states 
are incapable to interact with other subjects of international law in a usual manner. 
Their ability to fulfil international treaty obligations is severely diminished and so is 
the capacity to participate in international proceedings. Failed states’ diplomatic 
and consular relations suffer and the involvement in the work of international 
organisations is affected as well. The invocation of state responsibility in case of the 
type of states here analysed also proves problematic.  
It is clear that international law has several complex challenges that need to be 
addressed in relation to the failed states. The following chapters will investigate 
one of such problems – the question regarding the use of force in self-defence in 
response to the attacks conducted by non-state actors operating from a territory of 
the failed state. It is important to note, however, that when dealing with the 
phenomenon of failed states, the international legal order cannot completely 




THE LEGALITY OF SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS  
LOCATED IN FAILED STATES  
4.1 Introduction  
The law on the use of force in states relations is the cornerstone of post-Second 
World War legal order and is to be located in two main sources: the Charter of the 
United Nations1 and customary international law. The brevity and simplicity of the 
law stated in the Charter has given rise to multiple problems of interpretation and 
application. There are three main provisions regarding the use of force in the 
treaty. Firstly, Article 2.42 contains the prohibition of the use of force in states 
relations. Secondly, the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence is 
acknowledged in Article 513 and, finally, Article 42 allows the United Nations 
Security Council to authorise the use of force4.  Self-defence is an exception to the 
                                                          
1
 Charter of the United Nations (opened for signature 25 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 1 UNTS XVI 
2
 Article 2.4 of the Charter of the United Nations: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’. Charter 
of the United Nations (opened for signature 25 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI (UN Charter).  
3
 Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security’. 
Charter of the United Nations (opened for signature 25 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
4
 Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations: ‘Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
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general rule prohibiting the use of force in states relations and accordingly, it must 
be constructed in the context of other principles of international law, and in 
particular territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states. Nevertheless, the 
credibility of the law depends upon its ability to address effectively the realities of 
contemporary threats.5 
The interpretation of the provisions of Articles 2.4 and 51 of the UN Charter in 
relation to cases involving non-state actors and failed states remains uncertain and 
contested. Similarly, the efforts to clarify the development of customary 
international law regarding the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors 
in failed states are continuously obstructed by the ambiguities and inconsistencies 
in the ongoing state practice.6 The core of the problem is the decentralisation of 
international legal system and the fact that multiple claims may be considered as 
law by some actors and not by others.7   
This chapter aims to present and examine issues pertaining to the legality of the use 
of force in self-defence against non-state actors operating from the territories of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
land forces of Members of the United Nations’. Charter of the United Nations (opened for signature 
25 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
5
 See: D Bethlehem, ‘Self-Defence Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack By Nonstate Actors’ 
106 American Journal of International Law 770 (2012), p.772: ‘Self-defence is not a static concept 
but rather one that must be reasonable and appropriate to the threats and circumstances of the 
day’. 
6
 As noted by Crawford, ‘*…+ custom does not spring into existence fully formed, but it must undergo 
a period of maturation. The crucial question remains whether acts by states during that period are 
lawful or unlawful, or whether indeed their status as lawful or unlawful is somehow pending’. J E 
Crawford, Keynote Speech, ‘Identification and development of customary international law’, Spring 
Conference of the ILA British Branch – Foundations and Future of International Law, 23 May 2014.  
7
 For further discussion regarding the identification and development of customary international law 
see: M Wood, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on Identification of customary international law, 
International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session, A/CN.4/672, May 2014, para. 21&22: ‘The present 
report proceeds on the basis that the identification of a rule of customary international law requires 
an assessment of both practice and the acceptance of that practice as law (‘two-element’ approach) 
*…+ Under this approach, a rule of customary international law may be said to exist where there is ‘a 
general practice’ that is ‘accepted as law’. 
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failed states. In order to do so, it firstly identifies both the relevant treaty law and 
customary international law. The chapter seeks to analyse if and how states may 
use defensive force against non-state actors operating from failed states without 
actual attribution of the initial attack to the latter. This section of the thesis is 
closely linked with Chapter Five which turns towards the analysis of the recent state 
practice with regard to the exercise of self-defence against armed attacks 
perpetrated solely by non-state actors located within failed states. Chapter Five 
therefore, examines the application of the law, namely, to what extent state 
practice reflects the existing law analysed here, as well as, whether it may be 
contributing to the emergence of new rules of customary international law. Firstly, 
however, some limitations have to be disclosed with regard to the analysis provided 
in the present chapter. Accordingly, this part of the thesis will not aim to conduct a 
thorough investigation of the entirety of pre-conditions for self- defence. Instead, 
the chapter mainly focuses on the ‘armed attack’ element and in particular the 
aspect relating to the ratione personae of the ‘armed attack’. Clearly, the attacks by 
states’ regular forces come within the ambit of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 
legal issues discussed in the two parts below relate to the circumstances where the 
application of the said Article would not be immediately obvious. Such are the cases 
where the state fails to control its territory and the non-state actor carries out 
transborder military operation of such ‘scale and effect’ which may suffice for it to 
be considered an ‘armed attack’.  The growing support for a flexible reading of 
ratione personae element of ‘armed attack’ which may trigger the right of self-
defence is driven primarily by the increasing threat from international terrorism as 
well as developments and availability of modern transport, weaponry and 
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communication technology. Another caveat is expressed with regard to the fact 
that there may either be no link between the state apparatus and a non-state actor 
or the state is simply unable to prevent a non-state actor from launching the attack. 
The fact of the matter is, however, that one must distinguish between the question 
of possibility of non-state actors being responsible for an armed attack without 
state involvement and the necessity of actual attribution of such an attack to the 
territorial state in order to justify self-defence measures.   
The present chapter is divided into three main parts. The first one provides some 
essential background and identifies the law relevant to the use of force in self-
defence. The subsequent section focuses on the analysis of possible grounds for the 
exercise of the right of self-defence against non-state actors perpetrating alleged 
armed attacks from territories of failed states. The penultimate part addresses the 
parameters and application of self-defence which particular emphasis on what 
constitutes an “armed attack” for the purposes of self-defence, as well as, 
principles of necessity and proportionality. Final segment provides conclusion which 
links into Chapter Five.   
 
4.2 Identification of the law  
The law regarding use of force in states relations is set out in the United Nations 
Charter, in the rules of customary international law and in general principles of 
international law. Collectively, it is known as the jus ad bellum. The starting point in 
the examination of the treaty law in the area is the prohibition of the use of force 
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contained in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter8. The International Court of Justice 
confirmed that, as well as being a treaty provision, the Article constitutes a rule of 
customary international law.9 The relevant opinio juris was found in, amongst 
others, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) ‘Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’.10 Furthermore, the Court11 as 
well as the International Law Commission12 has taken the view that the prohibition 
has the character of a norm of jus cogens. Considered to be a response to the 
Second World War, Article 2(4) is one of the bedrocks of modern day international 
                                                          
8
 As noted by Moir ‘Although the terms of the prohibition may, prima facie, seem relatively clear, the 
precise scope of this provision had nonetheless been the subject of continued debate, even 
regarding the central concept of ‘force’ itself’. L Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force. International 
Law, Jus ad Bellum and the War on Terror (Oxford&Portland, Hart Publishing, 2010), p.6.   
9
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) 
[1986] ICJ Reports 14,100 [190] (Nicaragua). The Court states that the prohibition of the use of force 
could be regarded as a principle of customary international law ‘not as such conditioned by 
provisions relating to collective security, or to the facilities or armed contingents to be provided 
under Article 43 of the Charter’, para. 188.   
10
 UN Doc A/RES/2625. Principle (a) of the Resolution repeats Article 2.4 of the UN Charter near-
verbatim.  
11
 In the Nicaragua case the Court stated: ‘A further confirmation of the validity as customary 
international law of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact that it is frequently 
referred to in statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of customary 
international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law. The International Law 
Commission, in the course of its work on the codification of the law of treaties, expressed the view 
that "the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a 
conspicuous example  of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens’. Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) [1986] ICJ 
Reports 14, para. 190.  
12
 In 1996, the ILC pointed out in its commentary to Article 50 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (which later became Article 53) that ’the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of 
the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the 
character of jus cogens’.  Reports of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 
U.N.  GAOR Supp. No. 9, pt. II, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in *1966+ 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 172, at 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. More recently, in the context of the 
articles regarding the state responsibility, the Commission stated that: ‘It is generally agreed that the 
prohibition of aggression is to be regarded as peremptory’. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., 




law order which established prevention of armed conflicts as its primary goal.13 
Nevertheless, the UN Charter recognises the fact that an absolute prohibition on 
the use of force in states relations is unrealistic and therefore allows for certain 
exceptions, the most important one being the self-defence contained in Article 51 
which reads in full as follows:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members 
in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  
The concept of self-defence is both a treaty-based provision and the rule of 
customary international law.  Throughout the post-Charter era its interpretation 
underwent numerous changes and the evolving custom reflected the threats and 
circumstances of the day.14 The focus of this study is the aspect of self-defence 
which has raised a lot of controversy in recent years and relates, first of all, to the 
question of whether the use of defensive force against non-state actors operating 
from the territory of a failed state is allowed by Article 51 and other recognised 
                                                          
13 See: C Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.7.  
14
 O Corten, ‘The Controversies over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A 
Methodological Debate’ 16 European Journal of International Law 803 (2006), p.803 
129 
 
rules of international law.15 Subsequently, if states have a right of self-defence 
against non-state actors’ attacks emanating from the territories of failed states, 
what has to be analysed is the scope of such right and how it should be exercised. 
Before turning to these questions, however, it is necessary to reflect upon the 
preconditions of self-defence in general. Accordingly, the present chapter briefly 
examines the text of Article 51 as well as the relevant customary international law 
pre-existing the events of 11th September 2001. This will determine the baseline for 
the consideration of questions outlined above. Chapter five will then focus on the 
application of the law and identification of the relevant post 9/11 practice of states 
and address the question of evolving custom in respect of state sovereignty and use 
of force in self-defence against attacks coming from non-state actors in failed 
states.16  
Article 2.4 of the UN Charter constitutes a comprehensive ban against all uses, as 
well as threats, of force irrespective of their impact and gravity.17 Accordingly, the 
                                                          
15
 According to Taft IV and Buchwald: ‘In the end, each use of force must find legitimacy in the facts 
and circumstances that the States believe made it necessary. Each should be judged not on abstract 
concepts, but on the particular events that gave rise to it’. W H Taft IV and T F Buchwald 
‘Preemption, Iraq and International Law’ 97 American Journal of International Law 557 (2003), 
p.557.  
16
 As noted by Michael Wood, state practice plays important role in international law: ‘Practice, 
often referred to as the ‘material’ or ‘objective’ element, plays an “essential role” in the formation 
and identification of customary international law. It may be seen as the ‘raw material’ of customary 
international law, as the latter emerges from practice, which “both defines and limits it”. Such 
practice consists of “material and detectable” acts of subjects of international law, and it is these 
“instances of conduct” that may form “a web of precedents” in which a pattern of conduct may be 
observed’. Wood, supra note 6, para. 32.  
17
 See: T M Franck, Recourse to force: State action against threats and armed attacks (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p.12: “…*A+t San Francisco, many states that had not been at Dumbarton 
Oaks insisted that this provision be strengthened by introducing a duty to respect the territorial 
integrity and political independence of states. Australia offered an amendment that, after the 
prohibition on the use of force added the words “against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any member state…” This was adopted unanimously by the participants. 
Unintentionally, they thereby created an opening for some, later, to argue that the prohibition 
against force did not extent to “minor” or “temporary” invasions that stopped short of actual 
threatening of the territorial integrity of the victim state or its independence. Such a reading of 
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provision prohibits not only the use or threat of force against territorial integrity or 
political independence of another state, but also such force which is “in any manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN Charter”. The prohibition of the threat or 
use of force contained in Article 2.4 is directly linked with the legal mechanisms 
contained in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.18 The UN Security Council bears primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and 
possesses the power to resort to enforcement measures (economic, diplomatic and 
military ones) if it determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an 
act of aggression has occurred.19 Nevertheless, the drafters of the UN Charter 
recognised the fact that the UN Security Council may not always be capable to 
respond promptly to threats to international peace and security and acts of 
aggression and accordingly adopted Article 51 dealing with self-defence.   
Since the UN Charter came into force, the interpretation of self-defence exception 
to the general prohibition of the use or threat of force in states relations has 
undergone both adoption and expansion as a result of changing circumstances and 
through institutional and state practice. Nevertheless, the San Francisco Conference 
documents confirm that the intention of the drafters of the Article 51 was to limit 
the right of states and regional organisations to act in self-defence in several 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Article 2(4) is utterly incongruent, however, with the evident intent of the sponsors of this 
amendment”. See also Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p.87 
18
 For a comprehensive study regarding the questions pertaining to the powers of the Security 
Council Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter see: E de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United 
Nations Security Council (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) 
19
 See: Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the UN Charter.  
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ways.20 First of all, it is clear from the text of Article 51 that self-defence was 
designed as a temporary measure to be implemented only until such time as the 
UN Security Council takes an appropriate action.21 Secondly, the drafters limited the 
right to exercise self-defence to the situations where “armed attack” occurred 
thereby excluding the possibility of anticipatory self-defence.22 An ‘armed attack 
has been understood as implying ‘an act or the beginning of a series of acts of 
armed force of considerable magnitude and intensity (i.e. scale) which have as their 
consequence (i.e. effects) the infliction of substantial destruction upon important 
elements of the target State namely, upon its people, economic and security 
infrastructure, destruction of aspects of its governmental authority, i.e. its political 
independence, as well as damage to or deprivation of its physical element namely, 
its territory’23 There are three important aspects of the notion of an ‘armed attack’ 
for the self-defence purposes. Firstly, what acts can be considered an ‘armed 
attack’, secondly, what does one take place, and finally, from whom must the 
attack emanate. The thesis will focus primarily on the ratione personae aspect of an 
‘armed attack’. This is due to the fact that, as stated by Judge Kooijmans in his 
                                                          
20
 The reference to travaux préparatoires demonstrates that the provision was designed to limit the 
legitimate scope for the unilateral use of force. See: United Nations Conference on International 
Organisation, Documents, Vol VI (New York, United Nations, 1945) and US Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers (1945) General: the United Nations (1967).  
21
 As Frank points out: “Article 51, as drafted does not sanction continuation of the use of force by 
states in self-defence after the Council has taken measures. It is only by subsequent practice that the 
potential coexistence of collective measures with the continued measures in self-defence has 
become accepted practice”. T M Franck, Recourse to force: State action against threats and armed 
attacks (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.50 
22
 According to Ruys: ‘In general, an analysis of travaux préparatoires affirms our initial 
interpretation, according to which Article 51 qualifies the exercise of individual and collective self-
defence by imposing a double procedural condition, as well as a substantive condition, namely the 
incidence of an ‘armed attack’. The ‘armed attack’ requirement thus constitutes an integral part of 
Article 51; no self-defence can be exercised if no armed attack occurs’. T Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and 
Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolution in Customary Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
2013).  
23
 A Constantinou, The Right of Self-Defence under Customary International Law and Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, (Sakkoulas, Athens), p.64.  
132 
 
Separate Opinion to the ICJ Armed Activities case: ‘*i]f the attacks by the irregulars 
would, because of their scale and effects, have had to be classified as an armed 
attack had they been carried out by regular armed forces, there is nothing in the 
language of Article 51 of the Charter that prevents the victim State from exercising 
its inherent right of self-defence’.24 
Article 51 does not specifically define its key terms such as “inherent right”, “self-
defence” or “armed attack”25 leaving them open for discussion. Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties lists three primary elements of 
interpretation of any treaty provisions.26 Accordingly, considering the ordinary 
meaning of the words, it could be concluded that, rather than stating the obvious – 
that self- defence is available against armed attack – the drafters of Article 51 
added the phrase “if an armed attack occurs” in order to characterise and limit the 
scope of permissible self-defence. Secondly, analysing the contextual aspect, Article 
51 must be interpreted taking into consideration the other provisions of the UN 
Charter relating to the use of force in states relations, namely Articles 2(4), 39, 42 
and 53. It would appear that the intention was to create a comprehensive system 
whereby Article 51 is a temporary and exceptional measure which must be 
exercised in a restrictive manner. Finally, reference to the UN Charter ‘objects and 
                                                          
24
 Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, 2005, ICJ, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 
29.  
25
 As a consequence, ‘the law on self-defence is the subject of the most fundamental disagreement 
between states and between writers (…) as far as writers are concerned, the disagreement as to the 
scope of self-defence generally turns on the interpretation of Article 51’. C Gray, International Law 
and the Use of Force 3
rd
 edn. (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 114&117.   
26
 Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
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purpose’ supports the above conclusions.27 Clearly, being the response to the 
Second World War, the overall and primary goal of the UN Charter was to limit the 
scope of the unilateral use of force by states as much as possible and entrust the 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security with the 
Security Council. This restrictive reading of Article 51, however, has been contested 
by those who support a wider right of self-defence. The key element of contention 
is the fact that the first part of the first sentence of the provision refers to the fact 
that “nothing shall impair the inherent right of …self-defence”.28 Accordingly, some 
authors claimed that Charter did not impose any limitations on the pre-existing 
customary right of self-defence and is therefore not incompatible which such 
customary right.29 
                                                          
27
 See Chapter I, Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter.   
28
 The legal position regarding correlation between the customary international law and the 
provisions of the UN Charter was states by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. According to the Court: ‘On 
one essential point, this treaty itself refers to pre-existing customary international law; this 
reference to customary law is contained in the actual text of Article 51, which mentions the 
"inherent right" (in the French text the "droit naturel") of individual or collective self-defence, which 
"nothing in the present Charter shall impair" and which applies in the event of an armed attack. The 
Court therefore finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a 
"natural" or "inherent" right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a 
customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter. 
Moreover the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not go on to regulate 
directly aspects of its content. For example, it does not contain any specific rule whereby self-
defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to 
respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law. Moreover, a definition of the 
"armed attack" which, if found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the "inherent right" of self-
defence, is not provided in the Charter, and is not part of treaty law. It cannot therefore be held that 
Article 51 is a provision which "subsumes and supervenes" customary international law. It rather 
demonstrates that in the field in question, the importance of which for the present dispute need 
hardly be stressed. Customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas 
governed by the two sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same 
content’. Nicaragua case: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States), Judgement on merits of 27 June 1986, para. 176.  
29
 See: D W Bowett Self-Defence in International Law, (The Law Book Exchange, 2014), p. 187; S M 
Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modern International Law, pp. 479 – 83; C 
Kahgan, ‘Jus Cogens and the inherent right to self-defence’, (1996-7) 3 ILSA Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, p.802.  
134 
 
In addition to the requirement of occurrence of an ‘armed attack’, the right to 
exercise self-defence is further limited by several other conditions. Some of these 
restrictions can be found in Article 51, whereas the others are required by 
customary international law. The UN Charter provision stipulates that measures 
taken in the exercise of the right of self-defence must be immediately reported to 
the Security Council. The organ bears primary responsibility to ‘take any such action 
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security’.30 The reporting obligation was discussed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
case.31 The Court held that “the absence of a report may be one of the factors 
indicating whether the State in question was itself convinced that it was acting in 
self-defence”.32 The ICJ’s decision in the case concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo reconfirms the argument that the compliance with reporting 
requirement is an important element which has to be taken into consideration in 
order to determine the legality of measures allegedly taken in self-defence. The 
Court observed that ‘Uganda did not report to the Security Council the events 
which it had regarded as requiring it to act in self-defence’.33 In the Nicaragua case 
the ICJ considered the reporting requirement from customary international law’s 
perspective asking ‘whether in customary international law there is any 
requirement corresponding to that found in the treaty law of the United Nations 
Charter, by which the State claiming to use the right of individual or collective self-
defence must report to an international body, empowered to determine the 
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 See Article 42 of the UN Charter.  
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 ICJ, Nicaragua case (Merits), para. 200 & 235.  
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 ICJ, Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo 
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conformity with international law of the measures which the State is seeking to 
justify on that basis’.34 Accordingly, the question is whether the reporting 
requirement is a procedural necessity or whether it is an essential precondition for 
self-defence in the absence of which the latter cannot be invoked. It would appear 
that the requirement to report actions taken in self-defence cannot be considered 
as a pre-condition to self-defence as it only arises once measures in self-defence 
have already been taken. It would, therefore, be illogical to conclude that failure to 
comply with the requirement automatically destroys a claim to self-defence.35 
Nevertheless, if a state fails to report its actions to the Security Council, it 
undoubtedly raises questions about the lawfulness of the operation. This may be 
particularly relevant in cases where the legal basis for the exercise of self-defence is 
questionable. The recent state practice with regard to self-defence against non-
state actors located in failed states which will be analysed in detail in Chapter five, 
supplies some evidence that victim states consider compliance with the reporting 
requirement as, to a certain extent, a supporting element for their claim.       
Furthermore, the Article 51 imposes temporary limitation on the exercise of self-
defence specifically stating that it continues ‘until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’. It has been 
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argued that only such measures which effectively restore international peace and 
security impinge upon the right of self-defence.36 Accordingly, the right to exercise 
self-defence would be suspended if the Security Council imposes military 
enforcement measures in accordance with Article 42 of the UN Charter or 
economic sanctions in accordance with Article 41. It could be argued that other 
enforcement measures, such as, for example, a call for the aggressor state to 
withdraw its forces from the territory of the victim state, may only affect the 
exercise of self-defence if they are adequate and effective.   
Finally, it is widely agreed that in order to be lawful, recourse to self-defence must 
be necessary and proportionate. Customary nature of these two criteria has been 
reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in several cases.37 Furthermore, 
they have been repeatedly invoked in the practice of states. The two standards are 
often referred to in connection with the 1837 Caroline incident involving a pre-
emptive attack by the British forces in Canada on a ship operated by Canadian 
rebels who were planning an attack from the USA.38 The famous formula 
proclaimed by the US Secretary of State Webster refers to the ‘necessity of self-
defence, instant overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
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deliberation’.39 Although the precedential value of the Caroline incident for the 
modern law regarding the use of force has been questioned, the standards of 
necessity and proportionality constitute integral part of the concept of self-defence 
and it is widely agreed that any action taken in self-defence must abide by these 
principles. 
The requirements of necessity and proportionality are not expressed in the UN 
Charter but constitute essential elements of customary international law relating to 
the use of force in self-defence. As Professor Gray states, ‘Necessity is commonly 
interpreted as the requirement that no alternative response be possible. 
Proportionality relates to the size, duration and target of the response, but clearly 
these factors are also relevant to necessity’.40 The requirements are closely linked 
since if the use of force cannot be considered necessary; it is difficult to envisage 
how it could be proportionate.41 Likewise, if it is not proportionate, its necessity will 
be questionable. The primary goal of two principles is to limit the scope of self-
defence in that the latter should serve the purpose of halting and repelling of an 
armed attack only. If that goal is exceeded, self-defence would turn into a reprisal 
having punitive or retaliatory character. It is generally agreed, that in times of 
peace, reprisals involving the use of force are unlawful.42 Nevertheless, it is 
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clearly states that armed reprisals in times of peace are unlawful (para.46). For further discussion 
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sometimes problematic in practice to distinguish between lawful self-defence and 
unlawful reprisal.  
The principle of necessity comprises of several elements. First of all, the necessity 
criterion implies that, by definition, self-defence must be exercised as a last resort 
when all peaceful means have been reasonably exhausted and there are no other 
realistic means available for the victim state. Nevertheless, in practice, ‘the need to 
exhaust peaceful means only plays a subsidiary role for the assessment of self-
defence claims in response to a prior attack, and *…+ unlawfulness will only result 
when a manifest unwillingness to address diplomatic channels can be 
demonstrated’.43 Accordingly, the question of whether or not a state complied with 
the requirement to exhaust all available peaceful means must be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis and taking into account state’s actions preceding the eventual 
use of force in self-defence. It has been noted however, that although the 
obligation in question does require that the victim state actively pursues peaceful 
resolution; it is not expected that it will compromise its sovereignty while doing 
so.44  
The second element of the necessity requirement is ‘immediacy’ which determines 
that actions undertaken in self-defence should occur while the original armed 
attack is still in progress or in close proximity to it.45 Although subject to a certain 
                                                                                                                                                                    
regarding the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear use in this context see also T Farrell & H 
Lambert, ‘Courting controversy: international law, national norms and American nuclear use’ 27 
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 Ruys, supra note 22, at p. 98.  
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 J Green, International Court of Justice and Self-defence in International Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2009), pp. 80-86.  
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 See: J Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), at p. 150: ‘The requirement of immediacy is in fact inherent in the text of Article 51. 
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degree of uncertainty, immediacy undoubtedly presupposes the need for temporal 
link between the initial attack and lawful self-defence.46 Such link must, however, 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis and taking into consideration the entirety of 
circumstances. This is particularly relevant in cases of the ongoing and repeated 
cross-border attacks47 whereby victim state’s partial justification for defensive 
action relies on the need to prevent further attacks.48 As it will be discussed later in 
this Chapter, such situation is especially relevant in the context of non-state actors’ 
attacks who often rely on a series of small scale attacks.  
The second customary criterion applicable to the exercise of self-defence is the 
proportionality principle which imposes the limits on the size, duration and target 
of defensive actions. The principal difficulty however, is establishing in relation to 
what the action taken in self-defence must be proportional. There are two most 
commonly referred to options. First of all, defensive action must be reasonably 
                                                                                                                                                                    
What is contemplated by the Charter is that States have the right to respond to an armed attack 
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 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ concluded that the conditions sine qua non for the lawful exercise of 
self-defence by the United States were not fulfilled. In relation to the requirement of necessity, the 
Court states that: ‘(…) the United States measures taken in December 198 1 (or, at the earliest, 
March of that year - paragraph 93 above) cannot be said to correspond to a "necessity" justifying the 
United States action against Nicaragua on the basis of assistance given by Nicaragua to the armed 
opposition in El Salvador. First, these measures were only taken, and began to produce their effects 
several months after the major offensive of the armed opposition against the Government of El 
Salvador had been completely repulsed (January 1981) and the actions of the opposition 
considerably reduced in consequence(…) Accordingly, it cannot be held that these activities were 
undertaken in the light of necessity’. (Merits), para. 237.  
47
 The ‘accumulation of events’ theory of armed attack argues that states may use force not in 
response to every isolated cross border incursions but in response to the whole series of incursions 
which collectively amount to an armed attacks. 
48
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proportionate to the initial attack which provoked it. Secondly, as the 
proportionality and necessity criteria are closely interlinked, the former must be 
evaluated by reference to the overall goal of defensive actions.49 It is therefore not 
required for the victim state to be restricted to use the same weapons or the same 
armed forces as the perpetrators of the initial armed attack which triggered the 
military response. The methodology for assessment of proportionality becomes 
even more complex in cases of small-scale ongoing attacks which arguably reach 
gravity threshold of an armed attack. It is controversial whether the evaluation of 
proportionality requirement must include not only past but also future possible 
incursions.50 Nevertheless, it has been agreed that in order to repel the attack and 
prevent possible future attacks no more force than necessary must be used in order 
for it to be considered reasonably proportionate. There are several other elements 
which provide further assistance in the appraisal of the proportionality of defensive 
action. These are ‘the geographical and destructive scope of the response, the 
duration of the response, the selection of means and methods of warfare and 
targets and the effect on third States’.51            
To conclude, the customary requirements of necessity and proportionality overlap 
to a certain degree. Their ultimate goal is limitation of the defensive action to the 
halting and repelling of an armed attack, with exception of the case of ongoing 
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small scale incursions where the aim also includes prevention of future attacks. The 
two criteria are also closely linked to the ratione personae element of the ‘armed 
attack’ requirement for lawful exercise of self-defence. In this respect, it has been 
suggested that the reference to necessity and proportionality standards neutralises 
concerns regarding the legality of the use of defensive force against non-state 
actors.52 This argument will be analysed in more detail later in this chapter.  
The interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter undoubtedly evolved through the 
institutional and state practice. Similarly, developing custom which ‘continues to be 
constructed as a source of rules that does not require the solemnity of treaty-
making’53, challenges the established rules regarding the use of force in states 
relations. It is therefore necessary to examine the impact of such practice on the 
relevant treaty provisions as well as customary international law. In the post-
Charter era states proposed various justifications for the use of military force – 
sometimes explicitly put forward, other times implicit in the situation. This thesis 
will focus on the analysis of the latest claim, namely that states may resort to the 
use of force in self-defence against non-state actors operating from the territory of 
failed states and whose attacks cannot be attributed to such a state. Accordingly, 
the following section of this Chapter analyses legal positions which may be invoked 
in relation to the exercise of the right to self-defence in response to attacks 
emanating from the territories of failed states and perpetrated solely by non-state 
actors. The law in this area is unsettled and consequently, multiple legal claims may 
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be put forward simultaneously. Consequently, Chapter five will then investigate the 
application of the law and how the states responded in practice to the question of 
whether there exists a right to self-defence against non-state actors in failed states 
and how it can be exercised.        
 
4.3 Self- defence against non-state actors in failed states 
There is a great difficulty in the application of the traditional law of self-defence to 
the conflicts dominated by non-state actors, especially in circumstances where 
those actors exercise control over extensive parts of failed states’ territory. In such 
situations, strict adherence to purely state-orientated rules regarding the use of 
force may no longer be possible. It is, therefore, necessary that the international 
law engages with the new reality of conflicts characterised by the presence of 
powerful non-state actors operating from the territory of a state which has 
absolutely no control over their actions. The following sections examine several 
possible legal positions concerning the legality of the use of defensive force against 
non-state actors in failed states. As such, they focus on investigating the questions 








4.3.1 Absolute prohibition  
As noted above, it could be argued that according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
self-defence can only be invoked if an armed attack occurs.54 The most restrictive 
position would permit use of force against non-state actors only if the initial armed 
attack was attributable to the state. Accordingly, use of defensive force against 
non-state actors without attribution of their act to the territorial state and without 
that state’s consent would be equal to operating in breach of that state’s territorial 
integrity. The lawful means of addressing the problem would be requesting from 
the territorial state to prevent non-state actors’ attacks, obtaining the territorial 
state’s consent for the operation or finally, seeking the assistance of the UN 
Security Council. This legal position emphasises the fact that when interpreting 
Article 51, it must be taken into account that self-defence is first and foremost an 
exception to the general rule which prohibits the use or threat of force against the 
territorial integrity of another state.55  
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 See, inter alia, Y Dinstein, ‘Since the right of self-defence arises under Article 51 only ‘if an armed 
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Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963). 
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The absolute prohibition on the use of defensive force against non-state actors 
without considerable element of territorial state’s involvement finds support in the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.56 First of all, in the 1986 
Nicaragua case, the Court stated that ‘an armed attack must be understood as 
including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, 
but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force’.57 Accordingly, it could be 
argued that the ruling implied that in order to qualify as an armed attack which 
would justify use of force in self-defence, the attack perpetrated by non-state actor 
must be imputable to the state on whose territory the victim state exercises alleged 
self-defence. Furthermore, in the 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
the ICJ clearly stated that article 51 of the UN Charter applies only ‘in the case of an 
armed attack by one State against another State’.58 Similarly, in the 2005 Armed 
Activities case, the Court declared that ‘there was no satisfactory proof of the 
involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of DRC’.59 
Consequently, the attack was not attributable to the DRC and the Court stated that 
‘the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of self-defence by Uganda 
against DRC were not present’.60  
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Many international lawyers disagree with the ICJ’s position and argue that it has 
been superseded by more recent events and state practice.61 The latter will be 
examined in detail in the subsequent chapter with a view to analyse whether this is 
in fact correct position. Nevertheless, the Court’s judgements and advisory opinions 
are considered as highly authoritative in international law.62 As a result, some 
authors find support in the ICJ’s decision to the claim that ‘attacking non-state 
actors on the territory of another state is attacking that state’.63 According to Tladi, 
‘The use of force by a state against non-state actors for acts not attributable at all 
to another state falls to be considered under the paradigm of the law enforcement 
(in which the consent of the territorial state would be required) and not the law of 
self-defence’.64 
The absolute prohibition of the use of defensive force against non-state actors has 
also been invoked by some international organisations. Notably, the Latin American 
States collectively referred to the restrictive reading of Article 51 in response to 
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Colombia’s 2008 incursions against non-state actors emanating from Ecuador.65 The 
OAS Commission declared Colombia’s response ‘a violation of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principle that the territory of a State is 
inviolable and may not be object, even temporarily, of (…) measures of force taken 
by another State, directly or indirectly, on any group whatsoever’.66 Nevertheless, 
as it will be evidenced by the analysis carried out in Chapter five, there is an 
increasing dissonance between the absolute prohibition of the use of defensive 
force against non-state actors in failed states and the practice of states in this 
regard. It is therefore, necessary to investigate possible grounds states may submit 
for the exercise of the right to self-defence in these circumstances.   
 
4.3.2 Grounds for defensive action against non-state actors  
Despite the unquestionable importance of the ICJ jurisprudence, an absolute 
prohibition may not be considered as the most dominant position in current 
international law and many authors now regard self-defence against non-state 
actors as legal, at least in some circumstances,67 and support this claim by 
reference to the recent state practice. It is nevertheless unsettled when exactly the 
use of defensive force is permitted against the attacks by non-state actors, since it 
remains somewhat controversial exactly what type of activity could be considered 
as an armed attack. If states are entitled to exercise their right to self-defence only 
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if an armed attack occurs, the first question which needs to be considered is 
whether non-state actors’ actions could amount to such an attack. As noted above, 
the absolute prohibition requires that an armed attack must denote state 
involvement. The relationship between territorial state and non-state actors might 
have a variety of implications. It should not, however, be confused with the 
question of the possibility of non-state actors’ armed attack without the state 
involvement. As noted by Brownlie, there may be various different relationships 
between the state and non-state actors.68 At the one end of the spectrum, the state 
may be responsible for the organisation and support of the armed groups engaging 
in cross border incursions. This situation is commonly labelled as ‘indirect military 
aggression’, although the nexus between the state and the armed group can be so 
close that the latter becomes an agent of a state and consequently, any resulting 
attacks could in fact be, more appropriately, considered as ‘direct’ aggression.  On 
the other side, state could be completely unable to control the activities of armed 
groups. The question arises whether the inability of a state to take sufficient 
measures in order to control non-state actors operating from within its territory 
could be classified as an ‘indirect military aggression’.  
Unlike Article 2(4), which specifically refers to states, Article 51 of the UN Charter 
does not explicitly identify the nature of the party responsible for the armed attack. 
Self-defence can be exercised by the members of the UN (states), however, the 
provision in question does not indicate who must be behind the initial armed 
attack. According to the ICJ, ‘Article 51 of the Charter thus recognises the existence 
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of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against 
another State’.69 It is unclear however, how exactly the Court has arrived to the 
conclusion about the identity of the attacker.70 The Wall Advisory Opinion refers to 
the Nicaragua case as allegedly confirming the limitation of armed attacks to 
actions of states only.71 Nevertheless, it is to be noted that in Nicaragua case, the 
ICJ considered the question of attribution to a state and its consequences and did 
not analyse completely separate matter of whether the attacks by non-state actors 
alone without any state support could itself constitute an armed attack. The Court 
had further opportunity to clarify the issue of self-defence against non-state actors 
in the 2005 Armed Activities case. Yet again however, the position of the ICJ in this 
regard is unclear and the focus remains on the question of whether the non-state 
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armed attack . . . had it been carried out by regular armed forces" (ibid., p. 103, para. 195). While 
accepting, as I must, that this is to be regarded as a statement of the law as it now stands, i maintain 
all the reservations as to this proposition that I have expressed elsewhere’.  
71
 In Nicaragua case, the ICJ referred to the UN General Assembly Definition of Aggression but did 
not specifically indicate the required scale of force in order to in order for the military activities to 
qualify as an ‘armed attack’. As a result, according to Professor Higgins, ‘By adopting the 
unsatisfactory definition of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression Resolution, and 
proclaiming it customary international law, the Court appears to have selected criteria that are 
operationally unworkable. When a state have to decide whether it can repel incessant low-level 
irregular military activity, does it really have to decide whether that activity is the equivalent of an 
armed attack by a foreign army – and, anyway, is not any use of force by a foreign army entitled to 
be met by sufficient force required for it to withdraw? Or is that now in doubt also? Is the question 
of level of violence by regular force not really an issue of proportionality, rather than a question of 
determining what is an ‘armed attack’?’. R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and 
How We Use It (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994)    
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actors’ attacks could be attributed to the Democratic Republic of Congo.72 The 
position was criticised by Judges Simma and Koojimans in their separate opinions. 
Judge Kooijmans stated that ‘(…) if the attacks by the irregulars would, because of 
their scale and effects, have had to be classified as an armed attack had they been 
carried out by regular armed forces, there is nothing in the language of Article 51 of 
the Charter that prevents the victim State from exercising its inherent right of self-
defence’.73 The Judge also specifically referred to, what is understood in this thesis 
as a failed state situation, arguing that: ‘If armed attacks are carried out by irregular 
bands from such territory [namely the territory experiencing the almost complete 
absence of government authority in the whole or part] against a neighbouring State 
they are still armed attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the territorial State. 
It would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-defence 
merely because there is no attacker State, and the Charter does not so require’.74    
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 The ICJ stated as follows: ‘It is further to be noted that, while Uganda claimed to have acted in 
self-defence, it di not ever claim that it had been subjected to an armed attack by the armed forces 
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 Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, 2005, ICJ, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 
30. 
74
 Ibid.  
150 
 
The fact of the matter is that the argument that non-state actors can be responsible 
for armed attacks which give rise to self-defence has been increasingly invoked.75 
The support for this claim can be found in the interpretation of the Article 51, state 
practice based on this reading and secondary literature.76 Furthermore, in historical 
terms, the argument that non-state actors might be behind an armed attack which 
gives rise to self-defence has been recognised by states. The 1837 Caroline Case is 
of particular relevance here. According to Greenwood, ‘*…+ the famous Caroline 
dispute, itself shows that an armed attack need not emanate from a State. The 
threat in the Caroline case came from a non-State group of the kind most would 
probably call terrorist today. The United States was not supporting the activities of 
that group and certainly could not be regarded as responsible for their acts. Yet, 
nowhere in the correspondence or in the subsequent reliance on the Webster 
formula on self-defence is it suggested that this fact might make a difference and 
that the Webster formula might not apply to armed attacks that did not emanate 
from a State’.77 
Increasing acceptance for the claim that self-defence can be exercised against 
armed attacks perpetrated solely by non-state actors requires examination of legal 
issues raised by this kind of situations. Three matters are particularly important in 
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the context of this thesis. First of all, it will be analysed if and how defensive action 
against non-state actors is influenced by the by the position of the territorial state. 
The relationship between the non-state actors and territorial state is of particular 
relevance in case of failed states where governmental control does not extend to 
large parts of state’s territory. The second issue which needs to be addressed is 
whether the failed states could possibly bear any responsibility for actions of non-
state actors by not preventing such acts and what are the possible consequences if 
none such responsibility can be in fact established. The final issue requiring 
attention is how the two above matters influence the legality of defensive 
measures taken by the state which has fallen victim of non-state actors’ attacks.  
The relationship between non-state actors and the state is both a factual question 
of the formal connection between the two as well as a political one. It is obviously 
extremely challenging at times to determine the factual circumstances and each 
situation must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. As noted previously, the 
problem becomes even more complicated in cases of failed states. On the one end 
of the spectrum, the non-state actors may be so closely linked with the state that it 
could be considered as de facto state organ or in fact act in place of the non-
existent official governmental authority. On the other side, the official state 
apparatus may be either completely absent or unable to prevent non-state actors’ 
activities. There are various possibilities between those two extremes. For example, 
the non-state actor may receive considerable support and assistance from the 
state, it may have consent of a state to operate independently on its territory or the 
state may be unwilling to control its operations. Once the factual circumstances 
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have been determined, for the purposes of the legal analysis, it must be established 
whether or not the acts of non-state actors can be attributed to the state and 
whether such attribution is in fact required at all in order to legitimise the exercise 
of self-defence. This in turn leads to the assessment of possible available grounds 
for exercising self-defence against attacks perpetrated solely by non-state actors.      
The most commonly referred to test regarding the attribution of non-state actors 
attacks to the territorial state was set out by the International Court of Justice in 
the Nicaragua Case. The Court referred to the Definition of Aggression78 at the 
same time establishing a high threshold for the attribution of action by an armed 
group.79 The ruling referred to the fact that even provision of weapons to an armed 
group operating in another country would not in itself be sufficient to establish 
such attribution.80 The situation whereby attacks by non-state actors can clearly be 
attributed to the territorial state will not receive further consideration in the 
present thesis as it is outside of the scope of work focusing on the defensive 
measures directed against non-state actors located in failed states and operating 
independently. Accordingly, the sections below examine scenarios where the 
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 See ICJ, Nicaragua case (Merits), para. 195: ‘There appears now to be general agreement on the 
nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be 
considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by 
regular armed forces across an international border, but also "the sending by or on behalf of a State 
of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by 
regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein". This description, contained in Article 3, 
paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), 
may be taken to reflect customary international law’ 
79
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Aggression, UN Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX), Article 3(g) states that: ‘Any of the following acts, regardless 
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 ICJ, Nicaragua case (Merits), at para. 115 and 195.  
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factual examination of the relationship between the state and non-state actors 
does not automatically translate into the responsibility of the former on account of 
its relationship with the latter. This will be conducted by way of analysing possible 
available grounds for allowing defensive action against non-state actors’ attacks.       
Failing the obvious attribution threshold, the possible available grounds for allowing 
defensive action against non-state actor could be divided into two groups:- 
(a) The territorial state actively harbours and/or supports independent non-
state actors operating within its territory;  
(b) The territorial state is either unwilling or unable to confront the threat 
posed by non-state actors.  
The above listed classifications obviously overlap to a certain extent. Noticeably, 
however, starting from point (a), the second category appears to considerably 
extend the scope of permissible defensive action against non-state actors.  
 
4.3.2.1 Armed attacks originating from harbouring and/or supporting states 
The first possible ground for allowing defensive action against non-state actors 
stipulates that the territorial state actively harbours or supports them. Accordingly, 
the victim state is not in a position to rely on the territorial state to fulfil its 
international obligations and contain the threat. There is an increasing support for 
the argument that even in circumstances where a state is not directly sending 
armed groups; it may nevertheless bear some form of responsibility for their 
actions under the international law. In spite of that, the question remains whether 
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establishing such responsibility provides sufficient justification for the exercise of 
defensive force against non-state actors and violation of that territorial state’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the reference to harbouring 
and/or supporting by the territorial state indicates that this particular ground for 
defensive action against non-state actors does not dispose entirely of the 
requirement for the link to exist between the two entities for the purposes of 
establishing the applicability and scope of self-defence.  
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-Operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations states that:  
‘Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such 
acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of 
force’ and further that ‘no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or 
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent 
overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another 
State’81 
The International Court of Justice referred to the above statement in the Armed 
Activities Case and declared it as customary international law.82 It has to be noted, 
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 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation 
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Resolution 2625(1970), 
Annex, UN Doc A/5217 at 121.  
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 See: ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo, 2005, para, 162. The Court stated that ‘(…) 
even if the evidence does not suggest that the MLC’s conduct is attributable to Uganda, the training 
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however, that the Declaration on Friendly Relations refers to the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force in states relations contained in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter.83 Accordingly, although the threat or use of force may constitute a 
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, it does not automatically mean that they 
also amount to an ‘armed attack’ justifying use of force in self-defence.84 In 
accordance with the restrictive reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter, it would still 
be necessary to attribute the actual actions of non-state actors which may 
constitute armed attack to the territorial state in order to provide a legal basis for 
the exercise of self-defence.  
Despite the fact that ‘considerable uncertainty *…+ remains on the long-standing 
controversy as to the definition of armed attack’85, self-defence in response to 
cases involving harbouring and/or supporting non-state actors had been endorsed 
by many states primarily on the basis that Article 51 extends to attacks by non-state 
actors.86 The prime example is the global reaction following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks which will be discussed in detail in Chapter five. Referring to, inter alia, 
widespread support for the allied forces operation some commentators concluded 
that the use of defensive force in Afghanistan which allegedly harboured Al-Qaeda 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and military support given by Uganda to the ALC, the military wing of the MLC, violates certain 
obligations of international law’ (para. 161).   
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 See: L Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force. International Law, Jus ad Bellum and the War on 
Terror (Oxford&Portland, Hart Publishing, 2010), p.60.  
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 See: A Randelzhofer, ‘Article 51’ in B Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), p.790.  
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 Gray, supra note 35, p.200. 
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 The ‘effective control’ test established by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case was criticised long before 
the events of September 11. In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge Schwebel concluded that:  ‘*T+he 
Judgment of the Court on the critical question of whether aid to irregulars may be tantamount to an 
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Judgment implies a regressive development of the law which fails to take account of the realities of 
the use of force in international relations’ (para. 155).     
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was lawful.87 The same harbour and/or support standard was applied in case of the 
2006 Israeli operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon.88 In this situation, however, 
the element of lack of governmental control over the territory controlled by non-
state actor had to be taken into consideration. Although the Israeli use of defensive 
force was criticised in terms of its proportionality, the right of victim state to act in 
self-defence was recognised by many states. All the above cases will be analysed in 
detail later in this thesis.  
The proponents of harbouring and/or supporting standard point towards the text of 
the UN Security Council Resolutions 136889 and 137390 adopted following the 
events of September 11, 2001 in support of their argument. In Resolution 1373 
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on 28 September 2001, the Security 
Council decided that ‘all States shall 
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or 
persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of 
members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to 
terrorists;  
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(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, 
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of 
information;  
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist 
acts, or provide safe havens;  
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from 
using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or 
their citizens;  
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, 
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is 
brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures 
against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences 
in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the 
seriousness of such terrorist acts’91 
Accordingly, states that provide the assistance or fail to attempt to prevent non-
state actors from launching attacks from its territory are in breach of their 
international obligations and may be held responsible.92 The reference to ‘harbour 
and/or support’ standard can also be found in other sources, including the 2005 
African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact. Its definition of 
‘aggression’ includes, amongst others, ‘the encouragement, support, harbouring or 
provision of any assistance for the commission of terrorist acts and other violent 
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trans-national organized crimes against a Member State’.93 Nonetheless, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the responsibility for harbouring and/or 
supporting non-state actors and the actual responsibility for carrying out an armed 
attack for the purposes of Article 51. Accordingly, if the state is found responsible 
for the armed attack, it may become a legitimate target of self-defence action. On 
the other hand, it is questionable whether it could be so, if, although possibly being 
in violation of the international law, its only responsibility is for harbouring and/or 
supporting non-state actors.     
To conclude, the fact that a state bears responsibility for harbouring and/or 
supporting the non-state actors or not attempting to prevent their attacks does not 
equate to the determination that such attacks can be automatically attributed to 
such a state and justify response in self-defence.94 If one is to accept the fact that 
non-state actors can be responsible for armed attacks of such a ‘scale and effect’ as 
to give rise to the exercise of self-defence, then this is entirely separate matter 
from the question of the territorial state’s responsibility.95 The question is how it 
influences the legality of defensive measures taken by the victim state against non-
state actors. Maogoto suggested that ‘It may be of a greater consequence to admit 
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openly that the requirement of attribution does not play a role in definition of 
‘armed attack’ *…+ One may argue that criterion of the attribution of an ‘armed 
attack’ is only relevant in the context of the question towards whom forcible 
response may be directed’.96 As we will be evident from the analysis carried out in 
Chapter five, recent developments in state practice and increasing importance of 
non-state actors in international order, certainly make this approach appealing in 
some respects.  
The distinction between the two different issues, that of attribution and the 
classification of an armed attack for the purposes of Article 51, cannot divert from 
the question of justification for the violation of territorial state’s sovereignty in 
cases where defensive measures are employed solely against non-state actors. 
Nevertheless, on the other hand, the issue of whether the territorial state can itself 
be the object of self-defence, does not change the fact that the armed attack by 
non-state actor operating from its territory took place. Accordingly, it would appear 
that the right to exercise self-defence should not be analysed by reference to the 
question of whether the territorial state failed to comply with its international 
obligations by harbouring and/or supporting or by not preventing the non-state 
actors’ activities. The relevant focus is on the fact that there is a state which is the 
victim of an armed attack perpetrated by non-state actors and in need to take 
recourse to defensive measures in order to avert the danger.  
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4.3.2.2 Armed attack originating from unwilling and/or unable state 
The second possible ground for exercising the right of self-defence against attacks 
perpetrated solely by non-state actors refers to the unwillingness and/or inability of 
the territorial state to contain the threat posed by them.97 This standard is broader 
than the ‘harbouring and/or support’ as it also applies to the circumstances where 
the government of the territorial state, although actively trying, is ineffective in its 
attempts to control non-state actors’ activities.98 This ground is undoubtedly 
relevant in the context of failed states. As noted above, the two grounds analysed 
here overlap to a certain extent. Accordingly, it could be argued at unwillingness of 
the territorial state to control non-state actors may also manifest itself in providing 
them with a save haven. On the other hand, the inability scenario refers to state 
failure at its most extreme where the official state apparatus is either completely 
incapacitated or even non-existent. The latter scenario is of a particular relevance 
to the circumstances of states whose governments collapsed as a result of anarchic 
conflict and are unable to exercise effective control over its population and 
territory.  
In the 2005 Armed Activities case, Judges Kooijmans and Simma specifically 
referred to the lack of governmental authority being an important factor in the 
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assessment of the legality of self-defence measures taken against non-state actors. 
The two Judges asserted that if attacks are carried out by non-state actors against 
neighbouring states from the territory of a state which almost completely lacks 
governmental authority in the whole or part of its territory, such attacks are still 
considered to be armed attacks despite the fact that they cannot be attributed to 
the territorial state.99 The position was followed by the Institut de Droit 
International in 2007. Resolution 10A of 27 October 2007 states that ‘In the event 
of an armed attack against a State by non-State actors, Article 51 of the Charter as 
supplemented by customary international law applies as a matter of principle’ and 
further that ‘If an armed attack by non-State actors is launched from an area 
beyond the jurisdiction of any State, the target State may exercise its right of self-
defence in that area against those non-State actors’.100 Furthermore, the ‘Principles 
Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right to Self-Defence Against an Imminent or 
Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors’101 proposed by Daniel Bethlehem as well 
as The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-
Defence102 and Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter Terrorism and 
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International Law103, all refer to the unwillingness and/or inability of the territorial 
state to prevent the attacks by non-state actors and, therefore, possibly justifying 
use of defensive force by the victim state, as becoming increasingly accepted in 
state practice and supporting statements of both governments and international 
organisations.    
The distinction between the actual legal responsibility of the territorial state which 
is unable to prevent non-state actors’ attacks and the possibility of taking defensive 
measures against non-state actors is equally important here. Following the 
approach outlined in point 4.3.2.1 above, the conclusion regarding the legality of 
exercising the right of self-defence by the victim state would be the same. 
Accordingly, if the failed state is either unwilling or unable to prevent the military 
activities launched by independent non-state actor and if such activities amount to 
an armed attack for the purposes of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the victim state 
may have the right to take forcible self-defence measures against the non-state 
actors on the territory of such a state. The issue of attributing the armed attack to 
the failed state would therefore remain irrelevant in the assessment of the legality 
of self-defence measures. Nevertheless, the controversy remains with regard as to 
whether the occurrence of an armed attack perpetrated solely by non-state actors 
and the inability of the territorial state to prevent it provide sufficient justification 
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from the violation of the territorial sovereignty of the latter. The fact of the matter 
is that although self-defence would be directed against non-state actors, it would 
nonetheless, take place on the territory of a state innocent of perpetrating an 
armed attack.  
According to Randelzhofer: ‘For the purpose of responding to an ‘armed attack’, the 
state acting in self-defence is allowed to trespass on foreign territory, even when 
the attack cannot be attributed to the state from whose territory it is proceeding 
(…) Thus it is compatible with Art. 51 and the laws of neutrality when a warring 
state fights hostile armed forces undertaking an armed attack from neutral territory 
on the territory of neutral state, provided that the state concerned is either 
unwilling or unable to curb the ongoing violation of its neutrality’.104 The advocates 
of the ‘unwilling or unable’ test point towards its alleged ‘historical linage’ in the 
law of neutrality mentioned above by Randelzhofer.105 In principle, the victim state 
is obliged to initially resort to peaceful means and request that a territorial/neutral 
state deals with a threat posed by non-state actors.106 If however, it becomes 
apparent that the territorial/neutral state is unwilling or unable to prevent 
violations of its neutrality by non-state actors  ‘neutrality laws permit a belligerent 
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to use force on a neutral state’s territory’.107  It has been argued that ‘From a 
doctrinal point of view, such an approach may be based on two foundations: a 
conception of sovereignty as responsibility, entailing protective duties vis-a-vis third 
states; and the relative character of territorial integrity, placing states under the 
obligation to acquiesce in defensive action of other states, if no other option is 
available, to put an end to an impending danger’.108 
The ‘due diligence rule’109, which is one of the basic principles of international law, 
provides that  states have a duty to prevent their territory from being used to the 
detriment of the other states.110 It has to be noted however, that non-compliance 
with the due diligence standard raises the issue of state’s legal responsibility for the 
omission on the part of the state and not for the actual wrongful act of a non-state 
actor. Furthermore, the due diligence rule is not absolute and presupposes an 
obligation of means.111 Whether or not a state has fulfilled its obligation and taken 
‘all reasonable measures’ depends on the specific circumstances as well as the 
primary rules involved and must be established on case-by-case basis.112  The two 
most important applicable criteria are whether the state possesses the necessary 
means in order to suppress the said activity by non-state actors and whether the 
state is aware of such actions taking place. In many cases of failed states such 
necessary means are lacking. Accordingly a state’s failure to exercise due diligence 
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and prevent the non-state actors from using its territory in order to launch cross-
border attacks does not necessarily automatically entails the state’s responsibility 
for the use of force. Consequently, it is quite possible that a state’s territory could 
be used for launching cross border incursion without it committing any 
internationally wrongful conduct in terms of non-compliance with its due diligence 
obligations. It has been argued that ‘the duty to suppress illegal conduct carried out 
by non-state actors must be applied in a flexible manner for host states that may be 
ineffective in meeting their diligence duty due to the lack of means’.113 It would 
therefore, appear correct to conclude, taking into consideration specific situation of 
a failed state, that such a state cannot be held liable for the breach of its due 
diligence obligations.  
The implementation of the ‘unable and/or unwilling’ standard appears to allows for 
a defensive action against non-state actors even if the territorial state exercises 
governmental authority but is simply ineffective in containing the threat posed by 
non-state actor element.114 Although taking defensive action in these 
circumstances may constitute an infringement of the territorial state’s sovereignty, 
as well as, a threat to international peace and security in general, support for this 
argument can be found in some recent state practice and will be investigated in 
further detail in the subsequent chapter.115 Shortly, however, for example, it has 
been submitted that the 2008 Turkey’s intervention against the PKK is one such 
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application. Although the region in Northern Iraq could not have been considered 
as completely ungoverned, the actual Iraqi government was unable to prevent the 
escalation of violence.116 The international community’s reaction to the operation 
was predominantly muted as majority of states tacitly tolerated it without either 
endorsing or rejecting Turkey’s claim of self-defence in accordance with the Article 
51 of the UN Charter.117 Similarly, the standard was referred to during the Russian 
interventions in 2002 and 2007 against Chechen rebels in Georgia. Although 
Georgian government attempted to suppress the violence, the measures taken 
were considered as ineffective. The Russian military intervention met with mixed 
responses but nevertheless, majority of states did not condemn it thereby denying 
Russia’s right to use force extraterritorially.118 Most recently, the unwilling and/or 
unable scenario together with reference to the Article 51 of the UN Charter has 
been invoked by the US in providing the legal argument for the airstrikes against 
Islamic State in Syria.119 In contrast to some of the operations invoking the use force 
in response to states harbouring and/or supporting non-state actors, in the 
unwilling and/or unable scenario rather than expressly endorsing the legal claim, 
majority of states tacitly condoned the military operations. This difference may 
suggest that although the operations in response to state’s inability and/or 
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unwillingness to take effective measures against a threat posed by non-state actors 
may be tolerated, majority of states do not actively support them.120 
As noted by d’Aspremont customary international law ‘is a convenient instrument 
to vindicate the progressive development of international law and its expansion’.121 
Undoubtedly, the restrictive reading of the right to self-defence under Article 51 of 
the UN Charter has been challenged by recent state practice. At the same time 
however, it has to be remembered that ‘custom is a judgement of acceptability 
over time’.122 The legality of self-defence against non-state actors in failed states 
without those states consent remains controversial. Chapter five will therefore 
investigate the validity of the claim that ‘it is possible that the *unable and/or 
unwilling+ test has become customary international law’123 and that ‘states 
frequently cite the test in ways that suggest that they believe it is a binding rule’124, 
particularly if an armed attack has been perpetrated by non-state actors operating 
from a territory of failed states as defined in Chapter three above.    
 
4.4 State failure and the parameters of self-defence 
The acceptance that there may exist some possible grounds for the deployment of 
defensive force against non-state actors operating from the territories of failed 
states is only the first step of the examination of self-defence in this context. The 
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second set of questions which need to be addressed relates to the parameters and 
application of that right. According to Judge Kooijmans: ‘The lawfulness of the 
conduct of the attacked [by non-state actor] State must be put to the same test as 
that applied in the case of a claim of self-defence against a State: does the armed 
action by the irregulars amount to an armed attack and, if so, is the armed action 
by the attacked State in conformity with the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality’.125 It is of paramount importance that, when exercising their right 
of self-defence, states must comply with the limits of necessity and proportionality. 
Nevertheless, measuring specific uses of defensive measures against the yardsticks 
of these two principles may prove problematic. This is due to the fact that necessity 
and proportionality, although ‘consistently referred to*…+, are rarely, if ever, 
analysed in relation to the Charter scheme of self-defence’.126   
In order to employ defensive measures against non-state actors in failed states, 
various aspects of necessity and proportionality need to be reconsidered and 
perhaps even modified. This is due to the fact that, first of all, the attacks by non-
state actors may differ substantially from those of a state in that they are often a 
‘one-off’, ‘pin prick’ attacks of a limited duration. Such attacks considered 
individually, would possibly not reach the required ‘scale and effect’, however, 
when taken into consideration cumulatively, they may justify exercise of self-
defence.127 Taking into consideration a specific character of non-state actors’ 
military operations, the victim state might not be in a position to respond while the 
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attack is still on-going instead of taking action either before the attack has begun or 
after it has ended. Secondly, the need to re-assess the principles follows from the 
fact that if one is to admit self-defence against non-state actors in failed states, it 
requires a more lenient standard of attribution allowing forcible response on the 
territory of states which are unable to contain the threat posed by non-state actors. 
Finally, use of force on the territory of ‘non-consenting innocent state’ requires 
addressing the possible conflict between protection of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of such a state and the victim’s state right to defend itself.  
The following sections analyse if and how the specific circumstances surrounding 
failed states influence the application of necessity and proportionality principles to 
the defensive measures taken against non-state actors operating within their 
territories. The subsequent chapter will then focus on examination of state practice 
in this respect with reference to the factors and considerations which will be 
highlighted in the sections below as particularly relevant in the interpretation of 
necessity and proportionality.  
   
4.4.1 Necessity and immediacy of self-defence measures against non-state actors 
in failed states  
The principles of necessity and proportionality of self-defence require that the 
military response by the victim state be limited to what is necessary to address the 
actual armed attack and proportionate to the threat that the state faces.128 
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Immediacy refers to the temporal connection between the armed attack and the 
response in self-defence (ratione temporis element of an armed attack).129 
Accordingly, in order to be legitimate, the victim state should respond to an armed 
attack without delay. State practice indicates that the interpretation of the 
necessity criterion could differ depending on the type of actual or threatened attack 
to which the victim state is responding.130 It would appear that in terms of the 
assessment of the legality of forcible measures taken in response to attack 
perpetrated solely by non-state actors, the principle of necessity plays a crucial 
role.131 
The requirement of necessity imposes an obligation on the victim state to use 
forcible measures only if there are no alternative means of effectively responding 
to the threat.132 In cases of the armed attack being perpetrated by a state, the 
obvious initial alternative to military action is diplomatic efforts in order to attempt 
to reach peaceful solution. In circumstances where the armed attack was carried 
out solely by non-state actors, the victim state may try and seek a solution via the 
territorial state. Accordingly, the legality of self-defence measures might depend 
upon the victim state exploring the diplomatic avenues and demanding that the 
territorial state exercises its jurisdiction and takes appropriate actions in order to 
control armed activities by non-state actors. If this option exists and the victim state 
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decides not to pursue it, then the legality of measures taken in self-defence may be 
questioned and such state could find itself in violation of the UN Charter prohibition 
of the use of force in states relations.133 It has to be noted, however, that the victim 
state is under no obligation to exhaust absolutely all non-forcible measures before 
turning to self-defence. The victim state must only pursue those alternatives which 
are likely to be effective.134 
As noted above, the relationship between the territorial state and the non-state 
actor may be of such kind that the former chooses not to take any measures in 
order to prevent the latter from perpetrating armed attacks. This link between the 
territorial states and non-state actors appears to be a crucial element of the victim 
state’s justification for the necessity of self-defence.  In some cases of failed states 
the opportunity to make demands towards them to take action against non-state 
may not be available to the victim state. As noted above in Chapter three, the 
ability of failed states to enter into international relation with other subjects of 
international law and to fulfil their international legal obligations is seriously 
compromised. This is due to the fact that the effective government simply does not 
exist or it is obvious that any attempts to pursue peaceful resolution would not be 
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effective. In these circumstances, the victim state could claim that it has no other 
option but to exercise its right to self-defence, even without territorial state’s 
consent, on the basis that it is necessary to avert the armed attack. Nevertheless, 
the question remains whether the fact that the territorial state is failed and unable   
to provide control over non-state actors armed activities, automatically renders 
self-defence against the latter lawful in terms of necessity since the peaceful means 
alternative may not exist.    
The Bethlehem ‘Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defence 
Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors’ also refer to the 
necessity of initially pursuing consent of the territorial state before taking action in 
self-defence against non-state actors attacks.135 The application of the Principle in 
practice would equate to the permissibility of the use of force against non-state 
actors on the territory of non-consenting innocent state if the latter was unable to 
contain the threat. Similarly, according to the Chatham House Principles of 
International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence, ‘The right of states to defend 
themselves against ongoing attacks, even by private groups of non-state actors, is 
not generally questioned. What is questioned is the right to take action against the 
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state that is the presumed source of such attacks *…+ It may be that the state is not 
responsible for the acts of the terrorists, but it is responsible for any failure to take 
reasonable steps to prevent the use of its territory as a base for attacks on other 
states. Its inability to discharge the duty does not relieve it of the duty. But the right 
to use force in self-defence is an inherent right and is not dependent upon any prior 
breach of international law by the state in the territory of which defensive force is 
used’.136 
In conclusion, it is undeniable that the principle of necessity requires the victim 
state to pursue peaceful avenues before resorting to forcible measures. It is a 
primary responsibility of the territorial state to avert armed attacks by non-state 
actors. Nevertheless, the relationship between the territorial state and non-state 
actors heavily determines which non-forcible measures will be accessible to the 
victim state and could be potentially effective. It would appear that state failure 
and government’s lack of territorial control may considerably limit the alternatives 
available before exercising the right to self-defence.  
 
4.4.2. Proportionality of action taken in self-defence against non-state actors in 
failed states   
As noted above, the principle of proportionality also constitutes a crucial 
requirement of lawful self-defence and is equally applicable in the context of self-
defence against non-state actors.137 Despite the fact that proportionality remains a 
fundamental principle of international law, its implementation in practice and 
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precise content might be difficult to define.138 Requirements of proportionality 
apply in many areas of law including international human rights law and the laws of 
armed conflict regulating the means and methods of warfare. While their primary 
goal is always a balancing of interest, it has to be noted that the application of 
proportionality in different fields has various functions and consequently, this 
influences the formulation of respective proportionality equations.139 
In the context of self-defence as well as in general, the rules of ius ad bellum, 
proportionality has a dual function. First of all, it is an additional factor for 
determination of whether a state may resort to self-defence at all. Secondly, it 
imposes limitations on the scope and intensity of lawful self-defence. Compliance 
with proportionality requires that the defending state employs no more force than 
it is necessary in order to achieve the pursued objective.140 According to Ago, ‘It 
would be mistaken to think that there must be proportionality between the 
conduct constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action 
needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions 
disproportionate to those of the attack suffered. What matters in this respect is the 
result to be achieved by the ‘defensive action, and not the forms, substance and 
strength of the action itself’.141 Accordingly, the measures employed in self-defence 
do not necessarily have to quantitatively commensurate either with the attack 
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which it is responding to or with the threatened attack.142 This makes the 
proportionality requirement difficult to apply in practice as it does not operate on 
the basis of equivalence between the effects and is dependent upon the scope of 
legitimate objectives pursued by self-defence measures. As noted above, the 
defensive action is acceptable in response to ongoing or imminent attacks. 
Accordingly, the future harm which is reasonably expected to occur is relevant in 
the assessment of proportionality which imposes an obligation on states not to 
resort to self-defence actions which would be excessive in relation to the injury 
expected from the attack.  
When acting in self-defence against the attacks perpetrated by non-state actors, 
the same reasoning as above must be applied.143 Accordingly, if the proportionality 
of self-defence action is to be measured by reference to the danger faced by the 
victim state, the first task would be the assessment of this danger. The evaluation 
of the magnitude of the threat posed will be dependent upon the circumstances of 
each case and their evaluation. In cases of non-state actors’ attacks emanating from 
failed states this might be extremely difficult as the abilities of non-state actors are 
far less evident than those of a state. Additionally, the fact that a territorial state 
lacks effective governmental institutions and may be unable or unwilling to 
cooperate with the victim state, contributes even further to the evaluation of the 
threat posed by them being largely prognostic and often based on factual 
uncertainties.  
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There are a number of factors which are generally considered relevant in the 
assessment of proportionality of self-defence144 which should, undoubtedly, also be 
applied in cases involving non-state actors. First of all, the proportionality will 
depend on the scale and effects of an armed attack as well as the likelihood of the 
attacker’s success in the realisation of its goal. In cases of an ongoing small scale 
attacks by non-state actors, it has to be taken into consideration whether the 
armed attacks have been successful and the harm they already inflicted on the 
victim state. Furthermore, in order to appraise the proportionality of defensive 
measures, it is necessary to compare the injury already inflicted or expected from 
the non-state actors’ attack with the consequences of the self-defence action 
itself.145 The victim state would have to provide evidence justifying the scale of the 
response and means employed. It has to be noted however, that this should not be 
done by reference to the rules imposed by international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, as the proportionality test laid out by the rules of ius ad bellum is 
an entirely autonomous requirement.146 Accordingly, the means and methods 
employed by the victim state must be considered as necessary to respond to the 
attack or a threat thereof.147 Two further factors are relevant in the discussion on 
proportionality of defensive response, namely its geographical and temporal scope. 
Finally, it is also dependent on what may be subsumed under the broad notion of 
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‘collateral damage’.148 This denotes injurious consequences of defensive measures 
affecting actors not involved in the conflict (for example, failed state). Traditionally, 
the rights and duties of third states influenced by the armed conduct were 
governed by the laws of neutrality.149 Undoubtedly, the effects of self-defence on 
such a neutral/failed state may affect the assessment of proportionality. 
Accordingly, the greater the loss inflicted by defensive measures employed against 
non-state actors, the more detailed justification for inflicting them would have to 
be.  
The assessment of proportionality of self-defence would always be a challenging 
task, even in traditional state-only setting. In respect of self-defence against non-
state actors in failed states, matters are even more complex. The appraisal of 
proportionality is to a large extent dependent on the gravity of the threat posed by 
the non-state actors and the fact that failed states cannot contain them; as well as 
value judgement regarding what level of response would be permissible. As it will 
be evident from the analysis of state practice in subsequent Chapter, states often 
refer to the element of proportionality in self-defence against non-state actors. 
Nevertheless, it may be difficult to identify considerations on which assessment of 
the specific content and requirements of proportionality, as well as its application, 
are based.  
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The aim of this Chapter was to provide legal analysis of the questions pertaining to 
the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors operating from the 
territories of failed states, as previously defined in Chapter three. Clearly, the 
attacks by states’ regular forces come within the ambit of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. The legal issues which were discussed here relate to the circumstances 
where the application of the said Article would not be immediately obvious and the 
application of customary international law remains unsettled. Such are the cases 
where the state fails to control its territory and the non-state actor carries out 
transborder military operation of such ‘scale and effect’ which may suffice for it to 
be considered an ‘armed attack’. The first part of the Chapter provided essential 
background and identified the law relevant to the use of force in self-defence in 
general. The subsequent section proceeded to analyse possible grounds for the 
exercise of the right of self-defence against non-state actors perpetrating alleged 
armed attacks from territories of failed states. The penultimate part addressed the 
possible potential of principles of necessity and proportionality as limitations on the 
use of force against non-state actors in failed states.  
The adherence to strictly state-orientated rules regarding the use of force in self-
defence has been increasingly challenged by the new reality of conflicts 
characterised by the presence of powerful non-state actors operating from the 
territory of a state which, due to the lack of effectively functioning government, has 
absolutely no control over their actions. Accordingly, the Chapter addressed 
possible legal positions concerning the question whether and, if so, when the use of 
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defensive force against non-state actors in failed states may be considered as 
lawful. The use of force targeting non-state actors on the territory of ‘non-
consenting innocent state’ requires consideration of the possible conflict between 
protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of such a state and the 
victim’s state right to defend itself. It has been concluded that, despite the 
importance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the absolute prohibition of 
the use force in self-defence against armed attacks committed solely by non-state 
actors without attribution of their conduct to the territorial state, becomes 
increasingly challenged position in the current international law. The supporters of 
a widely understood right of self-defence question the restrictive reading of the 
ratione personae element of an armed attack and point towards the fact that 
Article 51 of the UN Charter does not explicitly identify the nature of the party 
responsible for the armed attack and that non-state actors are undoubtedly 
capable of perpetrating such an attack. The Chapter then proceeded to investigate 
three matters of particular interest in connection to the above claim. Firstly, it has 
been examined if and how defensive action against non-state actors could be 
influenced by the position of the territorial state. Secondly, the chapter addressed 
the possibility of the failed states bearing the responsibility for actions of non-state 
actors by not preventing such acts and failing to comply with their due diligence 
obligations. Finally, it has been examined how the two above matters influence the 
legality of defensive measures taken by the state which has fallen victim of non-
state actors’ attacks. It has been concluded that the distinction between the two 
different issues, that of attribution and the classification of an armed attack for the 
purposes of Article 51, cannot divert from the need for a legal basis for deployment 
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of defensive measures against non-state actors in possible violation of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of a failed state. The final part of the current Chapter 
examined the potential of the principles of necessity and proportionality as 
limitations on the use of force against non-state actors in failed states.  
This section of the thesis is the opening part of the discussion which continues in 
Chapter five and turns towards the analysis of the application of the law and recent 
state practice with regard to the exercise of the right to self-defence against armed 
attacks perpetrated solely by non-state actors located within failed states. The 
current situation can be characterised by an increasing gap between what is 
considered as the norms of international law and the norms which rule the 
operational practice of states. It will be argued that state practice is hardly 
uniformed and consolidated. It is often the case that states do not explicitly 
condemn military operation against non-state actors as unlawful. Nevertheless, this 
does not obviously imply that the victim states’ justification for the intervention 
remains uncontested. The analysis of recent state practice supports the conclusion 
that it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain the claim that international law 
absolutely prohibits the use of defensive force against non-state actors operating 
from the territories of failed states which are unable to control their actiovities. 
Nevertheless, states remain conflicted as to when such force can be employed and 




FAILED STATES AND THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS.  
ANALYSIS OF RECENT STATE PRACTICE 
5.1 Introduction  
A considerable proportion of the world’s population today lives in states which are 
developing and whose political structure, boundaries and frequently even the very 
existence is highly artificial and often a legacy of the colonial system. The process of 
colonisation and subsequent decolonisation did not necessarily result in 
reproduction or implementation of the Westphalian model of states, possessing 
clearly defined territory, population and effective governments capable of entering 
into international relations with other international law subjects. Failed states are 
unique creatures which have no real analogy to concepts already existing in 
international law. As a consequence, although the international community 
continues to perpetuate a notion of ‘statehood’ which allows the state-centric 
system of international law to exist, when dealing with practical and political 
realities of state failure, international law may no longer consider external 
sovereignty of states as an undeniable entitlement to statehood.1 Recent state 
practice with regard to the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors 
operating within failed states appears to support this conclusion. Accordingly, 
although the ‘statehood’ of failed states remains uncontested, their sovereignty is 
increasingly considered to be dependent on the existence of effective governments 
and recent cases of military interventions in the exercise of self-defence indicate a 
                                                          
1
 See supra Chapter 3.2 & 3.3.  
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clear movement beyond sovereignty-driven reluctance in the use of force in states’ 
relations. The analysis of state practice in this respect appears to suggest that failed 
states considerably changed the modern landscape of peace and security. 
Nevertheless, the exact consequences and the impact of this change in 
international law are yet to be fully explored.  
The circumstances surrounding failed states clearly show increasing dissonance 
between the challenges facing contemporary security system, and the largely static 
international legal order, particularly in relation to the use of force. Clearly, these 
difficulties have been noticed and consequently, the actions of states in their 
international legal relations have evolved. As a result, although the absence of 
effective government and other failed state characteristics, investigated in details if 
Chapter three above, do not affect statehood as such, the same cannot perhaps be 
concluded with regard to the sovereignty of such territorial entities. This thesis 
addresses one of the manifestations of this claim, namely increasing number of the 
examples of the use of defensive force against non-state actors operating from the 
territories of failed states.  
The following Chapter aims to analyse state practice with regard to both the 
interpretation of the treaty law and contribution towards a dynamic and 
continuous process of creation of customary international law within the area of 
the use of force in states’ relations. In particular, it will be examined if and how the 
lack of effective government and inability to fulfil international obligations by failed 
states influenced states’ reactions towards armed attacks perpetrated solely by 
non-state actors. The main question will be whether there is a constant and 
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uniform practice of states regarding the military intervention in self-defence on the 
territory of failed states despite the fact that the responsibility for an ‘armed attack’ 
cannot be attributed to the latter. Can one have a legitimate expectation of the 
same conduct in the future in a similar set of circumstances? Did state failure 
become a lawful justification for intervention in self-defence against the attacks 
committed solely by non-state actors? Chapter five, therefore, complements the 
analysis conducted in the preceding chapter by putting the factual situations of 
failed States into the particular context of the legal framework relating to the use of 
force in states relations.   
When the United Nations Charter was created, its drafters focused predominantly 
on armed attacks carried out by one state against another.2 The idea of cross-
border attacks perpetrated by non-state actors did not receive any attention. The 
following sections identify and analyse instances of recent state practice in relation 
to the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors operating from a 
territory of states lacking effective government capable of guaranteeing law and 
order. Accordingly, the chapter seeks to investigate how the ratione personae 
requirement of ‘armed attack‘ is being interpreted in recent state practice. From 
whom must an armed attack emanate in order to trigger the right of self-defence 
and how the alleged failure of territorial state influences this analysis?  In principle, 
it is uncontroversial that when substantial cross-border attacks by non-state actors 
can be imputed to a state, there is an ‘armed attack’ against which the victim state 
may exercise defensive measures, subject to the necessity and proportionality 
criteria. Nevertheless, the precise content of the rules on state responsibility has 
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 See Supra Chapter 4.2.   
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only recently been clarified as a result of the ICJ’s case law and the work of the 
International Law Commission3 but still does not by any account remain 
undisputed. Consequently, the analysis carried out in this Chapter aims to 
contribute towards the discussion regarding the state practice with respect to the 
exercise the right of self-defence absent state imputability.  
The present Chapter proceeds in four parts. The first one briefly analyses the 
situation of a territorial state with reference to Chapter’s three definition of state 
failure phenomenon; as well as the position of the perpetrators of the attack – non-
state actors. As noted previously, state failure is not a static situation and although 
there are significant common denominators, the level of ‘failure’ may vary from 
country to country. Accordingly, various states are considered in the section below, 
including, for example, Afghanistan, which under the Taliban rule may have had 
seemingly strong government, and Somalia, which at certain points in time did not 
possess any sort of government at all.  The second part ascertains the justifications 
provided by the victim states for the military operation as well as the response, if 
any, of the territorial/failed states to the intervention. In particular, it is analysed 
whether despite the failed states’ inability to exercise control over the non-state 
actors operating from within their territory, the victim states still implies the 
responsibility of the failed state for the armed attack. Furthermore, it is considered 
if and how such inability can be interpreted by the victim state as an element of 
responsibility. The penultimate section of the Chapter examines the reaction of 
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 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts With Commentaries, text adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-




individual states as well as various international organisations to the identified 
instances of the use of defensive force. The creation of customary international law 
is not momentary. Accordingly, the conclusion of the present Chapter will discuss 
whether recent state practice with regard to the exercise of right of self-defence 
against non-state actors’ attacks emanating from the territory of failed states is 
sufficiently widespread and consistent and considered to be accepted as law.4   
 
5.2 Failed states and non-state actors – situation of the territorial state   
The underlying assumption of the UN Charter state-centric security framework is 
that within each internationally recognised state there is some form of central 
authority in control of all internationally relevant armed forces based within that 
territory.5 The common denominator of states discussed in this section is the 
inability to effectively govern the entirety of their territory and population. The lack 
of effective control manifests itself in the powerlessness of the state’s military and 
police vis-à-vis non-state actors seeking to establish safe haven within the state’s 
territory. The inability to control violence within a defined territory, as well as, 
increasing capacity of non-state actors to perpetrate transborder armed attacks, 
presents increasing threat to international peace and security and emphasises the 
growing inadequacy of state-centric security regime.  
                                                          
4
 See: M C Wood, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on Identification of Customary International 
Law, International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session, A/CN.4/672, Geneva, 5 May-6 June and 7 
July-8 August 2014, para. 21-30.  
5
 See: Z Daboné, ‘International law: armed groups in a state-centric system’ 93(882) International 
Review of the Red Cross 395 (2011).   
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Examples of failed states abound. Despite the fact that the level of their 
ineffectiveness in exercising territorial control varies, the one common 
denominator is the fact that they all failed to prevent non-state actors from 
operating across international frontier. In the early days of the post-Charter era, 
states consistently relied on a close association between the non-state actors and 
the territorial states in order to hold the latter responsible for the attacks by armed 
groups. More generally, the non-state actors were regarded as ‘instruments’ in the 
hands of states. This approach has changed and since the late 1960s there have 
been many incidents where the states relied on self-defence justification and the 
link between territorial state and non-state armed groups carrying out cross-border 
attacks was far less evident. There are a number of cases of resort to use of force in 
self-defence in response to armed attacks by non-state armed groups in the post-
Charter era.6 Nevertheless, it is argued that the military operation in Afghanistan 
following the events of the 9th of September 2001 and subsequent international 
community’s reaction to these events opened up a new chapter in the analysis of 
the matters pertaining to the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors.7  
When exactly Afghanistan became a failed state is a matter of some contention.  
Following its creation, the country never became a homogenous nation and 
remained more of a collection of varying groups divided along ethnic, linguistic, 
religious and racial lines. The majority of a failed state features were present in 
Afghanistan at the time of September 11, 2001 events, including, inter alia, limited 
                                                          
6
 See: T Ruys, ‘Armed Attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp. 428 – 433;   
7
 A Cassese, ‘Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories in International Law’ 12 (5) 
European Journal of International Law 993(2001)   
187 
 
political institutionalisation of the society, strong ethnic and/or religious divisions, 
systematic humanitarian law and human rights violations and poverty. Despite the 
fact that Taliban government exercised some level of control over the majority of 
the state’s territory, this did not mean that their rule remained uncontested.8 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, described the country as de facto collapsed before the events of 
September 11, 2001, when the Taliban controlled vast majority of the State’s 
territory.9 According to the Reports of the UN Secretary-General10, Afghanistan was 
one of the poorest countries on earth.   
State practice analysed in this Chapter relates to the use of force against 
independent non-state actors which do not satisfy ICJ’s ‘effective control’ test for 
state responsibility nor do they function as de facto agents of state government. 
The September 11 attacks were not perpetrated by the Taliban regime but by a 
powerful non-state actor based in Afghanistan – Al-Qaeda11, an international 
terrorist network founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s. The existence of a 
close relationship between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime would seem beyond 
doubt. According to the available information however, the Taliban regime did not 
                                                          
8
 By 11 September 2001, only three states, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, recognised the 
Taliban regime as a legitimate Afghan government. The majority of international community 
recognised a government represented by the United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan 
(“Northern Alliance”) fighting the Taliban since the USSR left Afghanistan in 1989. 
9
 Lakhdar Brahimi, Briefing to the Security Council, Transcript from 13 November 2001, available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/Brahimi-sc-briefing.html.  
10
 Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for 
International Peace and Security, S/2000/1106, 20 November 2000. Available at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/754/94/PDF/N0075494.pdf?OpenElement  
11
 US President George W. Bush stated on 20
th
 September 2001 in his Address before a Joint Session 
of the Congress that ‘The evidence we have gathered all points to *the attacks having been carried 
out by] a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organisations known as Al-Qaeda’. US President 
‘Address Before Joint Session of the Congress of the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks 
of September 11’ 37 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1347.   
188 
 
control or instruct Al-Qaeda fighters.12 Although the Taliban government was in 
breach of the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations)13 by providing safe heaven and 
training facilities on the Afghan soil to the Al-Qaeda, it is questionable whether this 
breach of international obligations can be considered an ‘armed attack’ on the US. 
In particular, it has been suggested that it was the Taliban government which was 
dependent on and even subordinate to Al-Qaeda rather than the other way 
round.14 The United Kingdom’s government report on ‘Responsibility for the 
Terrorist Atrocities in the United States’ stated that: ‘Usama Bin Laden has provided 
the Taleban régime with troops, arms and money to fight the Northern Alliance. He 
is closely involved with Taleban military training, planning and operations. He has 
representatives in the Taleban military command structure. He has also given 
infrastructure assistance and humanitarian aid’.15 Although the document did not 
conclude that the Taliban regime was directly involved in the attack, it did make an 
observation that a close link existed between the two structures. Nevertheless, the 
non-state actor seems to have been operationally and financially independent from 
the Taliban and on the factual basis it is not possible to consider Al-Qaeda as an 
                                                          
12
 The UK Government’s report on ‘Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States’ 
clearly states that: ‘Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida, the terrorist network which he heads, planned 
and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001’. The Report further states that: ‘Usama Bin 
Laden and Al Qaida were able to commit these atrocities because of their close alliance with the 
Taleban régime, which allowed them to operate with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity’.  
Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ukreport.pdf  
13
 UN Docs A/RES/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. These violations of international law were the 
subject of the Resolutions 1214 (1998), 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) of the Security Council, which 
requested, in their operative parts, that the Taliban stop their support and extradite Osama bin 
Laden 
14
 See: A C Müller ‘Legal Issues Arising from the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan’ 4 Non-State Actors 
and International Law 239 (2004), at p. 248   
15
 The UK government’s report on ‘Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States’  
Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ukreport.pdf  
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organ of the Afghan state or a mean in the hands of the Taliban to fulfil their own 
objectives.16 Accordingly, although the unwillingness of the Taliban regime to 
comply with international obligations relating to the duty to refrain from supporting 
terrorist attacks against another state could be quite easily established, the actual 
ability of this de facto government would have to be analysed separately. It is 
questionable whether, even if they were willing to do so, the Taliban would be able 
to control Bin Laden’s organisation as the latter was financially and military a 
superior force. The inability of governments, if they exist at all, to exercise control 
over non-state actors is a common denominator in case of state failure and the 
examples of the recent state practice examined in this Chapter.  
The UN Charter’s state centric security regime is predicated upon states exercising 
monopoly of force within their territorial boundaries. Failed states are unable to 
fulfil this function.  Consequently, the gap between the ideal of effective statehood 
and the reality faced by the states with ineffective or even non-existing government 
creates optimal environment for the non-state actors to thrive. This was certainly 
the case in Africa’s Great Lakes Region where political strife, armed conflict and 
population displacement resulted in grave humanitarian consequences. The conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo was characterised by a multitude of rebel 
groups controlling vast proportions of the state’s territory and often being allied 
with neighbouring states involved in the conflict.17 The conflict involved a number 
of unaffiliated non-state actor groups capable of allying with other states as well as 
                                                          
16
 Ibid.   
17
 See: R Lemarchand ‘The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Failure to Potential Reconstruction’ 
in R I Rotberg, ed. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, (Washington D.C., Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003), pp. 29-70  
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acting independently.18 In particular, the Eastern part of the country became a 
region where ‘rebel groups were able to operate ‘unimpeded’ (…) because of its 
mountainous terrain, its remoteness from Kinshasa (more than 1500 km), and 
almost complete absence of central government presence or authority’.19 By 2002, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo was described as ‘not just a failed state’ but ‘the 
epitome of the failed state’.20 It is estimated that at the time, approximately half of 
the state’s territory was under control of the rebel movements and six other 
nations (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia) were involved 
in the conflict. When the first annual Failed State Index was presented in 2005 (also 
the year when the ICJ issued its judgement in the Armed Activities case), the DRC 
ranked second.21 Accordingly, the country could be considered a perfect example of 
a failed state as described in Chapter three above.  
Nowhere was, and to a certain extent still is, the inability to effectively control its 
territory more evident than in the case of Somalia. The country features on the 
Failed State Index from its inception and is considered by many as the best 
contemporary example of a failed state. Its history has been marked anarchic 
conflicts characterised by constant violence, military coups, assassinations, 
alliances, and more recently, the turn to radical Islamic militancy.22 Consequently, 
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 P Okowa, ‘Congo’s War: the legal dimensions of a protracted conflict’ 72 British Yearbook of 
International Law 203 (2006) 
19
 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v Uganda), Judgement of 19
th
 December 2005( Merits) http://www.icj-cij.org, para. 301.  
20
 See: R Lemarchand, supra note 11, p.29.  
21
 See: The Failed State Index 2005, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/the-failed-
states-index-2005/ 
22
 Various parties struggled for control over its territory since the country’s formation in 1960 
following the unification of the Italian and British territories and the proclamation of the 
independent Somali Republic in July 1961. The concept of a ‘State’, however, was foreign to the 
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there has been virtually no control of Somalia’s borders. This lack of territorial 
control, as well as persistently ineffective governments, created a very volatile and 
dangerous situation for Somali security, seriously undermining the country’s long 
term stability and that of the region in general. Many different groups bear 
responsibility for Somalia’s difficulties, ranging from clans, sub-clans, criminals, 
nationalists, warlords, military entities, and Islamists.23 In 1991, General Mohamed 
Siad Barre, who came to power through a military coup in 1969, was ousted from 
power by several Somali armed groups.24 The state became a playground for non-
state armed groups due to the fact that ever since forced departure of President 
Mohamed Siad Barre, it essentially lacked any effective government. The 
international community has certainly taken steps to resolve the situation in 
Somalia and a number of attempts have been made to establish effective 
government.25 Nevertheless, various groups operating within the country 
undermined every attempt to do so.  
In 2004 an agreement was reached between competing fractions to create a 
Transitional Federal Government (hereinafter TFG) under President Abdullahi 
                                                                                                                                                                    
inhabitants of Somali territory, as the society was traditionally organised in clans where the clan 
elders and chiefs exercised the primary authority. Consequently, despite nearly a century of colonial 
rule, Somalia’s clan structure had not essentially changed. The Cold War complicated the situation in 
the country even further. As a result, intensified by the influenced of the US and the Soviet Union, 
the Ogaden War fought between Somalia and Ethiopia between July 1977 and March 1978 is 
believed to be the cruellest armed conflict in Africa since the Second World War. 
23
 The major clan groups are the Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, Dir, Rahanwayn, and Digil. See: T Dagne, 
‘Somalia: Current conditions and Prospects for Lasting Peace’ Congressional Research Service, 
Report for Congress, 31 August 2011, Figure 1, p. 29. Available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf  
24
 Mohamed Siad Barre took control of Somalia in 1969. He was deposed from power by the Habar 
Gida militia sub-clan of the Hawiye clan headed by General Muhammad Farah “Aideed.” See: J 
McLure, ‘The Troubled Horn of Africa: Can the War-torn Region Be Stabilised?’, 3 CQ Global 
Researcher 149, 163–64 (2009). Following the collapse of central authority in Mogadishu, rival 
Somali groups engaged in armed struggle for personal political power and prevented food and 
medicine from reaching innocent civilians suffering from drought and famine. What followed was 
the death of an estimated 500,000 people due to violence, starvation, and disease. 
25
 UNSOM I & II, UNITED TASK FORCE (UNITAF)  
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Yusuf.26 The government received expressed African Union and UN Security Council 
support.27 The newly formed government, however, did not exercise control over 
the entirety of the state’s territory and soon faced a very serious challenge from the 
Union of Islamic Courts (hereinafter UIC)28. According to a Chatham House report: 
‘During 2006 a variety of Islamist organizations, centred on a long-standing network 
of local Islamic or sharia courts in Mogadishu, had come together under an 
umbrella organization, popularly known in the Western media as the Islamic Courts 
Union. (…) the movement (…) became an alternative to the internationally 
recognized, but internally disputed, Transitional Federal Government, then 
restricted to Baidoa’.29 In June 2006, the UIC took control over much of the 
southern and central Somalia including capital Mogadishu. In an unprecedented 
turn of events, the Courts managed to unite Mogadishu for the first time in 16 years 
and re-establish some peace and security.30 The UIC officials heavily criticised the 
policies of Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa and raised questions about 
the status of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in a future Somalia.31 
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 See: 2004 Nairobi Conference: Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues Proposed by the 
Somali Delegates at the Somali Consultative Meetings from 9–29 January 2004.  
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 UN Security Council Resolutions 1587 (15 March 2005) and 1676 (10 May 2006).  
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 The Union of Islamic Courts renamed itself the Supreme Islamic Courts Council on 24
th
 July 2006.  
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 C Barnes and H Hassan, ‘The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts’ Chatham House, Africa 
Programme, April 2007. Available at: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpsomalia0407.pdf  
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 Ibid. For example, the airport and seaport were both re-opened.  
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 The Transitional Federal Government remained weak, ‘confined to part of Mogadishu, riven by 
political squabbles and dependent for its survival on the troops of the African Union (AU) mission 
(AMISOM). Relatively stable regions to the north refuse to  recognise its authority, and much of 
southern and central  Somalia is controlled by Al-Shabaab, a Salafi jihadi group  bent on 
overthrowing the TFG and imposing its extreme  version of Islam on the entire country, if not the 
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Furthermore, prominent UIC figures publicly criticised the role of Ethiopia in 
Somalia’s internal affairs.32 Both the USA and Ethiopia accused the group of being a 
terrorist organisation with strong links to Al-Qaida.33 Ever since taking over control 
in Mogadishu and other areas, the UIC accused Ethiopia of sending troops into 
Somalia in order to assist the TFG. Clashes between the UIC and the TFG began to 
escalate from July 2006. 34 
The disintegration of Somali state led to implosion of national institutions, law and 
order and authority. The failure of the state to provide good governance, security, 
and respect for the rule of law is at the very heart of Somalia’s endemic conflict. In 
2011 the country topped the Failed State Index for the fourth year running.35 Ten 
out of twelve Somalia’s indicators scores were above 9.0 on the scale of 10. In 
                                                                                                                                                                    
entire region’. See: International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 170, 21 February 2011, ‘Somalia: 
The Transitional Government on Life Support’, p.1.    
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 Ibid.  
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 ‘Somalia: Eliminating the Terrorist Threat’ Fact Sheet, African Affairs, US Department of State, 25 
January 2007. Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/2007/79383.htm  
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Conference, 20 June 2006.  
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 The UIC forces made significant advances towards Baidoa where the TFG resided. According to the 
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particular, Security Apparatus indicator score was at the possible maximum of 10.0, 
whereas the Legitimacy of State indicator score was almost equally high at 9.8.36 As 
a consequence of the unstable situation in the country and near complete lack of 
government for a number of years, since the mid-1990s a number of extremist 
groups operating from Somalia carried out or facilitated multitude of attacks in the 
region.37  
The state’s capacity to maintain relatively homogenous effective control 
throughout the internationally recognised borders has also been seriously 
compromised in many Middle Eastern countries. As a result, non-state actors 
thrived where states such as Lebanon, Iraq and most recently Syria failed to 
consolidate control over their population and territory. From 1975 until the early 
1990s Lebanon endured an anarchic conflict where a number of regional players 
such as Israel, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organisation used the country as a 
battleground to carry out their own conflicts.38 Following the Taif Accord of 22nd 
October 1989 which provided the basis for ending the civil war in Lebanon, south of 
the country nevertheless remained the one area of active fighting. Hezbollah 
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emerged during the Lebanese civil war as a Shiite militia and in response to Israeli 
invasion in 1982 and subsequent occupation of some parts in the south of the 
country.39 The group maintains extensive security apparatus, political organisation 
and social services network in many parts of Lebanon and is often described as 
‘state within a state’.40 According to the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on 
Lebanon, ‘Hezbollah has grown to an organization active in the Lebanese political 
system and society, where it is represented in the Lebanese parliament and in the 
cabinet. It also operates its own armed wing, as well as radio and satellite television 
stations.  It further funds and manages its own social development programmes’.41 
At the time of the beginning of the so-called ‘Second Lebanese War’, it has been 
widely recognised that the Lebanese government was deeply divided and did not 
have the capacity to control Hezbollah militia. It has been reported that 
‘Hezbollah's militia, estimated at some 3,000 full-time fighters based in Lebanon's 
southeast, is as strong as the Lebanese army, and the government has made no 
effort to take the group's weapons. Hezbollah resists control by the government, 
and considers itself a representative of the Shiite majority in Lebanon’.42 Lebanese 
government lacked political base and effective army capable of disarming Hezbollah 
militia. Yet again, the situation of Lebanon serves as a good example of a state 
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where ineffectiveness of the existing government lead to a severe deterioration of 
its capacity to maintain law and order.  
Iraq placed second on the 2007 Failed State Index with only Sudan’s situation being 
considered as comparatively worse.43 Following the US-led military operation in 
Iraq which began in March 2003, the country experienced prolonged time of 
conflict and the period between mid-2007 and mid-2008 was considered to be one 
of the bloodies ones with high number of deaths among both US personnel and 
Iraqi civilian population.44 Although a permanent Iraqi government took office on 
22nd May 2007, the year was marked by increasing sectarian and political 
violence.45 Widely autonomous Kurdish region in the north was much more stable 
that the rest of the country and the two dominant parties, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), agreed to form a 
unified government for the region, the Kurdish Regional Government, which was 
announced in May 2007.46 Nevertheless, the relationship between the leadership of 
Iraqi’s Kurds and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (hereinafter PKK) fighters was 
somewhat ambiguous – on the one hand they wanted to maintain positive trade 
relations with Turkey; on the other hand remained to a certain extent sympathetic 
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towards the struggle of Turkish Kurds and considered the PKK as a bargaining chip 
to exert pressure on Turkey over the disputed status of oil-reach region of Kirkuk.47  
Both Iraq and Syria are considered to be the two Middle Eastern nations that are 
the most diverse countries in the region with a number of different communities, 
including Sunni, Shia and Christians. According to the Fragile States Index Decade 
trends, the situation in Syria became significantly worse over the last 10 years.48 
This has been particularly evident during the past four years when following the 
pro-democracy protests which erupted in March 2011, the country descended into 
a conflict.49  The fighting claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and created even 
more refugees.50 Territorial control in Syria has changed repeatedly since the 
beginning of the conflict. It is currently divided between the Islamic State 
militants51, Syrian armed forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and a number of 
various armed groups.52 Syria has been labelled as ‘Somalia-style failed state’53 and 
indeed, it is apparent that the hugely contested state apparatus is incapable to 
prevent non-state actors from controlling significant parts of the state’s territory 
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and population. Undoubtedly, the most powerful non-state actor in the conflict is 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, a Salafi militant organisation established in the 
early 2000s and whose main goal is the establishment and expansion of a 
caliphate.54   
Sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens and the security 
interests of other states by exercising control over their territory and monopoly 
over the use of force.55 Many states undoubtedly lack the resources to do so and 
accordingly the non-state element activity around the world is on the rise. This has 
been and still is in some cases, the experience of states like Ecuador, Georgia or 
Mali. Increasing importance of non-state actors reveals the inadequacy of state-
centric security regime and exposes the fact that formal equality of states has not 
resulted in substantive equality. As a consequence, the international system based 
upon the formal equality of states fails as it does not account for the challenges 
posed by failed statehood and the security threat created by non-state actors. The 
following section provides support for the claim that ‘States increasingly invoke the 
notion of sovereignty as responsibility in justifying military operations against 
irregular forces’.56 Nevertheless, the question remains whether the failed state can 
be held accountable for the non-state actors’ activities that it is unable to control 
and if so, what is the exact scope of the victim state’s right to self-defence? Sub-
chapter 5.3 investigates how states responded to those questions in their practice.   
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5.3 The analysis of the grounds for defensive action submitted by the victim states 
and the failed states’ response 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the international community refuses to 
withdraw recognition for the sovereignty of failed states unable to discharge even 
the most basic important international obligations.57 Accordingly, the inability to 
prevent attacks by non-state actors does not meet the high attribution standard 
established by the International Court of Justice or even slightly less stringent 
requirement proposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia.58 As a consequence, the restrictive interpretation of self-defence 
favours the territorial/failed states’ right to non-interference over the victim states’ 
security concerns. A number of examples of the use of force in self-defence against 
non-state actors located in failed states, however, illustrate increasing dissonance 
between the theory and reality of statehood and jus ad bellum. It is evident from 
the ambiguous and inconsistent state practice that the content of the law in the 
area of defensive action against non-state actors remains uncertain and 
controversial. This chapter looks both at the operational practice as well as the legal 
position advanced by the intervening states and the response of the territorial 
state, if any.  
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There are a number of cases prior to the events of 9/11 which relate to the use of 
force in another state’s territory where the initial armed attack was attributable 
primarily to a non-state actor.59 Nevertheless, Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan commenced a period of intense struggle against armed groups having 
no association with the territorial state or even openly opposing the internationally 
recognised central government of a state. The debate regarding the content of the 
rules regarding the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors followed. 
The conflict in Afghanistan continues today, however, the period considered in this 
section occurred between the 11th of September 2001 attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon, the subsequent US bombing of Afghanistan, removal of 
the Taliban  government from the country and the installation of the interim 
government lead by Hamid Karzai in the final months of 2001. The events of 11th 
September 2001 are extremely well known. Briefly, four civilian aeroplanes were 
hijacked by terrorists and subsequently two of them were flown into the World 
Trade Centre, one into the Pentagon while the fourth one crashed in the 
Pennsylvania countryside.60 After demands issued to the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan were not met, the United States and United Kingdom launched 
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ on 8th October 2001.   
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Despite the fact that the September 11 attacks could not be attributed to the State 
of Afghanistan both the United States and the United Kingdom relied on self-
defence as the legal justification for their military operation.61 A national 
emergency was proclaimed on 18 September in the US and the US Congress 
authorised President Bush to use ‘all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organisations or persons he determines planned, authorised, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harboured 
such organisations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organisations or persons’.62 
The Taliban's control over the terrorist attacks has never been alleged nor proven 
by the US. The claim on which the US based its self-defence action was that the 
Taliban provided ‘safe heaven’ to the Al-Qaeda organisation. In its letter to the UN 
Security Council, the US stated that there was a compelling evidence that the Al-
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Qaeda organisation which is ‘supported by the Taleban regime in Afghanistan had a 
central role’ in the ‘armed attacks’ against the United States and that these was 
‘made possible by the decision of the Taleban regime to allow the parts of 
Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation’.63  
Despite the fact that the Taliban movement established itself in Afghanistan and 
managed to exercise some form of control over extensive parts of the State’s 
territory, it did so without any respect for international norms and values. 
Consequently, it quickly became isolated from the international community and 
had been branded a rogue State by the West. Notwithstanding the historical 
interpretation one adopts regarding the Afghanistan’s functionality, it is quite clear 
that once the Taliban succumbed to the US military intervention, the country failed 
completely. The public institutions imploded, there was no longer any centralised 
control over the State’s territory and population and undoubtedly no monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force existed at this point. As a consequence, the external 
sovereignty, as described in detail in Chapter three, of the State was considered by 
the international community as lost as well. This argument is further supported by 
the provisions of the Bonn Agreement which was designed to facilitate the 
rebuilding of Afghanistan after US intervention and which concluded that a new 
Afghan Interim Authority would become ‘the repository of Afghan sovereignty with 
immediate effect’.64 The phrase seems to suggest that its authors considered 
Afghanistan’s sovereignty as having been lost as a consequence of the US military 
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action and perhaps preceding inability of the government to rule the country, and 
now being returned to a new legitimate government. Nevertheless, the statehood 
of the country as such was not questioned at any point.  
The case of the military intervention in Afghanistan in response to the September 
11 attacks is somewhat different from the other cases of state practice considered 
here. First of all, initially it may appear that the Taliban exercised quite a substantial 
level of control over the majority of the State’s territory. Secondly, the US and its 
allies clearly attempted to indirectly attribute the responsibility for the armed 
attack to the Taliban government. The situation was viewed in the context of the 
Taliban’s repeated failure to comply with the explicit demands from the UN Security 
Council that Osama bin Laden be handed over to the appropriate authorities and 
that all training facilities on the territory under the Taliban control be closed. 
Nevertheless, the reason for including the consideration of the Operation Enduring 
Freedom in this Chapter is the fact that clearly the primary responsibility for the 
attack had been attributed to a non-state actor operating on the territory of a State 
which, although it did have some form of government, at the same time manifested 
a lot of failed state symptoms as described previously. Based on the information 
available at the time, it was generally accepted that the 9/11 attacks were not 
attributable to the Taliban government within the meaning of the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility. The terrorist attack was not ‘directed or controlled’ by the 
Taliban’s as envisaged in Article 8 of the ASR65, nor could the refusal of the Taliban 
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to extradite Osama Bin Laden amount to the ‘acknowledging and adopting’ of the 
attacks as their own as provided for in Article 11 of the ASR.66 Nevertheless, the 
intervening powers accused the Taliban of ‘allowing the Afghan territory to be used 
as a base of operation’ by Al Qaeda – in other words: they relied on a ‘harbouring’ 
doctrine as discussed in sub-chapter 4.3.2.1 above. It could therefore be concluded 
that in this respect, despite the presence of failed State features, which entail 
inability to control State’s territory and non-state actors, the States which acted in 
self-defence implied some sort of ‘positive’ action on the side of Afghanistan and its 
government, namely the ‘harbouring and/or supporting’ Al-Qaeda. Accordingly, 
although claims have been made that the 9/11 precedent could be held to 
constitute ‘instant custom’67 and amount to acceptance of self-defence against 
non-state actors regardless of State’s involvement; the fact that intervening States 
put forward a flexible interpretation of ‘substantial involvement’68 element which 
encompasses the ‘harbouring’, or ‘aiding and abetting’ of non-state actors that 
conduct cross-border attacks, might as well mean that the nexus between the non-
State actors and the territorial State has not become completely redundant for the 
purpose of determining the applicability or scope of the right of self-defence.   
Shortly after the events of 9/11 and the commencement of the Operation Enduring 
Freedom, Russia began to link what has become known as the international ‘war 
against terrorism’ to its own struggle against the Chechen rebels emanating from 
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the Georgian region of Pankisi Gorge. It was alleged that a number of Al-Qaeda 
members relocated to Georgia following the onset of the conflict in Afghanistan69 
but nevertheless, Georgia insisted that it was capable of effectively controlling its 
borders. On the contrary, Russia claimed that Pankisi Gorge became a safe haven 
for terrorist element and Chechen rebels. When tensions escalated in the summer 
of 2002, following initial denial of the intervention, Russia eventually asserted its 
right to self-defence against attacks committed by non-state actors operating from 
the territory of a state unable to control their activities. In Letter to the UN 
Secretary-General, Russia accused Georgia of non-compliance with its international 
responsibilities and argued that it rendered the use of defensive force against non-
state actors as legitimate.70 In particular, Russia highlighted the fact that “(t)he 
continued existence in separate parts of the world of territorial enclaves outside 
the control of national governments, which, owing to the most diverse 
circumstances, are unable or unwilling to counteract the terrorist threat is one of 
the reasons that complicate efforts to combat terrorism effectively. One such place, 
where the situation is giving rise to particular alarm in the Russian Federation, is the 
Pankisi Gorge and other areas of contiguous territory along the line of the State 
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border between Georgia and the Russian Federation”.71 Clearly, Russia considered 
the alleged inability of the Georgian state to control its borders and fulfil 
international obligations by preventing armed attacks emanating from its territory, 
sufficient justification for the use of defensive force against non-state actors in 
Pankisi Gorge.72  
Georgia responded to Russia’s raids by labelling them as “acts of aggression” and 
claiming that it complied fully with its international obligations.73 The state pointed 
out “unaptness of the reference to article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which 
allows the attacked State to render armed resistance in order to defend its 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Russian Federation has not been subjected 
to armed aggression by Georgia”.74 Georgia denied that it was unable to deal with 
the non-state actors Pankisi Gorge and claimed that it did comply with its counter 
terrorist obligations under international law.75 It is to a certain extent unclear 
whether Russia believed that Georgia was unable or unwilling to exercise control 
over the entirety of its territory as the official statements refer to both scenarios.76 
Nevertheless, it would appear that from the legal point of view, at least in Russian 
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opinion, this makes no difference as both unwillingness and inability warrants use 
of defensive force against non-state actors located in the failed state.  
States attempted to apply the unable or unwilling standard in other cases. One of 
them is the 2007-2008 Turkish military operation in Iraq against the Kurdiastan 
Workers’ Party (hereinafter PKK) fighters following the general increase in Kurdish 
separatist violence since 2004. The PKK which emerged in the 1970s strives for the 
creation of the autonomous Kurdistan on Turkish territory. The group began its 
armed campaign in 1984 in response to the discrimination of Kurdish minority in 
Turkey. Ever since 1991, the mountainous terrain of Northern Iraq became a safe 
haven for the organisation. 2004 saw an intensifying campaign from the Kurdish 
separatists’ violence. Turkey carried out repeated attacks in the PKK bases in the 
region.77 Tensions escalated in 2007 when on 7 October, thirteen Turkish soldiers 
were killed in an ambush78, just days after PKK gunmen had shot dead thirteen 
village guards on a bus. On 21 October, another cross-border attack resulted in the 
killing of twelve soldiers and the capture of eight others.79 Despite calls for peaceful 
resolutions of the situation from both Iraq and the US, Turkish operations 
continued following the release of the captured soldiers on the 4 of November. On 
16 of December 2007, Turkey sent over 50 fighter jets in order to hit PKK positions 
some 95 kilometres into Iraqi territory.80 Similar operations continued throughout 
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December and January.81 The new phase of the intervention began on 21 February 
2008 when the Turkish military launched a major ground offensive (Operation 
‘Sun’), sending several thousand troops into Northern Iraq.82 By the end of 
February, ground operation concluded, however, air strikes continued throughout 
subsequent months.83 
Despite the scale of the operation launched by Turkey on 21st February 2007, the 
country did not report its military action to the UN Security Council and did not 
provide any elaborated legal justification for it. Throughout the crisis Turkey’s 
officials adopted the justificatory language with direct reference to the US 
counterterrorism rhetoric. In nota verbale submitted to the Human Rights Council 
on 26th March 2008, Turkey declared that: ‘(t)he counter terrorism operation 
carried out ... in northern Iraq was limited in scope, geography and duration. It 
targeted solely the PKK terrorist presence in the region. Turkish military authorities 
took all possible measures to ensure the security of civilians and to avoid collateral 
damage. As a result, there has been no civilian casualty. Turkey remains a staunch 
advocate of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq’.84 Turkish Prime 
Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, repeatedly stated that the operation was justified under 
the ‘international law governing self-defence’85 and warned that Turkey ‘will not 
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tolerate those who help and harbour terrorists’.86 It is clear that Turkey adopted the 
justificatory language reminiscent of that used by the US with regards to the 
counterterrorism operations. The country also implied that Iraq’s complete inability 
to contain the threat posed by non-state actors’ violence was a sufficient 
justification for the defensive operation.  
It can be concluded that Iraq failed to take appropriate actions in order to prevent 
cross-border incursions by the PKK fighters into the Turkish territory. Iraqi 
government and Kurdish national authorities, despite certain level of sympathy 
displayed by the latter ones, definitely did not actively support PKK. On the contrary 
Iraq specifically denounced the non-state actor’s actions. The national government 
did not exercise “overall” or “effective” control over the PKK attacks. On the 
contrary to the Hezbollah in Lebanon, however, the PKK did not exercise any 
significant territorial control over the northern Iraq or performed elements of 
governmental authority.  Although initially taking a conciliatory attitude, after the 
Turkish air strikes of 16 December 2007, the Iraqi government lodged a formal 
complaint with Turkey declaring that it was neither consulted nor informed about 
the operation.87  The Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani declared 
that Turkish strikes constitute violation of Iraqi sovereignty.88 Following the 
commencement of ‘Operation Sun’ the Iraqi government again strongly condemned 
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the intervention as a violation of its state’s sovereignty and demanded immediate 
withdrawal of the Turkish forces from the region.89  
The legal arguments presented following Israel’s military operation in Southern 
Lebanon imply further formal recognition of the threat posed by state failure and 
powerful non-state actors, as well as, the growing acceptance for the use of 
defensive force in such circumstances. Ever since Israel pulled back its troops from 
southern Lebanon in 2000 and retreated behind the UN-monitored ‘Blue Line’, the 
relations between the two countries remained tense but relatively stable. The 
situation changed drastically on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah militants attacked an 
Israeli military patrol, capturing two soldiers and killing eight.90 In response, Israel 
engaged in military operations to retrieve the captured soldiers while carrying out 
air strikes against several targets in Lebanon, including Beirut airport. The incident 
escalated in the following days and the so-called ‘Second Lebanon War’ ended one 
month later, when a ceasefire was put in place at the order of the UN Security 
Council.91 
Israel did comply with the requirement to report its actions to the UN Security 
Council. In a letter dated 12 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Israel 
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Security Council, Israel reserved its right to act in accordance with Article 51 of the 
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Charter and exercise its right to self-defence.92 Israel’s justification for its military 
action following the incident of 12 July 2006 is, nevertheless, somewhat 
contradictory. On the one hand Israel argued that the responsibility for the ‘acts of 
war’ lay with the government of Lebanon and that the attack of 12 July was ‘the 
action of a sovereign State’.93 On the other hand, Israel accused the governments of 
Iran and Syria of providing support and embracing those who carried out the 
attacks but did not specifically allege that such support was provided by the 
government of Lebanon to Hezbollah.94 The reason why Israel held the Lebanese 
government responsible was the fact that its ‘ineptitude and inaction ... *had+ led to 
a situation in which it [had] not exercised its jurisdiction over its own territory for 
many years’.95 Accordingly, Israel relied on the ineffectiveness of the Lebanese 
government to disarm Hezbollah in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 
1559 (2004).96 Despite the fact that Israel held the Government of Lebanon 
responsible, it ‘concentrated its response carefully, mainly on Hizbollah 
strongholds, positions and infrastructure’.97 Lebanon negated the responsibility for 
Hezbollah actions and strongly condemned ‘the Israeli aggression that targeted ... 
the vital and civil Lebanese infrastructure’.98 Nevertheless, the state conceded that 
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it lacked effective control over its southern territory where Hezbollah was based. At 
the same time Lebanon suggested that this very fact absolved it of responsibility 
and called upon the Security Council to take up the situation.99    
Colombia’s raids on targets in Ecuador is another case of use of defensive force 
against non-state actors exploiting ungoverned regions of states in order to carry 
out armed incursions in its neighbour’s territory. Operation ‘Phoenix’ commenced 
on 1 March 2008 and was conducted by Colombian military against Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) bases on the Ecuadorian territory.100 As a result 
of the intervention, twenty-five guerrilla fighters were killed including senior FARC 
commander Raúl Reyes.101 Colombia justified the operation as a use of force in self-
defence against non-state actors perpetrating attacks on Colombian territory from 
their bases in Ecuador.102 The country accused Ecuador of failing to take 
appropriate action in order to secure its borders.103 The operation resulted in the 
most serious diplomatic crisis in Inter American Diplomacy within the decade.104 
Colombia claimed that evidence obtained from computers seized during the 
operation suggested that FARC fighters received financial support from Ecuador, 
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weapons supplies from Venezuela and that Ecuadorian government communicated 
with the guerrilla commanders.105  
The March 2008 military operation against FARC is yet another incident in the 
longest running and the most violent conflict in Latin America. The UN Security 
Council as well as the Organisation of American States both determined that FARC 
violence against Colombia constitutes acts of terrorist and threatens peace and 
security in the region. The UN Security Council Resolution 1465 of 13 February 2003 
expressly stated that the bomb attack in Bogota on 7 February 2003 was an act of 
terrorism.106 In a similar fashion, the Permanent Council of the Organisation of 
American States in the Resolution adopted on 12 February 2003, condemned the 
same terrorist attack and further decided to ‘ratify the commitment of the member 
states to step up actions for strict observance of the provisions of the United 
Nations Security Council resolution 1373 and the Inter-American Convention 
Against Terrorism concerning the obligation to refrain from providing any form of 
support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts’ and ‘reaffirm the 
unwavering commitment of the member states to deny refuge and/or safe haven to 
those who finance, plan, or commit acts of terrorism in Colombia or who lend 
support to such persons, noting that those responsible for aiding, supporting, or 
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harboring the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these acts are equally 
complicit’.107 
The fact that FARC used Ecuadorian territory as safe heaven and a base to launch 
attacks against Colombia has been well known.108 Nevertheless, Colombia refrained 
from using military force against FARC units located in Ecuador until March 2008. 
Colombia’s Defence Minister, Juan Manuel Santos, stated that the fact that his 
government did not seek Ecuador’s assistance with the March military operation 
was dictated by lack of confidence that the Ecuadorian government will maintain 
secrecy. Colombia’s repeated notifications to Ecuador about FARC bases and 
activities did not result in the latter redeeming the situation and preventing the 
non-state actor from using its territory. On the contrary, FARC established strong 
support network within Ecuador. The area where FARC set up its bases has been 
described as being ‘remote ungoverned territory lacking Ecuadorean state presence 
and security’.109 The heavily forested border between the two countries has never 
been properly controlled and lacks state presence, services, security and 
infrastructure. As a result, it became an ideal environment for drug and weapon 
trafficking. Colombian President Uribe maintained its country’s right of self-defence 
stating that FARC conducted some 40 armed incursions from Ecuadorean territory 
in the last 5 years.110  
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Ecuador labelled Colombian operation as an aggression and violation of its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.111 Furthermore, both Ecuador and Venezuela 
broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia and sent troops to the border.112 
Ecuador denied the fact that it tolerated the presence of ‘irregular forces’, as it 
labelled FARC units. The country’s representative to the United Nations stated that 
Ecuador is ‘a victim of Colombian conflict and not a facilitator’113 and reiterated the 
fact that Colombia has ‘the obligation under international law to prevent the effects 
of its internal conflict from spilling over its borders and affecting the societies and 
territories of neighbouring countries’.114 
As noted above, Somalia has been an epitome of failed state for a number of years. 
Unsurprisingly, non-state actors took advantage of the state’s inability to effectively 
control its territory to launch attacks on the neighbouring states. On the 30th of 
November 2006 the Ethiopian Parliament authorised military intervention aimed at 
countering any attacks or incursions in Ethiopia by non-state actors operating from 
Somali territory.115 The resolution declared that the Parliament sees "clear and 
present danger" from Somali Islamists. Furthermore, the resolution also alleged 
that the Islamists are training, sheltering and arming Ethiopian groups opposed to 
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the government, and accepting help from Ethiopia's rival in the Horn of Africa, 
Eritrea. The vote authorised Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to take any legal action 
to protect Ethiopia from an invasion.116  
On 21 December 2006, Sheik Hassen Dahir Aweys, one of the UIC spiritual leaders 
declared from Mogadishu that Somalia was in a state of war against Ethiopia, and 
that all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia.117 The clashes 
continued to escalate and on 24th December 2006 Ethiopia admitted having combat 
troops inside Somalia and that it had acted in self-defence.118 In an official 
statement, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said that his Government had taken self-
defensive measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces 
of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist groups.119 The UIC faced a major ground 
and air force attacks and as a result was soon forced to leave all cities and towns, 
including Mogadishu and Kismayo.120 Ethiopia officially declared that the UIC had 
been defeated on 9th January 2007 and began withdrawing its troops on the 18th 
January 2007.121    
Ethiopia relied on a number of justifications for its military intervention including 
the inherent right to self-defence and intervention by invitation. The focus here will 
be on the self-defence aspect of the Ethiopian military action which covers the 
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period of time after the 24th December 2006. The above mentioned Ethiopian 
Parliament Resolution voted on 30th November 2006, although not providing the 
authorisation for automatic military action, approved of the government taking all 
necessary and legal steps to avert the danger arising from the repeated declaration 
of a “holy war” against the country’. According to the Resolution, ‘the UIC has been 
training, sheltering and arming Ethiopian groups that are trying to overthrow the 
government’ and ‘the Courts have an expansionist intent to annex the Somali-
speaking parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti’.122 The Resolution did not refer to 
one specific attack or a string of attacks which would trigger the necessity to use 
military force in self-defence. On the 24th of December, the Ethiopian Prime 
Minister Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared that his country had “taken self-
defensive measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces 
of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist groups”.123 The action however, was not 
reported to the Security Council under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Prime 
Minister further stated in his speech to the Parliament on 2nd January 2007, that 
the enemies were the extremist leadership of the UIC, as well as, the foreign 
extremist terrorists and the soldiers of Eritrea. He concluded that ‘the UN Security 
Council did not put into question the measures we took in self-defence. Similarly, 
various governments in different parts of the world have supported our right to 
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self-defence and have refrained from putting any kinds of declarations which might 
have put into question our inherent right of self-defence’.124  
There are some questions regarding the precise legal basis for the Ethiopian military 
intervention in Somalia. Although Ethiopia initially denied the deployment of 
troops, it subsequently claimed self-defence. As Professor Gray states, ‘this was 
clearly not self-defence against armed attack by government forces, but apparently 
self-defence as part of the ‘war on terror’ against the threat posed by the UIC, and 
against its past terrorist attacks (…) Its major military operations extending far 
beyond the border area look more like action to protect TFG government against 
the UIC than self-defence of Ethiopia’.125  
As a consequence of the unstable situation in Somalia and near complete lack of 
government for a number of years, since the mid-1990s a number of extremist 
groups operating from Somalia carried out or facilitated multitude of attacks in the 
region. These include, amongst others, several terrorist attacks in Ethiopia carried 
out by al-Ittihaad al-Islami group in the mid-1990s, the 7th of August 1998 attacks 
on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the 28th of December 2002 
attack on the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya; and11th July 2010 bombings in 
Kampala which was attributed to Al-Shabaab. According to the International Crisis 
Group reports, the Kenyan Defence Forces considered and prepared for a military 
intervention in Somalia for a number of years.126 The military operation was 
eventually prompted by a number of cross-boarder kidnapping attacks which 
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targeted Western tourists on the Kenyan coast and aid workers from the refugee 
camp in Dadaab.  
At the press conference held in Nairobi on 15th October 2011, the Kenyan ministers 
of defence and interior announced that Kenya will engage in a military operation 
against Al-Shabaab militants operating in the Somalia’s Juba Valley.127 They invoked 
Article 51 of the UN Charter as a legal basis for the action and confirmed that all 
measures taken in the exercise of the right of self-defence will be duly reported to 
the UN Security Council. The announcement of operation Linda Nchi (Protect the 
Country) came after Al-Shabaab’s repeated incursions, as deep as 120km, into the 
Kenyan territory and abductions of several foreign nationals. The first phase of 
Operation Linda Nchi was launched o 16th October 2011. In the letter of the 
Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, it was claimed that: 
‘Kenya has been facing serious challenges emanating from the collapse of the State 
of Somalia over the past two decades. The situation has worsened of late, following 
the unprecedented escalation of threats to the country’s national security. Kenya 
has suffered dozens of incursions that were repulsed by its military and police 
forces. Scores of Kenyans have lost their lives over the past 36 months in border 
towns and communities owing to terrorist actions and incursions from Al-Shabaab 
militants’.128  
It is clear that, if observed in isolation, the Al-Shabaab incursions could not be 
individually considered as an ‘armed attack’. In its claim of acting in self-defence, 
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however, Kenya invoked nine separate incidents which occurred from 2009 to 2011 
accordingly relying on the argument that a number of successive lower intensity 
attacks which show a distinctive pattern can constitute an armed attack when taken 
into consideration as a whole. Furthermore, Kenyan government suggested that the 
country suffered severe economic loss due to the impact of the deteriorating 
security situation in the border area on the tourism industry. It is doubtful, 
however, whether the Al-Shabaab incursions reached the threshold necessary to be 
considered as an ‘armed attack’ and therefore, calling for the exercise of the right 
to use force in self-defence. On the other hand, this particular example of the use 
of force might support the argument that when assessing the necessity to use force 
in self-defence, the gravity of non-state actors’ cross-border attacks is one of many 
factors which has to be taken into consideration. The fact that TFG was unable to 
prevent Al-Shabaab from operating within its territory and crossing over into the 
Kenyan territory undoubtedly influenced Kenyan decision to carry out military 
operation against powerful non-state actor.     
 
5.4 The international community’s response to the use of defensive force against 
non-state actors in failed states 
Customary international law is the source of international law which most 
accurately reflects the changing practice and attitudes of states.129 Its creation, 
however, is not instant. On the contrary, the custom must undergo a ‘maturation’ 
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process and is a product of an ongoing debate amongst the international actors 
over time.130 The question is when state practice contributes to this process and 
eventually changes customary international law; and when it simply breaches a 
customary international rule.  In order to establish the consequences of particular 
events for the development of customary international law, one must look at, 
amongst others, explicit responses of individual states and international 
organisations as well as lack thereof.131 Accordingly, the following section analyses 
the response of individual states and international community to the above 
described instances of the use of defensive force against non-state actors operating 
from the territories of failed states.132     
The international condemnation of the 9/11 attacks was widespread and 
immediate. On the day of the attacks, the Secretary General of NATO133, the North 
Atlantic Council134, Secretary General of the Organisation of American States 
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(OAS)135 as well as the OAS General Assembly136 all issued public statements 
strongly condemning the attacks. On 12th September 2001, the UN Security Council 
unanimously approved Resolution 1368137 and a further one (Resolution 1373)138 
on the 28th September 2001. Both resolutions condemned the attacks and implicitly 
affirmed the right of self-defence in response to terrorist attacks for the first time, 
however, whilst calling for redoubled efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, 
the documents did not specifically mention al Qaeda or the Taliban. Similarly, the 
UN General Assembly Resolution 56/1 on the 18th of September strongly 
condemned ‘heinous acts of terrorism’.139 For the first time in its history, NATO 
invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty which states that an attack on any one 
or more states being NATO members is considered to be an attack on all.140 Yet 
more condemnation followed in succeeding days.141 The European Union declared 
its “wholehearted support for the action that is being taken in self-defence and in 
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conformity with the [UN Charter] and Security Council resolution 1368 (2001)’.142 
On the 15th of September Australia invoked the Australia-New Zealand-United 
States Pact instructing Australian personnel attached to the US forces to deploy 
with the US counterparts inside and outside of the United States.143 Most individual 
foreign leaders denounced the attacks. Several States, such as such as Canada, 
France, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Poland, notified the 
UN Security Council that ‘in accordance with Article 51 UN Charter’, they had 
adopted various measures in support of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’.144 Even 
States like Russia and China expressed their support.145 Arabic states did not 
criticise the action.146 Furthermore, States provided practical support by 
unprecedented offers of airspace and landing rights.147 Although certain States did 
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express concerns regarding the fate of the Afghan people, condemnation of the 
Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ was highly exceptional.148 Even the Organisation for 
the Islamic Conference made no criticism of the military action and only urged the 
US not to extend the military response beyond Afghanistan.  
The international response to Russian raids in Pankisi Gorge was relatively muted. 
Such lack of reaction by the international community of states may indicate either 
legal uncertainty or tacit acquiescence. Noticeably, however, the US condemnation 
of the Russian raids revealed the fact that although the major powers may agree 
regarding the use of force against non-state actors in principle, at the same time 
they differ with regard to its application. The United States Department of State 
reaffirmed Georgia’s right to territorial integrity and opposed unilateral action 
against Chechen rebels.149 Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe in its Recommendation of 24 September 2002 explicitly stated that 
‘Article 51 of the UN Charter and Resolution 1269 (1999) of the UN Security Council 
on international terrorism as well as Resolution 1368 (2001) of the UN Security 
Council of 12 September 2001 do not authorise the use of military force by the 
Russian Federation or any other State on Georgian territory’.150 At the same time, 
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however, the Parliamentary Assembly called upon the authorities of Georgia ‘to co-
operate with all States concerned as regards to the fight against terrorism and to 
take the necessary measures to ensure the rule of law on all parts of its territory, 
including the Pankisi valley’.151 Otherwise, there was no principled condemnation 
from other international actors which would deny Russia the right to use defensive 
force against non-state actors. Accordingly, the use of defensive force by Russia in 
Pankisi Gorge region does not necessarily mark a clear trend on matters of self-
defence against non-state actors operating from within a state unable to suppress 
their activities. It is nevertheless significant to note that Georgia’s inability to 
effectively control its territory was specifically invoked as a reason for the eventual 
military intervention.    
Despite the fact that international community urged Turkey to seek a diplomatic 
solution to the conflict, at the same time strongly condemning PKK attacks of 7 and 
21 October152, when Turkey eventually decided to proceed with the military 
intervention, the response was surprisingly muted. The emphasis was given to the 
importance of dialogue and cooperation between the governments of Turkey and 
Iraq in order to resolve the crisis. The EU Presidency statement called upon the 
government of Iraq as well as the Kurdish Regional Government to ensure that Iraqi 
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territory is not being used for violent attacks against Turkey.153 Similar statements 
motivated by fears that conflict will deteriorate regional security and negatively 
influence peace-building process in Iraq, followed from the US, Great Britain, France 
and other countries. The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon repeatedly 
expressed concerns about the operation and urged for ‘utmost restraint’ and 
respect for territorial integrity of both countries.154 The EU failed to state clearly its 
position regarding the legality of the intervention and instead focused on the 
proportionality of the action and urged Turkey to seek political solution.155 The 
United States although labelling the PKK ‘a common enemy’156, did not specifically 
endorsed the Turkish intervention. The country did not condemn it either and in 
fact aided Turkey by supplying the military intelligence regarding the PKK bases in 
Northern Iraq.157 The US Defence Secretary Gates however, stated that Turkey’s 
operation ‘should be short and precisely targeted as possible’.158 As noted by Ruys, 
the US reaction towards the Turkish operation must be evaluated against three 
factors: ‘the background of the deteriorating 'strategic partnership' with Turkey; 
Turkey's strategic importance for the US presence in Iraq (…) and the US' broader 
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'war on terror'.159 Clearly, it must be taken into consideration that the US position 
towards the Turkish intervention left both the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government with little choice but to take a non-confrontational approach 
in order to maintain positive relations with its neighbour. Furthermore, a majority 
of states refrained from pronouncing on the legality of the Turkish intervention. In 
conclusion, although certain individual states explicitly declared that Turkey had a 
right to defend itself against PKK attacks by military means,160 generally muted 
reaction of the international community may indicate that it did not choose to set a 
precedent based on the events in question. On the other hand, however, the above 
described case of Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq confirms the tendency 
identified in previous cases. Namely, the growing acceptance of the fact that an 
attack coming from a non-state actors in which the territorial state is not in any way 
substantially involved, may potentially trigger the right to exercise self-defence and 
use of force on the territory of another state, particularly, if the territorial state 
could be defined as a failed one.  
The reaction of the international community to the Israeli intervention in Lebanon 
is significant in several respects. First of all, due to the fact that it recognised the 
ineffectiveness of the Lebanese government to fully and effectively govern the 
entirety of the state’s territory; and secondly, in view of the implicit legitimisation 
of the Israeli claim of self-defence. The initial international reaction to the Israeli 
strikes was positive. The applicability of Article 51 of the UN Charter was recognized 
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implicitly or explicitly by the G8 countries161, the US Senate162, the Australian Prime 
Minister163, the Council of the European Union164, and even by UN Secretary-
General.165 During the Security Council debate following the initial strikes, a 
majority of the Council members supported Israel’s invocation of self-defence in 
principle even though they refrained from speaking out on Lebanon’s government 
possible responsibility for the Hezbollah attacks.166 Similarly, during the debate on 
21st July 2006167, despite increasing concerns regarding the proportionality of the 
Israel’s military actions, majority of States accepted, in principle, its right to defend 
itself against the attacks by Hezbollah. On the other hand, military action was 
strongly condemned as ‘act of aggression’ by the League of Arab States, as well as 
Russia168 and China169. Despite recognition and support for the Lebanon’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, it has been noted that it is the Lebanese 
government responsibility to exercise full sovereign control over its territory. For 
example, the United States stated that: ‘All militias in Lebanon, including Hizbollah,  
must disarm and disband immediately, and the Lebanese Government must extend 
and exercise its  sole and exclusive control over all Lebanese territory (…) We urge 
all parties to accept the principle that Governments must exercise sovereign control 
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over their territories’.170 Finally, although the Security Council’s Resolution 1701 of 
11th August 2006 did not affirm the Israel’s right to self-defence, the documents 
also refrained from specific condemnation of the state’s behaviour.171 The 
Resolution emphasised ‘the importance of the extension of the control of the 
Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory (…) for it to exercise its full 
sovereignty, so that there will be no authority other than that of the Government of 
Lebanon’.172 
The conclusion which can be put forward following the examination of the 
international community’s reaction to Israel’s military action in Lebanon in 2006 is 
that the majority of States did accept that the right to self-defence existed in 
principle and focused the criticism on the disproportionate character of the military 
intervention. Furthermore, it appears as though majority of States did not believe 
that there was an issue with the ratione personae element of an ‘armed attack’. In 
terms of the attribution of the Hezbollah’s attacks, Israel’s position was that they 
should be attributed to the government of Lebanon, be that through the 
government’s inability to exercise control over the entirety of the State’s territory – 
one of the main characteristics of failed State. The Lebanese government 
specifically rejected the responsibility for the Hezbollah’s actions. The state claimed 
that it had no means to prevent them as it repeatedly failed to comply with the 
Security Council Resolutions asking to expand territorial control to the areas where 
the group created a ‘State within a State’. The Report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon clearly stated that Hezbollah remained 
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predominant force in the Southern part of the country.173 It cannot therefore be 
concluded that the armed attack on Israel was in any way adopted or 
acknowledged by the central authorities. The widespread international support for 
the government of Lebanon and the fact that the Resolution 1701 (2006) implicitly 
recognised its inability to exercise jurisdiction over all of the State’s territory, 
supports the conclusion that it was not in any way directly responsible for or 
complicit in the attack of 12 July 2006. Despite the above, Israel’s right to self-
defence was not questioned as such. In conclusion, the response of international 
community to the so-called ‘Second Lebanese War’ may indicate that the actions in 
self-defence against non-state actors’ attacks emanating from the territory of failed 
State could be justified as long as such a response is necessary and proportionate.    
Similar to the case of the Israeli strikes against Hezbollah, the international 
response to Colombia’s raids against FARC in Ecuador represents another case of 
major powers tacitly recognising the right to cross-border use of defensive force 
against powerful non-state actors operating from the territory of an ‘unable’ state. 
Nevertheless, the response of the states in the region to the Colombian operation 
was highly condemnatory. On 5 March 2008, the OAS condemned Colombian 
operation and stated that conducting it without express consent of the government 
of Ecuador constituted ‘a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
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Ecuador and of principles of international law’.174 The Resolution reaffirmed ‘the 
principle that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object, even 
temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another 
State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever’.175 It was further decided 
that a fact-finding mission will be established in order to investigate the 
circumstances of Colombian military operation.  
Mexico criticised the raid and the Mexican President rejecting ‘any action that 
constitutes a violation of territorial sovereignty’.176 On 7 March 2008 Members of 
the Rio Group adopted a declaration denouncing ‘the violation of the territorial 
integrity of Ecuador’.177 Following the final report presented by the fact-finding 
mission established by its Resolution of 5 March, the OAS rejected ‘the incursion by 
Colombian military forces and police personnel into the territory of Ecuador (…) 
carried out without the knowledge or prior consent of the Government of Ecuador, 
since it was a clear violation of Articles 19 and 21 of the OAS Charter’.178 At the 
same time, the declaration ‘reiterated firm commitment of all Member States to 
combat threats to security caused by the actions of irregular groups or criminal 
organisations, especially those associated with drug trafficking’.179 
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The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, urged restraint and called upon Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis.180 The sole 
international supporter of the Colombian operation was the United States. The 
country declared that Colombia was ‘defending itself against terrorism’.181 Despite 
the condemnation by OAS and outrage by Ecuador and Venezuela, neither the UN 
Security Council not the UN General Assembly took any definitive action regarding 
the raids.  
The above mentioned OAS Resolutions and Declarations did not address the scope 
of self-defence, nevertheless, it appears as though they adhered to the more 
restrictive reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter and its application towards non-
state actors. The international reaction to operation ‘Phoenix’ focused on the fact 
that by deciding to carry it out against FARC on Ecuadorian soil; Colombia violated 
the neighbouring state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The international 
community did not comment on the lack of Ecuadorean government’s presence in 
the border areas where FARC set up its bases and the respective inability of the 
country to deal with a threat posed by the non-state actor. Neither did the 
international organisations statements referred to the possible unwillingness or 
inability of Ecuador to cooperate with Colombia in its fight against FARC. It could, 
therefore, be concluded that this particular incident stands as a clear example of  
state practice contrary to the conept that state failure and ‘unwillingness’ or 
‘inability’ to prevent non-state attacks, provides sufficient legal basis for the 
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intervention in self-defence against armed attacks perpetrated solely by non-state 
actors.   
 In response to the worsening situation in Somalia, the United Nations Security 
Council unanimously passed the Resolution 1725 (2006) under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter calling upon the resumption of peace talks and clearly providing 
support for the TFG against the UIC.182 The Resolution reaffirmed ‘its respect for the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia’183 
and called upon ‘all parties inside Somalia and all other States to refrain from action  
that could provoke or perpetuate violence and violations of human rights, 
contribute  to unnecessary tension and mistrust, endanger the ceasefire and 
political process, or  further damage the humanitarian situation’.184 Concluding that 
the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, the UN Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006) authorised the 
establishment of a regional protection and training mission in Somalia, modified the 
arms embargo as required and specifically stated that those states that boarder 
Somalia should not deploy troops.185 The UIC rejected the Resolution and claimed 
that the deployment of foreign troops in Somalia equals an invasion.186 
The UN Security Council neither condemned nor formally approved of the Ethiopian 
intervention. On the 22nd December 2006, however, the UN Security Council issued 
a Presidential Statement expressing deep concern over the continued violence 
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inside Somalia and calling upon all parties to draw back from conflict.187 The UN 
Secretary General subsequently called upon all parties to cease hostilities.188 No 
further comment had been made or a statement published until the UN Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1744 on 21st February 2007.  The 
Resolution welcomed the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia and 
authorised the African Union member states to establish a regional force, AMISOM, 
in Somalia in order to ‘help avoid a security vacuum’.189 Acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, the UN Security Council provided the ANISOM with authorisation to 
employ all necessary measures in order to fulfil its mandate; amongst others 
‘provide protection to the Federal Institutions (…) and security for key 
infrastructure’ and contribute to ‘creation of necessary security conditions for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance’.190 The UN Security Council did not discuss 
the legality of the Ethiopian use of force and did not call for an end of the fighting. 
The document expressed its support for the TFG throughout the military 
intervention as being the only representative government of Somalia.  
The African Union along with the Arab League called upon Ethiopia to withdraw its 
troops from Somalia. On 27th December 2006, in a Joint Communique, AU, the 
Arab League and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development appealed to all the 
parties involved to ‘ensure an immediate and unconditional ceasefire (…) and 
                                                          
187
 United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 22
nd
 
December 2006, S/PRST/2006/59.  
188
 SC 5614th meeting, 26th December 2006.  
189
 UN Security Council Resolution 1744, 21
st
 February 2007. UN Security Council: ‘Decides to 
authorize member States of the African Union to establish for a period of six months a mission in 
Somalia, which shall be authorized to take all  necessary measures as appropriate’ 
190
 Ibid.  
235 
 
complete cessation of hostilities’.191 The document further called for an immediate 
withdrawal of Ethiopian and other foreign troops from Somalia.192 Later on in 
January 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council’s statement ‘noted that the recent 
developments in Somalia have represented a new and historic opportunity that 
should be seized upon by Somali parties and the international community alike, 
with a view to fostering peace and reconciliation in Somalia’.193 Furthermore, in the 
same month, the AU Assembly also ‘noted with satisfaction the recent positive 
developments in Somalia which have resulted from Ethiopia’s intervention upon 
the invitation of the legitimate TFG of Somali, and which has unprecedented 
opportunity for lasting peace in the country’.194  
The individual states’ position varied. Eritrea strongly opposed the operation and 
claim that Ethiopia attempts to drag Somalia back into the previously existing 
instability. On the other hand, the United States provided strong support for the 
operation and considered it an appropriate response to the “aggression” by 
Islamists.195 The US shortly became a party to the conflict by carrying out air raids 
on fleeing UIC targets.196  
Effective governmental control is an imperative test not only for the creation of 
statehood in international law but also to assess the political independence and 
sovereign authority of any already existing state. It is clear from the UN Security 
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Council’s Monitoring Group Reports that neither the TFG nor the UIC could have 
achieved whatever level of territorial control they have achieved without military, 
financial and logistical support of external forces.197 Although internationally 
recognised, the TFG did not have the political and territorial independence to enter 
into international relations with other states. Throughout the period of the conflict, 
the statehood of Somalia has never been put into question. On the contrary, every 
single applicable UN Security Council Resolution, UN Security Council Presidential 
Statements or the Monitoring Group Report reaffirmed the respect for the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. 
Although the country did have a legitimate and internationally recognised 
governing body, the TFG did not have the capacity to maintain law and order in the 
country as it only exercised control over a very small portion of its territory. 
Nevertheless, Ethiopia did not consider the inability or unwillingness of the TFG to 
control UIC and its affiliates as a sufficient justification for its military intervention.  
On the other side, although the UIC exercised control over extensive parts of the 
state’s territory, it was neither recognised by the international community as a 
government of Somalia nor considered to have the entitlement to act for the 
Somali people.  
The international response to Kenyan intervention in 2011 was similar in many 
respects. The UN Security Council in Resolution 2036 of 22 February 2012 
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reaffirmed ‘its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence and unity of Somalia’.198 The document proclaims full support for the 
Transitional Federal Government and condemns all attacks on TFG , AMISOM, UN 
personnel and facilities and the civilian population by armed opposition groups and 
in particular Al-Shabaab which is considered to pose a terrorist threat to Somalia as 
well as the international community.199  
 
5.5 Conclusions  
The analysis conducted in this Chapter proves that state practice with regard to the 
use of force in self-defence against non-state actors located in failed states is far 
from settled. One of the indicators of sovereign statehood is the ability to provide 
certain public goods including, in particular, effective control of state’s territory and 
monopoly of the use of force. It is one of the primary responsibilities of the state to 
protect not only its own citizens but also essential security interests of other states. 
The post 9/11 state practice indicates that states increasingly invoke sovereignty as 
responsibility in justifying the military response against non-state actors. It has 
been more commonly argued by the victim states that state’s failure to discharge 
their international obligations in respect of exercising control over territory and 
population and preventing non-state actors’ attacks, may trigger the victim state’s 
right to exercise use of force in self-defence.  It would appear that states are not 
willing to apply more lenient standard towards failed states regarding their due 
diligence obligations under international law. Although the law in this area remains 
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unsettled, it is clear that many states have accepted, if not necessarily always 
endorsed, use of defensive forces against non-state actors operating from within 
states which are incapable to effectively govern the entirety of ther territory. 
Furthermore, the international community frequently, although not always, 
considered such interventions as lawful when the use of force was proportionate 
and necessary. The examples of state practice discussed in this Chapter also 
represent a growing trend towards the recognition of a right to self-defence against 
non-state actors irrespective of the territorial state’s responsibility for the attack. 
Notwithstanding, the issue of attribution of non-state actors’ attacks to the failed 
states remains uncertain as the victim states presented varying legal rationale, if 
any, at all to justify the military operation in self-defence against the latter ones 
only.  It appears as though states increasingly put forward the inability and/or 
unwillingness scenario as a justification for the use of defensive force against non-
state actors located in the territory of failed states. It has to be noted, however, 
that although there may be an agreement regarding the existence of the standard 
in principle, there is hardly a broad consensus regarding its application and that it 
provides sufficient legal basis for the use of defensive force against non-state actors 
in failed states. In view of the above, it is not surprising that the criteria of necessity 
and proportionality remain crucial in restraining the military action against non-
state actors. Hence, it is evident that the reaction of international community is 
very much dependent upon the fact whether the defensive response to a 
sufficiently grave armed attack is considered to be necessary and proportionate. 





This thesis examined questions pertaining to state failure and its consequences in 
international law and in particular in the context of rules regarding self-defence 
against non-state actors. It has been argued that, in view of the recent 
developments in states relations, one of the most pressing legal issues relates the 
right to use force in self-defence against non-state armed groups whose actions 
cannot be attributed to the failed states. The thesis focused on defensive measures 
taken without the consent of a failed state and analysed unilateral state actions 
rather than UN sanctioned or multinational peace support operations. It has been 
established that dealing with widely acknowledged issue of state failure has proven 
to be difficult both at the theoretical level and in practice. The thesis aimed to 
identify and analyse both treaty law and customary international law norms 
regarding the use of force in self-defence which would be applicable in the specific 
context of state failure. 
Sovereign states constitute building blocks of the modern world order and the 
primary subjects of international law. The system established at the San Francisco 
Conference aimed at preventing inter-states conflicts and, consequently favoured 
rigorous principles of non-intervention, as well as equality and sovereignty of 
states. The sine qua non condition for the functioning of that arrangement was the 
existence of empirically viable political communities - states. Chapter two provided 
some preliminary and essential background relating to the international law 
regulations applicable to sovereignty and statehood, primarily its creation but also, 
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extinction. It was submitted that notwithstanding the fact that the notion of 
sovereign statehood has profound implications for the nature of international law, 
its definition remains unsatisfactory. The examination of the criteria for statehood 
in this Chapter identified the legal context in which factual issues arise. The thesis 
has, thus, argued that definition of a state referred to in the Montevideo 
Convention applies primarily to the elements required for a state to be created. It 
was concluded that there exists a strong presumption regarding the continuity of 
states in international law and that even substantial changes in the four constitutive 
elements do not affect the condition of an entity as a state. 
In Chapter three of the thesis the more traditional doctrinal methodology focused 
on finding the applicable legal rules, was accompanied the by problem orientated 
research centred around the examination of the issue of state failure in 
international law as well as the policy underpinning the existing law’s approach 
towards this dilemma. It was argued that the Montevideo criteria provide very 
limited support in the analysis of statehood throughout its continuing existence. 
Nevertheless, while it is clearly necessary to recognise that a state does not 
disappear due to certain characteristics that were required at its creation being no 
longer present, it is equally important to acknowledge that the transformations in 
the constitutive elements of statehood, and in particular lack of effectively 
functioning government, severely affect the ability of the state to exercise its rights 
and perform its obligations. So-called failed states although formally not deprived 
of statehood are empirically incapable of providing basic political goods to their 
populations and fulfilling their obligations towards other states. Consequently, the 
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reality of dysfunctional territorial entities which lack organised central governments 
emphasises the inadequacies of the Westphalian system of international law relying 
on the presence of fully operational states. Failed states do not fit the paradigm and 
therefore, present a great challenge for the largely static international legal order. 
The thesis has explored how the debate surrounding statehood is currently 
conducted and what implications this might have for the analysis of the 
phenomenon of state failure.  
This thesis has established that encapsulating the concept of failed state within a 
legal paradigm is somewhat problematic. Such entities are fundamentally unique 
creatures requiring specifically tailored responses to the challenges they pose. 
Accordingly, the preliminary difficulty is the fact that in a state-orientated 
international legal system, there is no standard definition of what constitutes a 
‘failed’ state and different terms are used to describe the same situation or seaming 
different ones but closely related. The common denominator of state failure is the 
loss of governmental control over states’ territory, which may, of course, vary in its 
form and extent, and which follows logically the implosion of central authority. This 
thesis took the view that it is important to distinguish between the symptoms or 
features which characterise failed states and actual legal concepts which can 
constitute their defining criteria. It has been submitted that from the international 
legal perspective, the most important element of state failure is undoubtedly the 
protracted loss of effective government. The notion of effective government is a 
constitutive element of statehood as well as a legal concept. It is therefore suitable 
for the purposes of the present analysis. Consequently, the first part of Chapter 
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three concluded with an introduction of a proposed definition of state failure which 
would be reserved for such states which as a consequence of anarchic conflicts, 
lack, either totally or partially, an effective government capable to maintain law and 
order in its territory or part of its territory, and which also lack the capacity to 
rebuild their governments by their own means. Accordingly, the level of state 
failure could be determined by reference to the degree of lack of effective 
government – with extreme cases of a complete lack of governmental authority and 
other examples where the existing power structures exercise only marginal control 
over population and territory of the State. The final part of Chapter three dealing 
with selected examples of international legal consequences of continuing existence 
of failed states provided a bridge between examination of state failure and account 
and the analysis pursued in Chapters four and five.              
For a considerable period, the international community continued to view failed 
states in terms of relatively containable humanitarian disasters with limited global 
impact beyond immediate threat to their neighbours. The rhetoric changed 
dramatically after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the wake of the 
twenty first century, failed states, as well as non-state actors operating within their 
territories, became one of the primary threats to international peace and security. 
The complex process referred to as state failure is commonly accompanied by and 
associated with armed conflict and non-state actors control over vast proportions 
of the state’s territory. This thesis introduced the analysis of legal consequences of 
continuing existence of failed state and non-state actors control over extensive 
parts of a state territory in the context of jus ad bellum with particular emphasis on 
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self-defence. Accordingly, Chapter four examined issues pertaining to the legality of 
the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors operating from the 
territories of failed states. In order to do so, it firstly identified both the relevant 
treaty law and customary international law.   
Self-defence is first and foremost an exception to the general rule prohibiting the 
use of force in states relations and accordingly, it must be constructed in the 
context of other principles of international law, and in particular territorial integrity 
and sovereign equality of states. Nevertheless, it is argued here that the credibility 
of the law depends upon its ability to address effectively the realities of 
contemporary threats. The contentiousness of the application of appropriate legal 
provisions is certainly one of the reasons why this research was undertaken, since 
its general objective is to explore what the implications of the state of the law are. 
The interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter in relation to cases involving non-
state actors and failed states remains uncertain and contested. Similarly, efforts to 
clarify the development of customary international law regarding the use of force 
against non-state actors in failed states are continuously obstructed by the 
ambiguities and inconsistencies in ongoing state practice.  
This thesis focused primarily on the legal implications relating to the use of force in 
the situations where the paradigm of traditional statehood is inapplicable. 
Accordingly, the investigation conducted in Chapter four proceeded in three main 
parts. After giving some preliminary background identifying the relevant law, the 
thesis proceeded on to the analysis of possible grounds for the exercise of the right 
of self-defence against non-state actors operating within the territories of failed 
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states. The final section of the chapter addressed applicability of the principles of 
necessity and proportionality in such circumstances. In view of the recent 
developments in state practice, it was submitted that international law must 
engage with the new reality of conflicts characterised by the presence of powerful 
non-state actors operating from the territories of states which have absolutely no 
control over their actions. Consequently, this thesis provided an in-depth analysis of 
the problems relating to strict adherence to purely state-orientated rules regarding 
the use of force.  
Chapters four and five were the crux of the thesis and concluded that, despite the 
importance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the absolute prohibition to 
exercise self-defence against non-state actors without attribution of their conduct 
to the territorial state, may not be considered as the most dominant view in the 
current international law and state practice. The supporters of a widely understood 
right of self-defence point towards the fact that Article 51 of the UN Charter does 
not explicitly identify the nature of the party responsible for the armed attack and 
that non-state actors are undoubtedly capable of perpetrating such an attack. It is 
indeed increasingly difficult to defend the argument that non-state actors lack the 
capacity to carry out transborder military operation of such ‘scale and effect’ which 
may suffice for it to be considered an ‘armed attack’. Accordingly, the growing 
support for a flexible reading of ratione personae element of ‘armed attack’ which 
may trigger the right of self-defence is driven primarily by the increasing threat 
from international terrorism as well as developments and availability of modern 
transport, weaponry and communication technology. The chapter proceeded to 
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investigate three matters of particular interest in connection to the above claim. It 
was examined if and how defensive action against non-state actors could be 
influenced by the position of the territorial state. Secondly, the chapter addressed 
the possibility of the failed states bearing the responsibility for actions of non-state 
actors by not preventing such acts and failing to comply with their due diligence 
obligations. Finally, it was examined how the two above matters influence the 
legality of defensive measures taken by the state which has fallen victim of non-
state actors’ attacks. Rather than taking a position for or against restrictive reading 
of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the thesis focused on emphasising the fact that the 
distinction between the two different issues, firstly that of attribution and secondly, 
the classification of an armed attack for the purposes of Article 51, cannot divert 
from the need for a legal basis for deployment of defensive measures against non-
state actors in possible violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of a failed 
state. 
The acceptance that there may exist some possible grounds for the deployment of 
defensive force against non-state actors operating from the territories of failed 
states is only the first step in the examination of self-defence in this context. In view 
of this, the second part of Chapter four aimed to contribute towards the debate 
regarding the parameters and application of self-defence focusing specifically on 
the principles of necessity and proportionality. It has been submitted that in order 
to apply to the defensive measures employed against non-state actors in failed 
states, various aspects of necessity and proportionality need to be reconsidered 
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and perhaps even modified. Nevertheless, their role remains crucial in discussions 
regarding self-defence against non-state actors located in failed states.    
Despite the fact that the international community continues to perpetuate a notion 
of ‘statehood’ which allows the state-centric system of international law to exist, 
when dealing with practical and political realities of state failure, international law 
may no longer consider external sovereignty of states as an undeniable entitlement 
to statehood. Recent state practice with regard to the use of force against non-
state actors operating within failed states appears to support this conclusion. 
Accordingly, although the ‘statehood’ of failed states remains uncontested, their 
sovereignty is increasingly considered to be dependent on the existence of effective 
governments and recent cases of military interventions in the exercise of self-
defence indicate a clear movement beyond sovereignty-driven reluctance in the use 
of force in states’ relations. This thesis argued that the analysis of selected state 
practice appears to suggest that failed states considerably changed the modern 
landscape of peace and security. Nevertheless, the exact consequences and the 
impact of this change in international law are yet to be fully explored. 
The penultimate Chapter of this thesis examined selected examples of post 9/11 
state practice in pursuit of an answer to the question whether there exists an 
increasing dissonance between the absolute prohibition of the use of defensive 
force against non-state actors in failed states and the practice of states in this 
regard. In particular, it was examined if and how the lack of effective government 
and inability to fulfil international obligations by failed states influenced states’ 
reactions towards armed attacks perpetrated solely by non-state actors. The main 
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purpose of Chapter five was to complement the analysis conducted in the 
preceding chapter by putting the factual situations of failed States into the 
particular context of the legal framework relating to the use of force in self-defence 
in states relations.  Consequently, the analysis carried out in this Chapter aims to 
contribute towards the discussion regarding the state practice with respect to the 
exercise the right of self-defence absent state imputability. 
It was concluded that in the post 9/11 state practice the trend is crystallising which 
points towards perception of sovereignty as responsibility in justifying the military 
response against non-state actors. It has been more commonly argued by the victim 
states that state failure to discharge their international obligations in respect of 
exercising control over their territory and population and preventing non-state 
actors’ attacks, may trigger the victim state right to self-defence.  It does not appear 
that states are willing to apply more lenient standard towards failed states with 
respect to the latter due diligence obligations under international law. The 
examples of state practice discussed in Chapter five also point towards the fact that 
states increasingly recognise the right to self-defence against non-state actors 
irrespective of the territorial state’s responsibility for the attack. 
Chapter five further investigated to what extent state practice reflects the existing 
law analysed previously as well as whether it may be contributing to the emergence 
of new rules of customary international law. The thesis argued that state practice is 
hardly uniformed and consolidated. It is often the case that states do not explicitly 
condemn military operation against non-state actors as unlawful. Nevertheless, this 
does not obviously imply that the victim states’ justification for the intervention 
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remains uncontested. The analysis of recent state practice seems to support the 
conclusion that it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain the claim that 
international law absolutely prohibits the use of defensive force against non-state 
actors. Nevertheless, states remain conflicted as to when such force can be 
employed and is lawful. 
Lastly, this thesis posed a question whether state failure has in fact contributed to 
shaping various incipient doctrines relating to the use of force in self-defence. Put 
differently it has asked whether the implicit or explicit invocation of the state 
weakness and incapacity to act provides sufficient legal basis for the intervention in 
self-defence. This thesis took the view that states increasingly put forward the 
inability and/or unwillingness scenario as a justification for the use of defensive 
force against non-state actors located in the territory of failed states. The 
conclusion, nevertheless, emphasised the fact that although there may be an 
agreement regarding the existence of the standard in principle, there is hardly a 
broad consensus regarding its application and that it provides sufficient legal basis 
for the use of defensive force against non-state actors in failed states. This thesis 
has accordingly taken a position that it should be acknowledged that the criteria of 
necessity and proportionality are here to play an increasingly important role in 
restraining the military action against non-state actors. Hence the reaction of 
international community is very much dependent upon whether the defensive 
response to a sufficiently grave attack is considered to be necessary and 
proportionate. This thesis therefore generally concluded that the exact scope of the 
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